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11/1/25

 




The Safety and Quality of Health Care

53CHAPTER 8

quality of care delivered in the United States to date. The results were

sobering. The authors found that, across a wide range of quality parameters, patients in the United States received only 55% of recommended

care overall; there was little variation by subtype, with scores of 54%

for preventive care, 54% for acute care, and 56% for care of chronic

conditions. The authors concluded that, in broad terms, the chances

of getting high-quality care in the United States were little better than

those of winning a coin flip.

Work from the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care evaluating geographic variation in use and quality of care demonstrates that, despite

large variations in utilization, there is no positive correlation between

the two variables at the regional level. An array of data demonstrate,

however, that providers with larger volumes for specific conditions,

especially for surgical conditions, do have better outcomes.

Strategies for Improving Quality and Performance Many

specific strategies can be used to improve quality at the individual level,

including rationing, education, feedback, incentives, and penalties.

Rationing has been effective in some specific areas, such as persuading

physicians to prescribe within a formulary, but it generally has been

resisted. Education is effective in the short run and is necessary for

changing opinions, but its effect decays fairly rapidly with time. Feedback on performance can be given at either the group or the individual

level. Feedback is most effective if it is individualized and is given in

close temporal proximity to the original events. Incentives can be effective, and many believe that they will prove to be a key to improving

quality, especially if pay-for-performance with sufficient incentives is

broadly implemented (see below). Penalties produce provider resentment and are rarely used in health care.

Another set of strategies for improving quality involves changing

the systems of care. An example would be introducing reminders

about which specific actions need to be taken at a visit for a specific

patient—a strategy that has been demonstrated to improve performance in certain situations, such as the delivery of preventive services.

Another approach that has been effective is the development of “bundles” or groups of quality measures that can be implemented together

with a high degree of fidelity. Many hospitals have implemented a

bundle for ventilator-associated pneumonia in the intensive care unit

that includes five measures (e.g., ensuring that the head of the bed

is elevated). These hospitals have been able to improve performance

substantially. Another technique is SCAMPs, or Standardized Clinical

Assessment and Management Plans. These are care guidelines developed by clinicians who identify key steps in workflow and decisions to

help improve the process outcomes.

Perhaps the most pressing need is to improve the quality of care

for chronic diseases. The Chronic Care Model has been developed by

Wagner and colleagues (Fig. 8-3); it suggests that a combination of

strategies is necessary (including self-management support, changes

in delivery system design, decision support, and information systems)

and that these strategies must be delivered by a practice team composed of several providers, not just a physician.

Available evidence about the relative efficacy of strategies in reducing hemoglobin A1c (HbA1c) in outpatient diabetes care supports this

general premise. It is especially notable that the outcome was the

HbA1c level, as it has generally been much more difficult to improve

outcome measures than process measures (such as whether HbA1c was

measured). In this meta-analysis, a variety of strategies were effective,

but the most effective ones were the use of team changes and the use

of a case manager. When cost-effectiveness is considered in addition, it

appears likely that an amalgam of strategies will be needed. However,

the more expensive strategies, such as the use of case managers, probably will be implemented widely only if pay-for-performance takes hold.

The evidence linking better performance on quality metrics assessing process and outcomes varies greatly by condition. For example,

there is strong evidence that performing Pap smears results in better

outcomes in patients who develop cervical cancer, but the evidence for

many other conditions is far more tenuous.

National State of Quality Measurement In the inpatient setting, quality measurement is now being performed by a very large

proportion of hospitals for several conditions, including myocardial

infarction, congestive heart failure, pneumonia, and surgical infection

prevention; 20 measures are included in all. This is the result of the

Hospital Quality Initiative, which represents a collaboration among

many entities, including the Hospital Quality Alliance, The Joint Commission, the National Quality Forum, and the Agency for Healthcare

Research and Quality. The data are housed at the Centers for Medicare

and Medicaid Services, which publicly releases performance data on

the measures on a website called Hospital Compare (www.cms.gov/

Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/HospitalQualityInits/HospitalCompare.html). These data are reported voluntarily and are available for a very high proportion of the nation’s hospitals.

Analyses demonstrate substantial regional variation in quality and

important differences among hospitals. Analyses by The Joint Commission for similar indicators reveal that performance on measures by

hospitals has improved over time and that, as might be hoped, lower

performers have improved more than higher performers.

Public Reporting Overall, public reporting of quality data is

becoming increasingly common. There are now commercial websites

that have quality-related data for most regions of the United States, and

Act

Plan

Do

Check

Adopt or abandon

strategies based

on results

Identify potential

improvement

strategies

Try out

strategies

Measure

effectiveness

of strategies

FIGURE 8-2 Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle. This approach can be used to improve

a specific process rapidly. First, planning is undertaken, and several potential

improvement strategies are identified. Next, these strategies are evaluated in

small “tests of change.” “Checking” entails measuring whether the strategies have

appeared to make a difference, and “acting” refers to acting on the results.

Productive

interactions

Informed,

activated

patient

Prepared,

proactive

practice team

Improved Outcomes

Selfmanagement

Support

Delivery

system

design

Decision

support

Clinical

information

systems

Community

Resources and policies

Health System

Organization of health care

FIGURE 8-3 The Chronic Care Model, which focuses on improving care for

chronic diseases, suggests that (1) delivery of high-quality care requires a range

of strategies that must closely involve and engage the patient and (2) team care is

essential. (From EH Wagner et al: Eff Clin Pract 1:2, 1998.)


54PART 1 The Profession of Medicine

Diagnosing patients’ illnesses is the essence of medicine. Patients

present to doctors seeking an answer to the question, “What is wrong

with me?” Ideally, no clinician would want to treat a patient without

knowing the diagnosis or, worse yet, erroneously treat a misdiagnosed

illness. From the earliest moments of medical school, the defining

quest toward becoming a knowledgeable and proficient physician

is learning how to put a diagnostic label on patients’ symptoms and

physical findings, and clinicians pride themselves on being “good

diagnosticians.” Yet the centuries-old paradigm of mastering a long

list of diseases, understanding their pathophysiology, and knowing the

cardinal ways they manifest themselves in signs and symptoms, while

still of fundamental importance, is being challenged by new insights

illuminated by the glaring spotlight of diagnostic errors. Basic internal

medicine diseases, such as asthma, pulmonary embolism, congestive heart failure, seizures, strokes, ruptured aneurysms, depression,

and cancer, are misdiagnosed at shockingly high rates, often with

20–50% of patients either being mislabeled as having these conditions

(false-positive diagnoses) or having their diagnosis missed or delayed

(false negatives). How and why do physicians so often get it wrong,

and what can we do to both diagnose and treat the problem of delayed

diagnosis or misdiagnosis?

Diagnosis is both an ancient art and a modern science. The current

science of diagnosis, however, goes far beyond what typically comes to

clinicians’ and patients’ minds when they conjure up images of stateof-the-art molecular, genetic, or imaging technologies. Improvements

in diagnosis are just as likely to come from other areas, many with

origins outside of medicine, as they are from advanced diagnostic

testing modalities. These diverse sciences that the field of diagnostic

safety has, and must, draw from include systems and human factors

9 Diagnosis: Reducing

Errors and Improving

Quality

Gordon Schiff

these data can be accessed for a fee. Similarly, national data for hospitals are available. The evidence to date indicates that patients have not

made much use of such data, but that the data have had an important

effect on provider and organization behavior. Instead, patients have

relied on provider reputation to make choices, partly because little

information was available until very recently and the information that

was available was not necessarily presented in ways that were easy for

patients to access. Problems still exist with quality metrics; many can be

“gamed,” and even though providers are now nearly universally using

electronic health records (EHRs), most metrics come from claims that

include many inaccuracies. More metrics that leverage EHRs are sorely

needed. However, many authorities think that, as more information

about quality becomes available, it will become increasingly central to

patients’ choices about where to access care.

Pay-for-Performance Currently, providers in the United States

get paid the same amount for a specific service, regardless of the quality of care delivered. The pay-for-performance theory suggests that, if

providers are paid more for higher-quality care, they will invest in strategies that enable them to deliver that care. The current key issues in the

pay-for-performance debate relate to (1) how effective it is, (2) what

levels of incentives are needed, and (3) what perverse consequences

are produced. The evidence on effectiveness is limited, although a

number of studies are ongoing. With respect to incentive levels, most

quality-based performance incentives have accounted for merely 1–2%

of total payment in the United States to date. In the United Kingdom,

however, 40% of general practitioners’ salaries have been placed at

risk according to performance across a wide array of parameters;

this approach has been associated with substantial improvements in

reported quality performance, although it is still unclear to what extent

this change represents better performance versus better reporting. The

potential for perverse consequences exists with any incentive scheme.

One problem is that, if incentives are tied to outcomes, there may be a

tendency to transfer the sickest patients to other providers and systems.

Another concern is that providers will pay too much attention to quality measures with incentives and ignore the rest of the quality picture.

The validity of these concerns remains to be determined. Nonetheless,

it appears likely that, under health care reform, the use of various payfor-performance schemes is likely to increase.

■ CONCLUSIONS

The safety and quality of care in the United States could be improved

substantially. A number of available interventions have been shown

to improve the safety of care and should be used more widely; others

are undergoing evaluation or soon will be. Quality also could be dramatically better, and the science of quality improvement continues to

mature. Implementation of value-based approaches such as accountable

care that include pay-for-performance related to safety and quality

should make it much easier for organizations to justify investments in

improving safety and quality parameters, including health information

technology. However, many improvements will also require changing

the structure of care—e.g., moving to a more team-oriented approach

and ensuring that patients are more involved in their own care. Payment

reform focusing on value seems very likely to progress and will likely

include both positive incentives and penalties related to safety and

quality performance. Measures of safety are still relatively immature

and could be made much more robust; it would be particularly useful

if organizations had measures they could use in routine operations to

assess safety at a reasonable cost, and substantial research is addressing

this. Although the quality measures available are more robust than

those for safety, they still cover a relatively small proportion of the entire

domain of quality, and more measures need to be developed. The public

and payers are demanding better information about safety and quality

as well as better performance in these areas. The clear implication is that

these domains will have to be addressed directly by providers.

■ FURTHER READING

Bates DW et al: Effect of computerized physician order entry and a

team intervention on prevention of serious medication errors. JAMA

280:1311, 1998.

Bates DW et al: Two decades since to err is human: An assessment

of progress and emerging priorities in patient safety. Health Aff

(Millwood) 37:1736, 2018.

Berwick DM: Era 3 for medicine and health care. JAMA 315:1329,

2016.

Brennan TA et al: Incidence of adverse events and negligence in hospitalized patients. Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I. N

Engl J Med 324:370, 1991.

Chertow GM et al: Guided medication dosing for inpatients with

renal insufficiency. JAMA 286:2839, 2001.

Institute of Medicine. Report: To err is human: Building a safer

health system. 1999. https://www.nap.edu/resource/9728/To-Err-isHuman-1999--report-brief.pdf.

Institute of Medicine. Crossing the quality chasm: A new health

system for the 21st century. 2001. https://www.nap.edu/catalog/10027/

crossing-the-quality-chasm-a-new-health-system-for-the.

Landrigan C et al: Effect of reducing interns’ work hours on serious

medical errors in intensive care units. N Engl J Med 351:1838, 2004.

McGlynn EA et al: The quality of health care delivered to adults in the

United States. N Engl J Med 348:2635, 2003.

Pronovost P et al: An intervention to decrease catheter-related bloodstream infections in the ICU. N Engl J Med 355:2725, 2006. Erratum

in: N Engl J Med 356:2660, 2007.

Starmer AJ et al: Rates of medical errors and preventable adverse

events among hospitalized children following implementation of a

resident handoff bundle. JAMA 310:2262, 2013.


Diagnosis: Reducing Errors and Improving Quality

55CHAPTER 9

can also lead to biases and errors. Table 9-2 lists some of the common

cognitive biases that can lead diagnosis astray (this topic is discussed

further in Chap. 4).

However, clinicians will also benefit from having a better understanding of diagnosis as a “system” rather than just what takes place in

clinicians’ minds. Classic teaching exhorting trainees and practicing

physicians to have a broad differential and “high index of suspicion”

for various diseases is challenged not only by these unconscious biases

but also by limitations of human memory, information shortfalls,

constrained encounter time, system process failures, and the myriad

nonspecific symptoms that patients bring to clinicians. Many symptoms are self-limited, defy a precise diagnosis or etiology, and do not

portend harmful outcomes. Insights from safety and cognitive sciences

call for rethinking traditional approaches to diagnosis and suggest new

approaches to overcome current limitations (Table 9-3).

■ UNCERTAINTY IN DIAGNOSIS

Given variations and overlap in ways patients present, illnesses evolve,

and tests perform, it is often not possible or practical to “make” a

definitive diagnosis, particularly in the primary care setting early

in the course of a patient’s illness. Clinicians need to harness these

uncertainties to both engineer situational awareness of where things

Diagnostic

Process

Failures

Delayed,

Missed,

or Wrong

Diagnosis

Adverse

Outcomes

FIGURE 9-1 What is a diagnosis error? (Adapted from GD Schiff et al: Diagnosing

diagnosis errors: Lessons from a multi-institutional collaborative project, in

Advances in Patient Safety: from Research to Implementation. Vol. 2 Concepts and

Methodology, Rockville, MD, 2005, pp. 255-278, and GD Schiff, L Leape: Acad Med

87:135, 2012.)

TABLE 9-1 National Academy of Medicine Recommendations for

Improving Diagnosis in Health Care

1. Facilitate more effective teamwork in the diagnostic process among health

care professionals, patients, and their families.

2. Enhance professional education and training in the diagnostic process in

areas such as clinical reasoning; teamwork; communication with patients,

families, and other health care professionals; and appropriate use of

diagnostic tests.

3. Ensure that health information technologies support patients and health care

professionals in the diagnostic process.

4. Develop and deploy approaches to identify, learn from, and reduce diagnostic

errors and near misses in clinical practice including providing systematic

feedback on diagnostic performance.

5. Establish a work system and culture that supports the diagnostic process and

improvements in diagnostic performance.

6. Develop a reporting environment and medical liability system that facilitates

improved diagnosis by learning from diagnostic errors and near misses.

7. Design a payment and care delivery environment that supports the diagnostic

process.

8. Provide dedicated funding for research on the diagnostic process and

diagnostic errors.

engineering, reliability science, cognitive psychology, decision sciences,

forensic science, clinical epidemiology, health services research, decision analysis, network medicine, learning health systems theory, medical sociology, team dynamics and communication, risk assessment and

communication, information and knowledge management, and health

information technology, especially artificial intelligence and clinical

decision support. A clinician reading this chapter is likely to find this

list of overlapping and intersecting domains quite daunting. However,

rather than feeling overwhelmed, we urge readers to view them as the

basic science supports that will ultimately make their lives easier and

diagnosis more accurate and timely. Rather than feeling intimidated,

clinicians should feel a sense of relief and assurance in understanding

that good diagnosis does not rest entirely on their shoulders. Instead,

it is a systems property, where an infrastructure and a team, one that

especially includes the patient, can in a coordinated way work together

to achieve more reliable and optimal diagnosis.

■ EMERGENCE OF DIAGNOSIS ERROR AS AN

IMPORTANT PATIENT SAFETY ISSUE

Over the past decade, a series of studies culminating in a landmark

report from the U.S. National Academy of Medicine (NAM), Improving

Diagnosis in Health Care, have shone a spotlight on diagnostic errors.

Reports from patient surveys, malpractice claims, and safety organizations, such as the ECRI and the National Patient Safety Foundation

(now part of Institute for Healthcare Improvement), have found that

diagnostic errors are the leading type of medical error. Although errors

in diagnosis are defined in various ways, the NAM Committee defined

diagnostic error as “the failure to (a) establish an accurate and timely

explanation of the patient’s health problem(s) or (b) communicate that

explanation to the patient.” One way to visualize diagnostic errors is

through a Venn diagram (Fig. 9-1), which illustrates the fact that many

things can go wrong in the diagnostic process (e.g., failure to ask an

important history question, physical examination sign overlooked, laboratory specimen erroneously switched between two patients, x-ray not

followed up), but this usually does not result in a wrong diagnosis or

patient harm. Similarly, a patient can be misdiagnosed but unharmed,

without any identifiable error in the care received. Our greatest concern is where these three circles intersect, with conservative estimates

suggesting that 40,000–80,000 patients die each year in U.S. hospitals

alone from diagnostic errors. The NAM report outlined eight recommendations that are the foundation for this chapter (Table 9-1).

■ NEW WAYS TO THINK ABOUT DIAGNOSIS AND

DIAGNOSTIC ERRORS

Medical textbooks have historically given attention to “clinician

reasoning” and associated cognitive heuristics and biases. Errors

in clinical reasoning can be summarized in three broad groups: (1)

hasty judgments, (2) biased judgments, and (3) inaccurate probability

estimates. Research from cognitive psychology has identified scores

of common mental shortcuts or “heuristics” humans are prone to use

in everyday life, many of which are useful for efficient diagnosis but

TABLE 9-2 Selected Cognitive Biases Contributing to Diagnostic

Errors

1. Premature closure: accepting a diagnosis before it has been fully verified

2. Anchoring: tendency to fixate on a specific symptom or piece of information

early in the diagnostic process with subsequent failure to appropriately

adjust

3. Confirmation bias: tendency to look for confirming evidence to support one’s

diagnostic hypothesis, rather than disconfirming evidence to refute it

4. Search satisficing: tendency to call off a search, satisfied once a piece of

data or presumed explanation is found, and not considering/searching for

additional findings or diagnoses

5. Availability bias: tendency to give too much weight to diagnoses that come

more readily to mind (e.g., recent dramatic case)

6. Base-rate neglect: failing to adequately take into account prevalence of a

particular disease (e.g., erroneously interpreting a positive test as indicating

disease in a low-prevalence population using a test with 5% false-positive

rate)

7. Knowledge deficit (on part of provider, with accompanying lack of

awareness)

8. Framing bias: Judgement overly influenced by the way the problem was

presented (how it was framed in words, settings, situations)

9. Social/demographic/stereotype bias: biases from personal or cultural beliefs

about women, minorities, or other patient groups for whom prejudices may

distort diagnostic assessment


56PART 1 The Profession of Medicine

TABLE 9-3 New Models for Conceptualizing Diagnosis and Diagnosis Improvement

TRADITIONAL WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT DIAGNOSIS

AND DIAGNOSTIC ERROR NEW PARADIGMS/BETTER WAYS TO THINK ABOUT DIAGNOSIS AND IMPROVING DIAGNOSIS

General

A good diagnostician gets it right the first time, almost all

of the time

Diagnosis is an inexact science with inherent uncertainties

Goal is to minimize errors and delays via more reliable systems and follow-up

Lore of masterful/skillful academic expert diagnostician

who knows/recalls everything; need to look to them if

seeking diagnostic excellence

Less reliance on (fallible) human memory

Quality diagnosis is based on well-coordinated distributed network/team of people and reliable processes

All patients entitled to receive quality diagnosis, regardless of where and from whom they receive care

Diagnosis is the doctor’s job Co-production of diagnosis among clinicians (including lab, radiology, specialists, nurses, social workers)

and, especially, the patient and family

Patients often viewed as overly anxious, exaggerating,

time-consuming, questioning, with sometimes

unreasonable demands and expectations

Patients are key allies in diagnosis; hold key information

Need to address understandable/legitimate fears, desires for explanations

Leveraging patient questions and questioning of diagnosis to stimulate rethinking the diagnosis where

needed

Diagnosis and treatment as separate stages in patient care

(i.e., make a diagnosis, then treat)

Prioritizing diagnostic efforts to target treatable conditions

More integrated strategies and timing for testing and treatment depending on urgency for treatment

Clinical practices

Order lots of tests to avoid missing diagnoses Judicious ordering: targeted, well-organized data and testing

Appreciation of test limitations (false positive or negative, incidental findings, overdiagnosis, test risks)

and resulting harms

More referrals to avoid missing rarer/specialized

diagnoses; concomitant utilization barriers (copays, prior

authorization) to minimize overuse

“Pull systems” to lower barriers and make it easier to pose questions, obtain real-time virtual consults

Co-management approaches to enable collaborative watch-and-wait conservative strategies where

appropriate

Frequent empirical drug trials when uncertain of diagnosis Conservative use of drugs to avoid confusing clinical picture or labeling patients with diseases they may

not have

Physician attention/efforts to ensure disease screening Automating, delegating clerical functions; teamwork to free up physician cognitive time

Diagnosis errors and challenges

Diagnostic error viewed as a personal failing

Errors classified as either “system” or “cognitive”

Many errors/delays rooted in processes and system design/failures

Errors multifactorial with interwoven, interacting, and inseparable cognitive and system factors

Errors are infrequent; hit-and-miss ways to learn about

errors

Errors are common; systematic proactive follow-up is needed to recognize potential for errors

Surveilling of high-risk situations and one’s own diagnostic performance and outcomes

Clinicians’ reactions: denial, defensive, others to blame,

pointing to others also making similar errors

Culture of actively and nondefensively seeking to uncover, dig deep to learn from, and share errors and

lessons

Dreading complex, frustrating diagnostic dilemmas Welcoming/enjoying intellectual/professional challenges

Adequate support (time, help, consultations) for more complex patients

Diagnoses as distinct labels, events Diagnoses can be indistinct, interacting comorbidities, socially constructed, multifactorial, evolving over

time, or have overlapping genotype-phenotype expressions

Documentation/communication

Viewed as time-consuming, mindless, primarily to

document for billing code and/or bulwark against

malpractice claims

Documentation as useful tool for reflecting, crafting, sharing assessments, differential diagnosis,

reflecting about unanswered questions

Opportunities for decision support interacting with computer

Notes open for patients to read to help understand and critique diagnosis

Say and write as little as possible about uncertainties, lest

it be used against you in malpractice allegation

Share uncertainties to maximize communication and engagement with other caregivers, patients

Don’t let patient know about errors so they don’t become

angry, mistrustful, or sue

Patients have right to honest disclosure; often find out about errors anyway (e.g., cancer evolves);

anticipate, engage their concerns

Patients advised to call if not better; no news is good news

(test results: “We’ll call if anything is abnormal.”)

Systematic proactive follow-up to close loop on tests and symptoms, to check how patient is doing,

monitor outcomes

Global remedies

Knowing/memorizing more medical knowledge Knowing more about the patient (including psychosocial, past history, environmental contexts)

Attention to the “objective” data (physical exam, tests) to

reliably make diagnoses

Renewed emphasis on history, history-taking, listening

Acknowledgement of ubiquitous subjective cognitive biases; efforts to anticipate, recognize, counteract

Exhortations to have “high index of suspicion” of various

diagnoses

Less reliance on memory recall of lectures/reading; more just-in-time info look-up

Affordances, alerts to red flags engineered into workflow

Delineation of “don’t miss” diagnoses with design of context-relevant decision support reminders

Ensuring physician is copied on everything, thorough/

voluminous notes, widespread reminders/alerts

Biggest problem is no longer lack of access to information, but rather information overload; strategies to

organize, minimize

Continuing medical education (CME) courses to expand

medical knowledge

Real-time, context-aware reminders of pitfalls, critical differential diagnoses, and key differentiating

features.

Ready access to medical references, second opinions

(Continued)


 


Global Diversity of Health System Financing and Delivery

49CHAPTER 7

privately structured GP-based primary care is more efficient and effective than various clinic-based forms of primary care services. Recent

movement in Northern and Central Europe toward more private GPs,

along with continued private office–based primary care in much of

Canada, the United States, and economically developed countries in

Asia, raises complex policy issues for international organizations like

the World Health Organization (WHO), as well as national policymakers. In the hospital sector, existing levels of clinical quality and patient

responsiveness in publicly operated command-and-control institutions

will increasingly have to compete with those of semi-autonomous public hospitals, as well as various types of private, sometimes very innovative providers. In the financing arena, continued pressure on publicly

raised health system revenues is likely to erode longtime commitments

in some tax-funded health systems to minimal patient copayments and

low out-of-pocket funding.

An additional set of challenges will arise from recent commitments

by international organizations like WHO to restructure health systems

in developed countries to better address the social determinants of

health. This new, incomplete strategy calls for a dramatic expansion of

health sector responsibility to include a wide range of existing institutional arrangements in housing, education, work-life, and social and

political decision-making. The influential 2010 Strategic Review of

Health Inequalities in England entitled “Fair Society, Healthy Lives,”

led by Sir Michael Marmot, a British epidemiologist, called for the

elimination of all “inequities in power, money, and resources.” Separate

from the political dimensions of this proposed new paradigm, how

such fundamental societal change will be funded and implemented has

yet to be addressed.

Looking forward, among the most essential challenges to national

decision-makers in the coming period will be four specific health system imperatives:

1. Finding a more sustainable balance between ethics and funding.

Policymakers in publicly funded health systems face a growing

gap between patient expectations of high-quality clinical care, staff

expectations of better compensation, and the economic imperative

of no new taxes. Recent research has suggested that SHI-funded

health systems, faced with increasing aging and thus proportionally

fewer employed, face a similar gap. While the present solidaristic

foundation for raising collective revenues is insufficient, available

nonsolidaristic tools (copayments, supplemental insurance, private

pay) inevitably contribute to overall inequality. But what then are the

realistic policy alternatives? The minimalist new policy goal necessarily will have to become one of raising new revenues while doing

the least economic and social harm.

2. Developing better strategies to steer provider diversity.

Health systems in developed countries are becoming more diverse

with more and different types of public owners: hospital trusts, state

enterprises, and mixed public-private hospital owners/managers.

There also are more and different types of private providers: not-forprofit community groups, foundations, and cooperatives, as well as

for-profit small local entrepreneurs, large international companies,

and risk capital funds (venture capital). Furthermore, new innovative delivery models are reorganizing traditional service boundaries:

not-for-profit private nursing homes in the Netherlands also provide

outpatient primary care to neighborhood elderly patients, as well

as hospice care; Israeli technology companies combine high-tech

home-based patient monitoring with standard medical and custodial home care services. Public pressure from citizens for more

choice and better outcomes will pressure policymakers toward new,

more accommodative health system arrangements. A 2019 national

government report in Sweden on the hospital sector recommended

a new emphasis on better access to out-of-office hours and out-ofhospital acute care by private as well as public providers.

3. Ensuring better coordination between social and health services.

Tax-funded and SHI-funded systems alike are under intense policy

pressure to develop better strategies to integrate services for the

chronically ill elderly, as a way to improve the quality of services

that these patients receive and to keep them at home healthier and

longer, reducing expensive acute visits to hospitals and emergency

departments. The clear delivery system goal will increasingly be to

keep the elderly out of nursing homes and acute care facilities for as

long as possible.

4. Building labor unions into provider innovation.

In many developed countries, health sector staff, including hospital

physicians, are members of labor unions. Effective policymaking

will require finding mechanisms to build these personnel unions

into accelerated health system restructuring processes. This process

will necessarily involve integrating unions into more innovative,

flexible, fiscally sustainable organizational arrangements with contracts that reward active participation in organizational change,

contracts that pay incentives to more productive employees, quicker

reassignment and redundancy procedures (firing health sector

workers can take a year or longer in some European health systems),

and establishing profit-sharing payments to teams/unions, also in

public sector organizations.

While the structure and complexity of resolving these specific organizational challenges will vary depending on a country’s cultural and

institutional context, the commonality of these problems suggests that

health systems in the developed world require a new, broader range of

targeted policy strategies and solutions.

■ FINANCING AND PROVIDING HEALTH SERVICES

IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (See also Chap. 474)

Health systems in developing countries reflect a complex combination

of the same core elements found in developed country systems (hospitals, primary care facilities, medical staff, pharmaceuticals) adapted to

different, widely varying organizational, social, political, and economic

contexts and conditions. System structure and provider institutions

typically vary by differing national characteristics including historical

relationships (Anglophone/Francophone/Hispanic/Soviet Semashko/

American institutional and educational links); GDP and per capita

annual national income (low- or middle-income developing countries);

political norms and values; and ethnic and/or cultural mix. Predominantly public sector funding, particularly in lower-income countries,

typically generates substantially lower levels of resources per capita

than in developed countries and tends to be less reliable, particularly

in countries where the economy is dependent on commodity exports.

Service delivery arrangements in developing countries, in turn,

typically have higher provider-to-population ratios as well as, in

public sector institutions, more mixed quality of care. In a number of

middle-income developing countries, migration of trained medical

staff to practice in higher-paying developed country health systems

(often going to countries with historical relationships and/or where

they received advanced training) further depletes available medical

resources. In nearly all developing countries, private sector providers play an important supplemental role, with some middle-income

developing countries like China currently encouraging their further

development.

Most middle- and lower-income developing countries struggle to

fund high-quality individual health services. Recent emphasis on universal health coverage has intensified that struggle. In middle-income

developing countries (Table 7-3), World Bank data from 2016 show

TABLE 7-3 Middle-Income Developing Countries: Total Health

Expenditure (% of gross domestic product)

Middle-Income Developing Countries

Kazakhstan 3.53%

Thailand 3.71%

Malaysia 3.80%

Turkey 4.31%

China 4.98%

Botswana 5.46%

Mexico 5.47%

Colombia 5.91%


50PART 1 The Profession of Medicine

TABLE 7-4 Low-Income Developing Countries: Total Health

Expenditure (% of gross domestic product)

Low-Income Developing Countries

Nigeria 3.65%

India 3.66%

Ethiopia 3.97%

Nepal 6.29%

Honduras 8.40%

TABLE 7-5 Middle-Income Developing Countries: Per Capita Health

Expenditures

Middle-Income Developing Countries

Thailand $221

Kazakhstan $262

Colombia $340

Malaysia $361

Botswana $379

China $398

Mexico $461

Turkey $468

TABLE 7-6 Low-Income Developing Countries: Per Capital Health

Expenditures

Low-Income Developing Countries

Ethiopia $27

Nepal $45

India $62

Nigeria $79

Honduras $199

a range of health expenditure rates as a percentage of GDP, including

Kazakhstan at 3.53% of GDP, Thailand at 3.71%, Malaysia at 3.80%,

Turkey at 4.31%, China at 4.98%, Botswana at 5.46%, Mexico at 5.47%,

and Colombia at 5.91%. Total health spending in low-income developing countries (Table 7-4) ranges from 3.65% of GDP for Nigeria, 3.66%

for India, 3.97% for Ethiopia, 6.29% for Nepal, to 8.40% for Honduras.

Given lower aggregate GDP levels, per capita annual expenditures

are considerably less than those found in developed countries. In

middle-income developing countries (Table 7-5), Thailand spent (2016

data in adjusted USD) $221 annually per person, Kazakhstan spent

$262, Colombia spent $340, Malaysia spent $361, Botswana spent $379,

China spent $398, Mexico spent $461, and Turkey spent $468. Among

low-income developing countries (Table 7-6), Ethiopia spent $27 per

person annually, Nepal spent $45, India spent $62, and Nigeria spent

$79, whereas Honduras spent $199.

China provides an interesting example of financing and service

delivery development in middle-income developing countries. Financing reforms replaced fully publicly funded services with three new

arrangements tied to work status and residence: (1) Urban Employee

Basic Medical Insurance in 1998 (incorporating privately funded medical savings accounts—a concept pioneered in Singapore); (2) Urban

Resident Basic Medical Insurance in 2007; and (3) New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme in 2007. The urban employee program is an

SHI model reflecting the rapid rate of economic growth and increasing

incomes for urban workers. Starting in 2013, the Chinese government

increasingly emphasized the development of new private hospitals and

promotion of private insurance in urban areas. These and other health

sector reforms became possible as continued strong economic growth

over 30 years raised an estimated 300 million Chinese into the middle

class, generating the requisite private as well as public revenues to

underpin major structural health sector change.

Service delivery in developing countries varies widely in access,

quality, and outcomes across and also within many developing countries. Medical services and tertiary institutions in urban areas of China,

for example, operate at a substantially higher standard of service than

those typically available in poorer rural regions. Similar disparities

exist in wealthier parts of India such as Rajasthan, whereas in poorer

states such as Bihar, primary care is mostly delivered by community

“volunteers” with basic medical training, supervised by a GP.

Two critical challenges for all developing country health systems

are contingent on generating adequate future funding flows. First, the

current push from United Nations agencies to achieve universal health

coverage will require additional public and private sector funding to

pay for the necessary new providers and services. Second, available

funding will need to be more effectively targeted on needed and appropriate services, with minimized managerial inefficiencies and substantially less political corruption.

Both forms of expanded funding will be dependent on strong

national and global economic growth, which in turn will require continued country-level economic and political reforms. Achieving both

funding-related objectives will require considerable international as

well as national effort.

■ FURTHER READING

Barber SL et al: Price Setting and Price Regulation in Health Care:

Lessons for Advancing Universal Health Coverage. Geneva, World

Health Organization, Organization for Economic Co-operation

and Development, 2019. https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/han

dle/10665/325547/9789241515924-eng.pdf.

Figueras J, McKee M (eds): Health Systems, Health, Wealth, and

Societal Well-Being: Assessing the Case for Investing in Health Systems.

Maidenhead, Open University Press/McGraw-Hill Education, 2011.

www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/164383/e96159.pdf.

Haseltine W: Affordable Excellence: The Singapore Health Story.

Washington, Brookings Institution Press, 2013. www.brookings.edu/

wp-www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/AffordableExcellencePDF.pdf.

Kuhlmann E et al (eds): The Palgrave International Handbook on

Healthcare Policy and Governance. London, Palgrave MacMillan,

2015.

Rice T et al: United States of America: Health System Review. Health in

Transition (HiT) Series 15 (3). Brussels, European Observatory on

Health Systems and Policies, 2013. www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/

pdf_file/0019/215155/HiT-United-States-of-America.pdf.

Safety and quality are two of the central dimensions of health care. In

recent years, it has become easier to measure safety and quality, and

it is increasingly clear that performance in both dimensions could be

much better. The public is—with good justification—demanding measurement and accountability, and payment for services will increasingly

be based on performance in these areas. Thus, physicians must learn

about these two domains, how they can be improved, and the relative

strengths and limitations of the current ability to measure them.

Safety and quality are closely related but do not completely overlap.

The Institute of Medicine has suggested in a seminal series of reports

that safety is the first part of quality and that the health care system

must first and foremost guarantee that it will deliver safe care, although

quality is also pivotal. In the end, it is likely that more net clinical

8 The Safety and Quality of

Health Care

David W. Bates


The Safety and Quality of Health Care

51CHAPTER 8

action when one is interrupted partway through it by a page, for example. Approaches that may be helpful in this area include minimizing

interruptions and setting up tools that help define the urgency of an

interruption.

Complexity represents a key issue that contributes to errors. Providers are confronted by streams of data (e.g., laboratory tests and vital

signs), many of which provide little useful information but some of

which are important and require action or suggest a specific diagnosis.

Tools that emphasize specific abnormalities or combinations of abnormalities may be helpful in this area.

Transitions between providers and settings are also common in

health care, especially with the advent of the 80-h workweek, and generally represent points of vulnerability. Tools that provide structure in

exchanging information—for example, when transferring care between

providers—may be helpful.

The Frequency of Adverse Events in Health Care Most large

studies focusing on the frequency and consequences of adverse events

have been performed in the inpatient setting; some data are available

for nursing homes, but much less information is available about the

outpatient setting. The Harvard Medical Practice Study, one of the

largest studies to address this issue, was performed with hospitalized

patients in New York. The primary outcome was the adverse event:

an injury caused by medical management rather than by the patient’s

underlying disease. In this study, an event either resulted in death or

disability at discharge or prolonged the length of hospital stay by at

least 2 days. Key findings were that the adverse event rate was 3.7% and

that 58% of the adverse events were considered preventable. Although

New York is not representative of the United States as a whole, the

study was replicated later in Colorado and Utah, where the rates were

essentially similar. Since then, other studies using analogous methodologies have been performed in various developed nations, and the

rates of adverse events in these countries appear to be ~10%. Rates of

safety issues appear to be even higher in developing and transitional

countries; thus, this is clearly an issue of global proportions.

In the Harvard Medical Practice Study, adverse drug events (ADEs)

were most common, accounting for 19% of all adverse events, and were

followed in frequency by wound infections (14%) and technical complications (13%). Almost half of adverse events were associated with a

surgical procedure. Among nonoperative events, 37% were ADEs, 15%

were diagnostic mishaps, 14% were therapeutic mishaps, 13% were

procedure-related mishaps, and 5% were falls.

ADEs have been studied more than any other error category. Studies

focusing specifically on ADEs have found that they appear to be much

more common than was suggested by the Harvard Medical Practice

Study, although most other studies use more inclusive criteria. Detection approaches in the research setting include chart review and the

use of a computerized ADE monitor, a tool that explores the database

and identifies signals that suggest an ADE may have occurred. Studies

that use multiple approaches find more ADEs than does any individual

approach, and this discrepancy suggests that the true underlying rate in

the population is higher than would be identified by a single approach.

About 6–10% of patients admitted to U.S. hospitals experience an ADE.

Injuries caused by drugs are also common in the outpatient setting.

One study found a rate of 21 ADEs per every 100 patients per year

when patients were called to assess whether they had had a problem

with one of their medications. The severity level was lower than in

the inpatient setting, but approximately one-third of these ADEs were

preventable.

The period immediately after a patient is discharged from the hospital appears to be very risky. A recent study of patients hospitalized on a

medical service found an adverse event rate of 19%; about one-third of

those events were preventable, and another one-third were ameliorable

(i.e., they could have been made less severe). ADEs were the single

leading error category.

Prevention Strategies Most work on strategies to prevent adverse

events has targeted specific types of events in the inpatient setting, with

nosocomial infections and ADEs having received the most attention.

Nosocomial infection rates have been reduced greatly in intensive care

Successive layers of defenses, barriers, and safeguards

Other holes due to

latent conditions

(resident “pathogens”)

Some holes due

to active failures

Hazards

Losses

FIGURE 8-1 “Swiss cheese” diagram. Reason argues that most accidents occur

when a series of “latent failures” are present in a system and happen to line up in

a given instance, resulting in an accident. Examples of latent failures in the case

of a fall might be that the unit is unusually busy and the floor happens to be wet.

(Adapted from J Reason: BMJ 320:768, 2000.)

benefit will be derived from improving quality than from improving

safety, though both are important and safety is in many ways more tangible to the public. The first section of this chapter will address issues

relating to the safety of care and the second will cover quality of care.

■ SAFETY IN HEALTH CARE

Safety Theory and Systems Theory Safety theory clearly points

out that individuals make errors all the time. Think of driving home

from the hospital: you intend to stop and pick up a quart of milk on the

way home but find yourself entering your driveway without realizing

how you got there. Everybody uses low-level, semiautomatic behavior

for many activities in daily life; this kind of error is called a slip. Slips

occur often during care delivery—e.g., when people intend to write

an order but forget because they must complete another action first.

Mistakes, by contrast, are errors of a higher level; they occur in new or

nonstereotypic situations in which conscious decisions are being made.

An example would be dosing of a medication with which a physician

is not familiar. The strategies used to prevent slips and mistakes are

often different.

Systems theory suggests that most accidents occur as the result of a

series of small failures that happen to line up in an individual instance

so that an accident can occur (Fig. 8-1). It also suggests that most

individuals in an industry such as health care are trying to do the right

thing (e.g., deliver safe care) and that most accidents thus result from

defects in systems. Systems should be designed both to make errors less

likely and to identify those that do inevitably occur.

Factors That Increase the Likelihood of Errors Many factors

ubiquitous in health care systems can increase the likelihood of errors,

including fatigue, stress, interruptions, complexity, and transitions. The

effects of fatigue in other industries are clear, but its effects in health

care have been more controversial until recently. For example, the accident rate among truck drivers increases dramatically if they work over

a certain number of hours in a week, especially with prolonged shifts.

A recent study of house officers in the intensive care unit demonstrated that they were about one-third more likely to make errors

when they were on a 24-h shift than when they were on a schedule that

allowed them to sleep 8 h the previous night. The American College of

Graduate Medical Education has moved to address this issue by putting

in place the 80-h workweek. Although this stipulation is a step forward,

it does not address the most important cause of fatigue-related errors:

extended-duty shifts. High levels of stress and heavy workloads also

can increase error rates. Thus, in extremely high-pressure situations,

such as cardiac arrests, errors are more likely to occur. Strategies such

as using protocols in these settings can be helpful, as can simple recognition that the situation is stressful.

Interruptions also increase the likelihood of error and occur frequently in health care delivery. It is common to forget to complete an


52PART 1 The Profession of Medicine

settings, especially by using checklists. For ADEs, several strategies

have been found to reduce the medication error rate, although it has

been harder to demonstrate that they reduce the ADE rate overall, and

no studies with adequate power to show a clinically meaningful reduction have been published.

Implementation of checklists to ensure that specific actions are carried out has had a major impact on rates of catheter-associated bloodstream infection and ventilator-associated pneumonia, two of the most

serious complications occurring in intensive care units. The checklist

concept is based on the premise that several specific actions can reduce

the frequency of these issues; when these actions are all taken for every

patient, the result has been an extreme reduction in the frequency of

the associated complication. These practices have been disseminated

across wide areas in the state of Michigan.

Computerized physician order entry (CPOE) linked with clinical

decision support reduces the rate of serious medication errors, defined

as those that harm someone or have the potential to do so. In one

study, CPOE, even with limited decision support, decreased the serious

medication error rate by 55%. CPOE can prevent medication errors by

suggesting a default dose, ensuring that all orders are complete (e.g.,

that they include dose, route, and frequency), and checking orders for

allergies, drug–drug interactions, and drug–laboratory issues. In addition, clinical decision support can suggest the right dose for a patient,

tailoring it to the level of renal function and age. In one study, patients

with renal insufficiency received the appropriate dose only one-third

of the time without decision support, whereas that fraction increased

to approximately two-thirds with decision support; moreover, with

such support, patients with renal insufficiency were discharged from

the hospital half a day earlier. As of 2019, over 95% of U.S. hospitals

had implemented CPOE, although the decision support often is still

limited.

Another technology that can improve medication safety is bar

coding linked with an electronic medication administration record.

Bar coding can help ensure that the right patient gets the right medication at the right time. Electronic medication administration records

can make it much easier to determine what medications a patient has

received. Studies to assess the impact of bar coding on medication

safety are under way, and the early results are promising. Another technology to improve medication safety is “smart pumps.” These pumps

can be set according to which medication is being given and at what

dose; the health care professional will receive a warning if too high a

dose is about to be administered.

The National Safety Picture Several organizations, including

the National Quality Forum and The Joint Commission, have made

recommendations for improving safety. The National Quality Forum

has released recommendations to U.S. hospitals about what practices

will most improve the safety of care, and all hospitals are expected

to implement these recommendations. Many of these practices arise

frequently in routine care. One example is “readback,” the practice

of recording all verbal orders and immediately reading them back to

the physician to verify the accuracy of what was heard. Another is the

consistent use of standard abbreviations and dose designations; some

abbreviations and dose designations are particularly prone to error

(e.g., 7U may be read as 70).

Measurement of Safety Measuring the safety of care is difficult

and expensive, since adverse events are, fortunately, rare. Most hospitals rely on spontaneous reporting to identify errors and adverse

events, but the sensitivity of this approach is very low, with only ~1 in

20 ADEs reported. Promising research techniques involve searching

the electronic record for signals suggesting that an adverse event has

occurred. These methods are not yet in wide use but will probably be

used routinely in the future. Claims data have been used to identify

the frequency of adverse events; this approach works much better for

surgical care than for medical care and requires additional validation.

The net result is that, except for a few specific types of events (e.g., falls

and nosocomial infections), hospitals have little idea about the true

frequency of safety issues.

Nonetheless, all providers have the responsibility to report problems with safety as they are identified. All hospitals have spontaneous

reporting systems, and if providers report events as they occur, those

events can serve as lessons for subsequent improvement.

Conclusions about Safety It is abundantly clear that the safety of

health care can be improved substantially. As more areas are studied

closely, more problems are identified. Much more is known about

the epidemiology of safety in the inpatient setting than in outpatient

settings. A number of effective strategies for improving inpatient safety

have been identified and are increasingly being applied. Some effective strategies are also available for the outpatient setting. Transitions

appear to be especially risky. The solutions to improving care often

entail the consistent use of systematic techniques such as checklists

and often involve leveraging of information technology. Nevertheless,

solutions will also include many other domains, such human factors

techniques, team training, and a culture of safety.

■ QUALITY IN HEALTH CARE

Assessment of quality of care has remained somewhat elusive, although

the tools for this purpose have increasingly improved. Selection of

health care and measurement of its quality are components of a complex process.

Quality Theory Donabedian has suggested that quality of care can

be categorized by type of measurement into structure, process, and outcome. Structure refers to whether a particular characteristic is applicable in a particular setting—e.g., whether a hospital has a catheterization

laboratory or whether a clinic uses an electronic health record. Process

refers to the way care is delivered; examples of process measures are

whether a Pap smear was performed at the recommended interval or

whether an aspirin was given to a patient with a suspected myocardial

infarction. Outcome refers to what happens—e.g., the mortality rate in

myocardial infarction. It is important to note that good structure and

process do not always result in a good outcome. For instance, a patient

may present with a suspected myocardial infarction to an institution

with a catheterization laboratory and receive recommended care,

including aspirin, but still die because of the infarction.

Quality theory also suggests that overall quality will be improved

more in the aggregate if the performance level of all providers is raised

rather than if a few poor performers are identified and punished. This

view suggests that systems changes are especially likely to be helpful in

improving quality, since large numbers of providers may be affected

simultaneously.

The theory of continuous quality improvement suggests that organizations should be evaluating the care they deliver on an ongoing basis

and continually making small changes to improve their individual

processes. This approach can be very powerful if embraced over time.

Several specific tools have been developed to help improve process

performance. One of the most important is the Plan-Do-Check-Act

cycle (Fig. 8-2). This approach can be used for “rapid cycle” improvement of a process—e.g., the time that elapses between a diagnosis of

pneumonia and administration of antibiotics to the patient. Some

statistical tools, such as control charts, are often used in conjunction

to determine whether progress is being made. Because most medical

care includes one or many processes, this tool is especially important

for improvement.

Factors Relating to Quality Many factors can decrease the level

of quality, including stress to providers, high or low levels of production pressure, and poor systems. Stress can have an adverse effect on

quality because it can lead providers to omit important steps, as can a

high level of production pressure. Low levels of production pressure

sometimes can result in worse quality, as providers may be bored or

have little experience with a specific problem. Poor systems can have a

tremendous impact on quality, and even extremely dedicated providers

typically cannot achieve high levels of performance if they are operating within a poor system.

Data about the Current State of Quality A study published by

the RAND Corporation in 2006 provided the most complete picture of


 


Global Diversity of Health System Financing and Delivery

43CHAPTER 7

TABLE 7-1 Developed Country Total Health Expenditure (% GDP)

TAX FUNDED IN WESTERN

EUROPE

SHI FUNDED IN WESTERN

EUROPE CENTRAL EUROPEAN DEVELOPED ASIAN

DEVELOPED NORTH

AMERICAN

Ireland 7.2% Belgium 10.3% Latvia 6.0% Singapore 4.5% Canada 10.7%

Spain 8.9% Netherlands 10.1% Poland 6.5% South Korea 7.6% United States 17.1%

UK 9.6% Germany 11.2% Czech Republic 7.2% Japan 10.9%

Finland 9.6% Switzerland 12.3% Slovenia 8.2%

Denmark 10.1%

Sweden 11.0%

Abbreviations: GDP, gross domestic product; SHI, social health insurance; UK, United Kingdom.

Source: The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data.

for primary and secondary pediatric health care services. More than

400,000 Finnish children (in a total population of 5 million) have privately purchased policies. In England in 2015, individual-, employer-,

and union-purchased private complementary insurance covered an

estimated 10.5% of the population, or about 6 million people. In

Canada, individuals are not allowed by law to purchase private complementary insurance (except for Supreme Court–ordered insurance

for three backlogged surgical procedures in Quebec Province—2005

Chaoulli decision); however, approximately 65% of the population

have employer-, union-, or private group–purchased supplemental

insurance for non–publicly covered services such as outpatient pharmaceutical prescriptions and home care.

Social Insurance–Funded Systems In Western Europe, SHI

funds have traditionally been organized on a private not-for-profit

basis, but with statutory responsibilities under national law. When

former Soviet Bloc countries in Eastern Europe regained their independence in 1991, they returned to pre–World War II SHI models, but

because there was no remaining organizational infrastructure, these

post-1991 arrangements typically became a single SHI fund, run as

an arm of the national government. In the United States, the Medicare

social insurance system for citizens over age 65, enacted in 1965, is

organized as a single fund tied to the national Social Security (public

pension) Administration, an independent agency within the national

government, with reimbursement arrangements supervised by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) inside the Department

of Health and Human Services. Medicare covers inpatient hospital care

plus limited post-hospital nursing home services (Medicare Part A).

Supplemental private insurance policies are bought by covered individuals to help pay for outpatient physician visits (Medicare Part B) and

for outpatient pharmaceuticals (Medicare Part D).

In Germany, 85% of the population is enrolled in one of 120 not-forprofit, monthly premium–based private SHI funds. This figure includes

all individuals with annual incomes below 54,500 euros, who are required

by law to join an SHI fund, as well as those with higher incomes who

choose to enroll or remain. Eleven percent of the population—all having annual incomes above the mandatory SHI enrollment ceiling of

54,500 euros—have opted out of the SHI system to voluntarily enroll

in claims-based private health insurance, whereas 4% of the citizenry

is enrolled in sector-specific public programs such as the military.

Since 2009, all SHI members pay a flat tax on gross monthly income

as a contribution (8.2% in 2018, up to an upper income limit of 49,500

euros), which is transferred by their SHI fund to a national pool,

TABLE 7-2 Developed Country Per Capita Health Expenditures

TAX FUNDED IN WESTERN

EUROPE

SHI FUNDED IN WESTERN

EUROPE CENTRAL EUROPEAN DEVELOPED ASIAN

DEVELOPED NORTH

AMERICAN

Spain $2738 Belgium $4149 Latvia $874 South Korea $2043 Canada $4458

Italy $2738 Germany $4714 Poland $809 Singapore $4083 United States $9869

UK $3958 Netherlands $4742 Czech Republic $1321 Japan $4233

Denmark $5565 Switzerland $9835 Slovenia $1834

Sweden $5710

Abbreviations: SHI, social health insurance; UK, United Kingdom.

and then redistributed back to their chosen fund on an individual

risk-adjusted basis. Employers send 7.3% of each employee’s salary to

the same national pool. Special arrangements exist for payments from

self-employed, retired, and unemployed workers. Since 1995, there has

been a separate mandatory social insurance fund for long-term care

(LTC), with an annual premium of 1.95% of each adult’s gross monthly

income, split 50%–50% with their employer. Pensioners since 2004

are required to pay the full 1.95% from their pensions. Childless SHI

enrollees pay a surcharge of 0.25% of monthly gross income. Overall,

78% of all health care expenditures in Germany were paid from public

and/or mandatory private SHI sources.

In the Netherlands since 2006, all adult citizens pay a fixed premium (about 1453 euros in 2019) to their choice among 35 private health insurers (not-for-profit and for-profit), with four large

insurance groups having over 1 million members each. In addition,

employers pay 6.95% of salary below 51,400 euros for each employee

into a national health insurance fund. Self-employed individuals pay

4.85% into the national fund for taxable income up to the same limit.

Retired and unemployed individuals also make payments. In addition

to the individual premiums paid to their choice of private insurance

fund, payments from the national health insurance fund, adjusted by

individual age, sex, and health characteristics, also are made to the

individual’s chosen insurer. The Netherlands has a separate mandatory

social insurance fund for LTC (the ABWZ, since 2015 the WLZ, and

now only for residential nursing home care) to which each employee

pays 9.5% of taxable income beneath 33,600 euros every year. Selfemployed, unemployed, and retired individuals also are required to pay

premiums to the WLZ. Overall, including SHI revenues, public spending provided 87% of total health expenditures in 2014.

In Estonia, a former Soviet Republic that re-established an SHI

system in 1991 upon regaining its independence, there is one national

SHI fund that is an arm of the national government. This fund collects

mandatory payments of 13% from salaried workers and 20% from

self-employed individuals, covering both health care and retirement

pensions. Overall, including SHI revenues, public spending accounted

for 74.5% of total health expenditures in 2017.

Singapore, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have predominantly SHI

systems of funding for individual care services. In these Asian countries (except Japan), there is one SHI fund that typically is operated as

an arm of the national government.

In Singapore, starting in 1983, all employees up to age 50 have been

required to place 20% of their income (employers add 16% more) into

a personal health savings account to pay for direct health care costs,


44PART 1 The Profession of Medicine

managed in their name by the Singapore government, called a Medisave

account. Medisave accounts have a maximum amount, are tax-exempt,

and receive interest payments (currently set at 4%). Consistent with

a Confucian emphasis on family, the funds that accumulate in the

Medisave account can be spent on health care for family members as

well. If the accumulated funds are not spent on health care during the

insured’s life, they become part of the individual’s personal estate and

are distributed as a tax-free inheritance to his or her designated heirs.

In addition, Singaporean citizens are also automatically enrolled into

a second government-run health insurance plan called MediShield

that pays for supplemental catastrophic, chronic, and long-term care.

While citizens can opt out, 90% of citizens remain in the program.

The Singapore government also operates a third, wholly tax-funded

payer called Medifund that, with approval of a local neighborhood

committee, will pay hospital costs for 3–4% of the population who are

recognized as indigent. In part reflecting the high level of mandatory

individual saving, public funding provided only 54.5% of total health

expenditures in 2016.

In South Korea, a state-run SHI system was established in 1977,

which in 1990 covered 30.9% of total health care costs. This percentage paid by the SHI system rose to 40.5% of total costs in 2017, with

national tax revenue covering 16.9%, leaving out-of-pocket expenses at

a relatively high 34.4% of total costs. Although there are legal ceilings

on total out-of-pocket copayments for each 6-month period, over 70%

of Korean adults purchase an additional private Voluntary Health

Insurance policy to cover these additional direct expenditures. In 2000,

three types of public SHI funds were merged into a single national

state-run fund. As of 2018, 6% of an employee’s salary must be paid

as a social insurance contribution into this fund, with employees and

employers each paying 50% of that amount. In 2008, an additional SHI

fund was introduced to pay for LTC, operated by the main state-run

SHI fund to reduce administrative costs. Contributions to the LTC

fund are set at 6.55% of the individual’s regular SHI contribution, coupled with 20% copayments for institutional care and 15% copayments

for home care services.

The United States There is no single preponderant source of

health care spending in the United States. The federal government’s

CMS reported that, for 2017, private health insurance covered 34% of

total health expenditures, Medicare (mandatory SHI program for all

citizens over 65) covered 20%, Medicaid (a joint federal-state welfare

program for low-income citizens) covered 17%, and out-of-pocket paid

10%. Sources of funds for these programs were 28% from the federal

government, 17% from state and local governments, 28% from private

households, and 20% from private business (e.g., employers). The

World Bank set public funding in the United States at 50.2% of total

health expenditures in 2017.

In 2010, the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extended

privately provided but heavily regulated and federally subsidized health

insurance to many low- and middle-income uninsured individuals and

families. Since the same act reduced the availability of existing individually purchased private health insurance, the total increase in the

number of newly covered individuals was less than expected. Insurance

premium increases for 2017 rose from 20% to over 100%, depending

on the particular state, with additional increases in up-front deductible

requirements, raising questions about the long-term sustainability of

the ACA initiative. The recent Republican administration sought to

repeal major financial and tax elements of the ACA and to replace

existing subsidy arrangements with a system of refundable tax credits

toward the establishment of individual health savings accounts and/or

purchase of private health insurance on open cross-state markets (currently, private health insurance in the United States remains controlled

at the separate 50-state level of government).

■ DELIVERING INDIVIDUAL PATIENT CARE

SERVICES IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Hospital Services In Europe, hospitals in both tax-funded and

SHI-funded health systems are mostly publicly owned and operated

by regional or municipal governments. In tax-funded health systems,

most hospital-based physicians are civil servants, employed on a negotiated salary basis (often by a physician labor union), and subject to

most of the usual advantages and disadvantages of being a public sector

employee. There are somewhat more private hospitals in SHI-funded

health systems. However, most larger hospitals are public institutions

operated by local governments, and most hospital physicians (with the

notable exception of the Netherlands, where they are private contractors organized in private group practices) are, like those in tax-funded

systems, public sector employees. In most tax-funded European countries (but not continental SHI-funded countries), few specialist physicians have office-based practices, and in both tax- and SHI-funded

systems, office-based specialists do not have admitting privileges to

publicly operated hospitals.

Most public hospitals in both tax-funded and SHI-funded health

systems are single free-standing institutions that can be classified into

three broad categories by complexity of patients admitted and number

of specialties available: (1) district hospitals (four specialties: internal

medicine, general surgery, obstetrics, and psychiatry); (2) regional

hospitals (20 specialties); and (3) university hospitals (>40 specialties).

In addition, many countries have a number of small, 15- to 20-bed,

freestanding, private (typically for-profit) clinics. Recently, some taxfunded countries have begun to merge district and regional hospitals

in an effort to improve the quality of care and create financial efficiencies (for example, Norway; planned for Denmark, also for Ireland;

however, failed Parliamentary passage and brought down the coalition

government, in Finland in 2019). Institutional mergers can be difficult

to negotiate among publicly operated hospitals, due to the role that

these large institutions play as important care providers and as large

employers in smaller cities and towns, especially given political and

union concerns about maintaining current employment levels. In the

United States, financial and reimbursement pressures triggered by the

implementation of the 2010 ACA have generated a number of private

sector hospital mergers into larger hospital groups.

In tax-funded health systems, publicly funded patients who are

admitted for an elective procedure cannot choose their specialist physician (except private-pay patients in “pay beds” in National Health

Service [NHS] hospitals in England). Specialists are assigned by the

clinic to a patient based on availability, with both junior and senior

doctors placed in rotation.

Capital costs (buildings, large medical equipment) are publicly

funded in all tax-funded systems and in most traditional SHI systems.

For example, in Germany, capital costs for public hospitals are paid for

by the regional governments. As a result, new capital investment is often

allocated politically, according to location and political priorities. In

Finland, local politicians in the 1980s would say that it “takes 10 years

to build a hospital,” meaning that it took that long to become a political

priority for the regional government that controlled capital expenditures. Local politicians would therefore regularly overbuild when they

got their one opportunity to obtain new capital.

Recently, efforts have been made to make public hospitals more

responsible for their use of capital. In the Netherlands, public hospitals

were shifted into private not-for-profit entities that are expected either

to fund new capital from operating surplus or to borrow the funds from

a bank based on a viable business plan. In England, more than 100 hospitals have been built using the Public Finance Initiative (PFI) program,

in which private developers build turn-key facilities (thus taking capital

costs off the public borrowing limit), and then rent these facilities back

to the NHS and/or the relevant NHS Foundation Trust. In Sweden and

Finland, while capital equipment is now a cost on hospital operating

budgets, large new capital equipment and major building renovations

remain politically driven processes often with extensive delays. In

Stockholm County, the New Karolinska University Hospital opened in

2018 was built and is managed by a separate nonprofit public-private

company.

In Singapore and South Korea, both of which are SHI funded, larger

hospitals are publicly operated. However, there are a substantial number of smaller private clinics typically owned by specialist physicians.

In the United States, the passage of the 2010 ACA has triggered the

selling of many private specialist group practices to hospital groups,


Global Diversity of Health System Financing and Delivery

45CHAPTER 7

transforming previously independent practicing physicians into hospital employees.

Primary Care Services Most primary health care in SHI-funded

health systems, and also in an increasing number of tax-funded health

systems (except in low-income areas of some large cities), is delivered by

independent private general practitioners (GPs), working either individually or in small privately owned group practices. Recent changes

in tax-funded health systems include Norway, where most primary

care moved from municipally employed physicians to private-practice

GPs in 2003, and Sweden, where, following a 2010 change in national

reimbursement requirements, new privately owned not-for-profit and

for-profit GP practices were established and now deliver 50% of all

primary care visits.

In England, most primary care physicians are private GPs who are

contractors to the NHS, working either independently or in small

group practices. These private GPs own their own practices, which they

can sell when they retire. However, as part of the original agreement to

convince physicians to support the establishment of the NHS in 1948

(which most physicians strongly opposed), private GPs also receive a

national government pension upon retirement. In the inner cities in

England, there are some larger primary health clinics.

In 2001, England’s private primary care doctors were organized into

geographically based Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). These PCTs were

allocated 80% of the total NHS budget to contract for elective hospital

services required by their patients with both NHS hospital trusts as

well as private hospitals. In 2013, PCTs were restructured into Clinical

Commissioning Groups with similar contracting responsibilities.

In 2004, the Quality Outcomes Framework (QOF) was introduced as

a quality of care–tied approach to providing additional income for NHS

GPs. This regulatory mechanism in 2010 set 134 different standards for

best practice primary care in four main domains: 86 clinical, 36 organizational, 4 preventive service, and 3 patient experience. GP income grew

on average by 25% through the introduction of the QOF, with general

practices averaging 96% of possible QOF points. Total spending on QOF

in 2014 in England consumed 15% of all primary care expenditures.

In April 2019, a slightly revised QOF contract was implemented,

which retired 28 low-value indicators, introduced 15 new more clinically appropriate indicators, added two Quality Improvement modules,

and added a new personalized care adjustment option. Funding was

only changed marginally.

Access for individuals to primary care services is considered good

in SHI-funded systems such as those in Germany and the Netherlands.

One often-cited reason is that private office-based physicians (both

GPs and specialists) in these countries are paid on a modified fee-forservice basis. In Germany, office-based physicians are paid on a quarterly basis by the Sickness funds, acting jointly at the Länder (regional)

level through a point-based system. A national agreement between

the physician association and the association of sick funds establishes

points for each clinical act. Similarly, the association of sick funds (led

in each of Germany’s 16 Länder by the fund with the most subscribers

in that region) establishes a fixed budget for all office-based physician

services for all sick fund patients each 3-month period. Retrospectively

at the end of each period, the total number of points is divided into the

sick funds’ fixed allocation for office-based physicians for that Länder

for that quarter, establishing the value of a point for that quarter. Subsequently, each office-based physician’s point total is multiplied by that

quarterly point value, resulting in that physician’s total payment from

the statutory sick funds.

In contrast to SHI systems, seeing a primary care doctor in a number

of tax-funded health systems has become increasingly difficult over

the past decade. In Sweden, in 2005, a “care guarantee” was introduced

that required its predominantly publicly operated health centers to see

a patient within 7 days after calling for an appointment. In Finland,

where public primary health care centers used to provide most primary

care visits, delays in getting public health center appointments have

pushed up to 40% of all visits into a parallel occupational health system, as well as to publicly employed primary care physicians working

privately in the afternoons.

In England in 2019, access to GP services has been labeled a “crisis,”

aggravated by a 6% fall in the number of practicing GPs, leading to

delays of up to 30 days for an appointment in urban areas like London.

A 2019 report by the King’s Fund found that only 1 in 20 trainee GPs

planned to work full time. Also in 2019, the Nuffield Trust published

a report suggesting that future planning for primary care services in

England should assume a permanent shortage of GPs, requiring large

numbers of new nurse practitioners and other auxiliary personnel. In

Central European countries that were formerly within the Soviet Bloc,

primary care provision had to be newly established after independence

was regained in 1991, since first-line care in the former Semashko

model was provided in specialist polyclinics. Primary care doctors

rapidly emerged as almost entirely private for-profit GPs, working

on contract from the national SHI fund (Estonia, Hungary, North

Macedonia), from state-regulated private insurance companies (Czech

Republic), or from regional/municipal public payers (Poland). Private

GPs in most Central European countries now are paid on a per-visittied basis. This arrangement was heavily influenced by the structure

of primary care in Germany, where private office-based GPs are paid

according to a point-system-tied framework.

In Asian countries such as Singapore, South Korea, and Japan, most

primary care is provided by private for-profit GPs working independently or in small group practices. Private GPs are reimbursed at a set

per-service fee by the national SHI fund(s). Access to primary care

physicians is considered good.

Developed countries have varying policies regarding access to individual preventive services. Health systems in most countries provide

vaccinations and mammography as part of funded health care services.

In the United States, most insured individuals—and in Canada, most

covered residents—automatically receive an annual physical exam

including full blood profiles. In Norway and Denmark, adult physical

exams are provided only upon special request by the individual, and in

Sweden, adult physical exams are provided only to pregnant women. In

Sweden, adults who wish to know their cholesterol or prostate-specific

antigen (PSA) levels have begun to purchase blood tests out-of-pocket

from private laboratories. In England in 2019, the NHS announced it

would stop providing PSA screening tests for prostate cancer, even to

men who requested one, similarly forcing concerned patients to purchase private laboratory testing.

Patients must make copayments to see a primary care doctor in

some tax-funded health systems and in most SHI countries. In taxfunded systems, for example, Swedish patients are required to make

a county-council-set copayment for each primary care visit up to a

national-government-set annual ceiling, after which ambulatory visits

(both primary and outpatient specialist) are not charged. Finland has

a fixed copay for public health center visits, while Denmark’s private

GP visits do not have a copayment. In England, there is no copayment

for GP visits.

In SHI health care systems in Europe and in Asia, patients usually

are responsible for a copayment for both primary and office-based

specialist care. To defray these charges (and to pay for other nonfunded

services), a high percentage of citizens typically purchase additional

supplemental health insurance. In France, where 95% of patients in

2015 purchased private supplemental insurance, patients paid directly

the full fee for 65% of outpatient primary and specialist services, reimbursed subsequently by both their SHI fund and their supplemental

insurance carrier for all payments (after deductibles), while for 35%

of services (for low-income individuals and certain high-cost procedures), full agreed prices were paid directly to providers by SHI.

Access to Elective Specialist Care Approximately half of all

European health care systems have a gatekeeping system that requires

referrals from primary care physicians in order to book hospital specialist visits (for publicly paid visits). In most tax-funded health systems

(although not in most SHI systems), there are substantial waiting times,

typically several months or more, for elective specialist appointments

as well as for high-tech diagnostic and treatment procedures. Waiting

times can be particularly long for cancer and other elective surgical

or high-demand services. In Sweden, government figures from the


46PART 1 The Profession of Medicine

summer of 2017 showed that, nationally, only 5–10% of prostate cancer

operations were performed within 60 days after diagnosis.

In the English NHS, waiting lists for elective surgery in 2019 were

often 6 months or longer. In August 2017, there were over 4,000,000

patients on NHS waiting lists. In January 2018, what administrators

termed “a severe flu season,” during which hospital emergency rooms

were overwhelmed with elderly patients requiring admission, led to

a national-level NHS decision to cancel all elective operating room

procedures in all hospitals in England (>50,000 procedures in 1200

hospitals) for the entire month of January, further lengthening waiting

lists. Regarding quality of care, again in England, a March 2018 report

from the national Office of Health Economics found that, in 2016 and

2017, up to three-quarters of patients who could have undergone keyhole procedures were forced to undergo open surgery, resulting in an

estimated 1 million procedures each year that were more invasive than

clinically necessary.

Delays in some tax-funded systems also are procedural. In England,

for example, a patient who requires a further consultation with a second specialist typically has to return to their primary care physician for

a second referral and then has to wait in the regular patient queue for

that second appointment.

There is also substantial waiting time for radiologic imaging services

in most tax-funded systems. In Malta, the tax-funded health system’s

recent efforts to prioritize elective MRI investigations have succeeded

in reducing waiting times from 18 months to 4 months. In both the

Alberta and British Columbia Provinces in Canada, waiting times for a

publicly funded nonemergency MRI can extend up to several months,

whereas privately paid MRIs were available in both provinces within

1 week.

This issue of waiting times for specialist services in tax-funded

health systems reflects a combination of growing demand (increasing/

aging populations and changing clinical indications), financial constraints, and insufficient capacity, including inadequate physician

working hours. For example, in the 1980s, when several surgical

procedures for the elderly became more routine practice (e.g., hip

replacement, coronary artery bypass graft, corneal lens implantation),

the waiting list problem worsened. It had been mitigated somewhat

through increased service capacity by the early 2000s, only to return

as a growing policy challenge once public sector financial resources

became constrained again after the 2008 global financial crisis. Timely

cancer diagnosis and care continue to be a particularly sensitive issue,

with tax-funded systems often taking several months for a patient to

see an oncologist and then months more to begin treatment. In 2013

in Sweden, a newspaper journalist set off a political storm when he

described women patients in one large county council (Malmo) who

had to wait more than 40 days to receive the results from their breast

cancer biopsy. In September 2019 in England, only 76.9% of patients

with suspected cancer began treatment within 2 months of an urgent

referral from a GP.

In response to pressure from national patient associations, a number

of tax-funded health care systems introduced maximum waiting times

for elective hospital procedures in the early 2000s. (Most Western

European SHI systems do not have long waiting times or treatment

guarantees for hospital care.) These maximum waiting times typically

include initial primary care visits as well as specialist evaluations and

treatment. In Denmark, a patient has the right to go to a different

Danish public hospital for care after waiting 30 days without treatment.

In Sweden, under the 2005 “waiting time guarantee,” an untreated

patient’s local county council is required to pay for care in another

county’s hospital after 180 days. In a parallel process at the European

Union (EU) level, beginning in 1997, the EU Court of Justice steadily

expanded the right of all EU citizens to travel to another EU country in

order to receive “timely” care, with their home country health system

required to pay for that care.

In private not-for-profit SHI-funded health systems such as in

Germany and Switzerland, waiting times for specialist visits and

hospital procedures are typically a few weeks to 1 month. In the SHI

system in France, which is more centrally organized and funded (part

of the Napoleonic tradition of public administration), ongoing disputes

about insufficient central government funding for public hospitals and

staff salaries led in March 2019 to 9 months of hospital staff strikes,

particularly in accident and emergency departments. In November

2019, the national government announced that it would take over

10 billion euros in public hospital debt as part of an effort to reverse

staff cutbacks, bed and operating theater closures, and personnel flight

to the private sector.

Long-Term Care Services LTC (consisting of residential and

home-based services) consumes a relatively small but increasing proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) in developed countries. In

2016, Norway (2.95% GDP), Sweden (2.87% GDP), and the Netherlands

(2.64% GDP) all spent more than one-fourth of their total health expenditures on LTC (Eurostat and OECD figures). More than one-fifth of all

health care expenditures went to LTC in Belgium (2.16% GDP), Ireland

(1.55% GDP), and Denmark (2.5% GDP). Lower-spending countries

included the United Kingdom (18% of health expenditures; 1.75%

GDP), Germany (12% of expenditures; 1.33% GDP), and Spain (9%

of expenditures; 0.81% GDP). In the United States, official figures put

total LTC expenditures in 2016 at 4.9% of total health expenditures, or

0.9% of total GDP. (Note that these figures do not include emergency,

inpatient, or outpatient hospital costs generated by elderly patients.)

Since nursing home care is more expensive than home care (nursing

home care requires the provision of housing, food, and around-theclock care providers), government policymakers seek to keep the

elderly and the chronically ill out of nursing homes for as long as feasible. Moreover, in developed countries like Sweden, Norway, and the

United States, some 70% of all home care services come from informal

caregivers: spouses, children (typically daughters), neighbors, and

nonprofit community groups. While some SHI systems (e.g., Germany)

have separate public LTC insurance (funded by mandatory premiums

paid by all adults) that make available cash payments for LTC that can

be used to compensate informal caregivers, most policymakers work

hard to not monetize what is a large amount of essentially free care.

Indeed, policymakers actively seek to encourage those providing these

services to continue to do so as long as possible, trying to postpone

caregiver burnout by providing support services such as free respite

care, special call-in lines for caregiving advice, pension points toward

retirement for the informal caregiver (Nordic countries), and free daycare center services.

In most tax-funded and SHI-funded European countries, home care

services are organized at the municipal government level. In tax-funded

systems, these services are also delivered mostly by municipal employees,

working according to union-negotiated protocols. In some European

SHI systems, and recently in tax-funded Sweden and Finland, private

companies also provide home care services on contract to municipal

governments. In combination with national legislation, these municipal systems also provide important support for informal caregivers,

since the financial costs of caring for adults in their own home are

substantially less than providing housing, food, and caregiver support

in publicly funded homes for the aged or in nursing homes.

A high proportion of nursing homes in European tax-funded and

SHI-funded health systems are publicly owned facilities operated by

municipal governments; in some instances, in SHI-funded systems

(Israel, the Netherlands), they are operated by private not-for-profit

organizations. Recently, in some tax-funded systems (e.g., Sweden),

private for-profit chains have begun to open nursing homes that are

funded on a contract basis with local municipal governments. Costs

for nursing home care can be expensive: in Norway, the cost per patient

is often over $100,000 per year in a publicly funded home, with the

patient responsible for paying up to 80% depending on the family’s

economic status. In Sweden, patients living in publicly funded nursing

homes in Stockholm County pay a relatively small official fee, but they

also pay room rent and up to 2706 Swedish krona (SEK) per month

(about $270 U.S. dollars [USD]) for food out of their monthly public

pension payments.

In 2012, in an effort to reduce demand for expensive hospital and

nursing home services, Norway and Denmark began elderly care

reforms that shifted service delivery as well as funding responsibilities


Global Diversity of Health System Financing and Delivery

47CHAPTER 7

to municipal governments. Among innovations in Norway, municipalities are required to establish a municipal acute bed unit (MAU) to treat

stable elderly patients and provide observation beds for evaluation.

Partial funding for these units is provided by the four public regional

health care administrations. Some municipalities have also embedded

primary care units inside their regional hospital to arrange discharge

and to coordinate care for the chronically ill elderly. Norwegian municipalities are also responsible through their contracted (mostly private)

primary care physicians to implement the National Pathways Program,

which established treatment protocols for cross-sector conditions such

as diabetes and cardiovascular conditions.

A differently configured structural innovation to better integrate

LTC for the chronically ill elderly with clinical individual health

services has been to consolidate both social and health care services

within the same public administrative organization. In 2019, as part of

health reforms in Ireland and Denmark and a proposed (unenacted)

reform in Finland, as well as a pilot decentralization program in

England for 2.8 million people in Greater Manchester, social and health

care programs are to be administered by a single responsible agency.

In the SHI-funded system in the Netherlands, almost 7% of the

population live in a residential home. National government legislation

revised the structure of nursing home funding and care in 2015. Three

acts restructured the separate public LTC SHI fund, which requires

mandatory payments by 100% of Dutch adults, and introduced

delivery-related reforms that reduced the number and overall cost of

nursing home patients paid for by the fund. Determination of eligibility

for public payment for nursing home care is now made by an independent national assessment body (the Centre for Needs Assessment).

Moreover, municipal governments now play a stronger role in funding

and delivering home care services. The reforms created social care

teams that hold “kitchen table talks” to steer the elderly first toward

seeking care from family, neighbors, churches, and other local community organizations before they qualify for publicly paid in-home care.

In 2012, some 1.5 million people (12% of total population) provided

informal care to ill or disabled persons, averaging 22 hours per week

of care per person.

Home care recipients in the Netherlands can choose to set up a “personal budget,” using their public funding allocation to select their preferred individual care personnel (either publicly employed or publicly

approved private providers). This arrangement also enables these home

care recipients to determine the particular mix of services they want,

as well as to augment the allocated public funds with personal funds. A

number of innovative not-for-profit nursing homes have been created

to provide additional services to elderly living in their neighborhood

(primary care home visits), as well as terminal hospice care (e.g., the

Saffier De Residentie Groep residences in The Haag).

In the United States, nursing home and home care are funded and

delivered in a variety of different ways. For individuals who have minimal

financial assets, nursing home costs are paid by a joint federal-regional

(state) welfare program called Medicaid. Most state government Medicaid programs pay out more than 40% of their total budget for nursing

home care. In the past, Medicaid did not pay for home care services.

However, some states have programs with private for-profit and not-forprofit providers that provide home care as a way to forestall the need for

the more expensive nursing home care.

Many private individuals take out private LTC insurance, typically

from commercial insurance companies. These policies require individuals to make premium payments for years in advance (often 20 or

more) before the individual learns whether they will, in fact, require

home or nursing home care. Some private insurers have also raised

premiums after individuals have paid in for many years and canceled

policies if the new higher rate is not affordable. The 2010 ACA contained a new public LTC insurance program. However, the program

was designed to be voluntary, and U.S. Department of Health and

Human Services administrators decided in 2013 not to implement that

portion of the law.

In addition to the tax-funded Medicaid program and privately purchased LTC insurance, many middle-class families pay for care from

savings, by selling the elderly person’s home, or by direct contribution

from children and other family members. Expenses can reach between

$60,000 and $100,000 per year depending on the location of a facility

and who operates it.

Nursing home care in the United States is provided by a wide mix

of private not-for-profit and for-profit providers, ranging from churchowned single-site homes to large stock market–listed companies. Many

of these homes are purpose-built as assisted-living or memory-care

facilities. Home care services are delivered by a mix of private not-forprofit and for-profit providers.

In Japan, a national LTC insurance fund was introduced in

2000. Although the new fund applies uniformly across the country,

the program is administered by municipal governments and the premium level differs across municipalities, with an average monthly

premium of 3000 yen (about $30 USD). In South Korea, an SHI fund

for LTC is funded by mandatory contributions of 4.78% of a person’s

regular national health insurance contribution, with an additional 20%

of total LTC expenditures provided by national government funds. The

client copayment for home care is set at 15% of expenses and at 20%

for residential care.

■ PHARMACEUTICALS

Pharmaceutical expenditures in developed countries (inpatient and

outpatient combined) vary widely across different health system types,

as well as between different countries within each institutional type.

OECD figures for 2018 show drug expenditures in tax-funded countries in Western Europe ranging from 6.3% of total health expenditures

(THE) in Denmark to 11.9% of THE in the United Kingdom and 18.6%

of THE in Spain. In SHI-funded Western European systems, pharmaceuticals absorbed 7.5% of THE in the Netherlands, while in Germany,

that figure was 14.1%. In the hybrid tax-funded SHI systems of Central

Europe, the pharmaceutical percentage of THE is higher: 18.2% of

THE in Estonia to 27.9% of THE in Hungary. Similarly, in Asian SHI

systems, pharmaceuticals consumed 20.7% of THE in South Korea and

18.6% of THE in Japan. The OECD’s 2018 figures for pharmaceutical

spending in North America are 12.0% of THE in the United States and

16.7% in Canada.

Contributing factors to this wide-ranging variation are (1) differences in national practice and prescription patterns reflecting differing

cultural expectations; (2) the ratio problem (relatively fixed level of

pharmaceutical costs due to international prices—the numerator—

divided by a greatly varying per capita health expenditure cost in

different developed country health systems); (3) the range and type of

pharmaceutical price controls in each country; and (4) the degree of

limitation placed on pharmaceutical supply, tied to formularies and/or

explicit forms of drug rationing.

Most European health systems have tight national controls on the

cost and, in some tax-based countries, on the availability of pharmaceuticals. Most European countries also use a number of different regulatory measures to limit prices and/or availability of both inpatient and

outpatient drugs, including mandatory generic prescribing, reference

pricing, patient copays (sometimes with an annual ceiling, after which

copayments are no longer required), and (particularly in tax-funded

systems) national formularies tied to clinical effectiveness. Norway,

for example, allows only about 2300 different preparations—including

dosage, delivery method, and box size—to be stocked by pharmacies.

Prices for drugs can vary considerably across different European

countries, tied to economic development and domestic pricing patterns. One consequence of these differential national pricing controls

has been the development of a parallel import market, in which drug

wholesalers and pharmacists in the more expensive countries purchase

supplies from a cheaper market elsewhere in Europe.

Access to expensive drugs has also been intentionally limited in

some tax-funded health systems in Europe. One basis for rationing has

been rationing tied to quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs). Rationing

also reflects a clash between strained public drug budgets and public

pressure. For example, in the case of cancer drugs in England, the

recommendation of the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) against funding the breast cancer drug trastuzumab

(Herceptin) was subsequently overturned by the Minister of Health.


48PART 1 The Profession of Medicine

Expensive cancer drugs continue to be rationed in England where the

NHS Cancer Drug Fund, established in 2011 to provide access to nonNHS-provided drugs on a case-by-case basis, ran out of funds in 2015,

forcing it to drop 25 of 83 covered drugs and close down for 3 months

to restructure its operations.

As part of earlier medical patterns in Asian countries, office-based

physicians traditionally filled prescriptions as well as prescribing drugs

to patients. These sales also served to supplement their income in a

setting of relatively low per-visit payments from state-run SHI funds.

Concerned about cost and overuse, both Taiwan (in 1997, except for

emergency cases or rural regions) and South Korea (for the whole

country in 2003) implemented “separation reforms,” which ended these

physician sales. In Japan, a series of fee and reimbursement reforms

have trimmed the percentage of all prescriptions dispensed in 2016 by

physicians to 26% of prescriptions filled.

■ GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION

Health care services in developed countries are steered, constrained,

monitored, and (to varying degrees) assessed by governments and

governmentally established and/or empowered bodies. Although these

measures apply particularly to the financial efficiency of governmentfunded services, they also seek to promote patient and community

safety, equity of access, and high-quality clinical outcomes. This oversight is often strongly focused on privately operated and contracted

providers and insurers, although in principle, it applies to publicly

operated organizations as well.

Governance consists of macro national-level policy, meso

institutional-level management, and micro clinic-level care decisions.

This complex mix of governance decisions is often shared among

different national, regional, and local governments, depending on the

degree of centralization, decentralization, or, recently, recentralization

(e.g., Norway and Denmark). While most systems officially prioritize

“good governance,” governance activities frequently comingle with

political objectives as core policy concepts are developed and transformed into concrete organizational targets.

In Sweden, health system governance is shared among national,

regional (county), and local municipal governments. The national government has responsibility to pass “frame” legislation, which establishes

the basic structure of the system. To cite one example, until recently, the

national government had limited an adult patient’s total copayments

for outpatient physician care (specialist and primary care) and pharmaceuticals to 2800 SEK (about $280 USD) for a 12-month period. The

20 regional governments, in turn, made policy decisions within that

legislation, deciding how to apportion the specific copayments for each

primary care and specialist outpatient visit. Since Swedes can self-refer

to specialists, some counties double the copayment to hospital-based

doctors to discourage unnecessary appointments. Similarly, fiscal policy normally is shared between the regional government, which raises

about 70% of total health expenditures through its own county-set flat

income tax, and the national government, which provides additional

purpose-tied funds for national objectives such as consolidating openheart surgery across county lines as well as supplementing lower tax

receipts in rural counties with smaller working populations. However,

this normal funding relationship across governments can change. In

the early 1990s, the national government placed a “stop” on raising

county taxes prior to Sweden’s admission in 1995 to the EU. In 2016,

each of the 20 counties could set their own ceilings, which were almost

all at 3300 SEK (about $330 USD).

In Spain’s tax-funded health system (71.1% publicly funded in 2015),

17 regional “autonomous communities” were given full managerial

responsibility for the provision of health services in a 1990s decentralization process, along with ownership of all publicly operated hospitals.

The national government generates a substantial proportion of health

care resources, which are included in the broad block grants it allocates

to the regional governments, which then add regional tax revenue to

make up the full public sector budget. In a mechanism to steer regional

government operating policies in this decentralized environment, the

national Spanish government established a joint federal-regional council to review quality and performance data (through the 2003 Health

System Cohesion and Quality Act). Italy’s tax-funded health system

(75.8% publicly funded in 2014) similarly shares governance responsibilities between national and regional governments. Health services are

provided by local health authorities (Azienda Sanitaria Locale) supervised by 20 regional governments within a nationally established governance framework, financed through a complicated mix of national and

nationally stipulated but regionally collected taxes. Again, like Spain,

the national government established a federal-regional government

council, seeking to better coordinate care standards and information

among the regions and with national government agencies. In 2006, the

national government imposed strict financial plans on 10 regions that

were systematically in deficit.

In Germany, where funding for its SHI-based health system is

predominantly the responsibility of 120 private not-for-profit sickness funds, governance decisions are shared among these private

sector sickness funds and public sector national, regional, and municipal governments. The sickness funds receive a risk-adjusted premium payment for each enrolled individual, according to a national

government–determined formula, and from a national government–

run health insurance pool. Most hospitals are owned and operated by

municipal governments, while investment capital for structural renovations and new building comes from the 16 regional Länder taken from

their tax revenues. Payment frameworks and amounts for public hospitals are negotiated between associations of these municipally owned

hospitals and associations of the private sickness funds, without formal

government participation.

Regulation is an essential element of an effective health care system

and a key component of overall health system governance. Regulation

incorporates both broad standard requirements that affect all organizations that operate in a country (e.g., hiring, firing, and wage decisions) as well as specific health sector–related regulations (e.g., proper

handling, use, and disposal of low-grade nuclear waste from radiation

treatments). Recent examples of health sector regulation in England,

for example, include the following:

1. Requiring all cancer drugs adopted for use in the NHS to cost no

more than $41,268/QALY;

2. Requiring in their employment contract that junior doctors in hospitals work a specific number of Sundays; and

3. Requiring that all emergency department patients receive care

within 4 h of their arrival.

A powerful tool that has the force of law, regulation can have substantial negative as well as positive effects. A well-known political

science corollary of regulatory power is that “the right to regulate is

also the right to destroy.” For example, in the United States, the federal

Environmental Protection Agency, as part of its pursuit of cleaner air,

issued wide-ranging regulatory orders setting performance standards

that resulted in the closing of many West Virginia coal mines, with the

loss of tens of millions of dollars of productive capacity and thousands

of high-paying jobs, and likely contributing to social conditions that

helped spawn that state’s high rates of opioid abuse among unemployed males. Similarly, in some tax-funded European systems, such

as those in Sweden and England, there is growing pressure from public

health advocates for national regulations to prohibit the making of a

profit from publicly paid funds. In Sweden, the national government’s

Reepalu report in 2016 honored a pledge made by the Social Democratic government to its Left (socialist) Party ally by calling for a legislated ban on profit-making in the provision of publicly funded health

care services. The report’s publication triggered substantial divestment

of existing investor-owned primary care, nursing home, and home care

companies.

■ FUTURE CHALLENGES

Health systems in developed countries face continued challenges in

the coming years. These include financial, organizational, and policy

dilemmas for which institutionally viable, financially sustainable, and

politically supportable solutions will be complicated to develop and

difficult to implement. On the delivery side, a key question is whether

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