34 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

force in sub-Saharan Africa in the mid-I 960s. The Ethiopian

Air Force and, to a lesser extent, the Navy were also built up to

respectable strength by generous doses of military aid. In the

r course of two decades the total amount of such aid given to

\ Ethiopia exceeded th;t granted by the United States to the

f rest of the continent for similar purposes.

6

--- Substantial economic aid was also provided. The total for the

same period minus loans was slightly less than that given for ' ' . military aid. A swarm of United States government agencies

established themselves in the country, and their funds and influence permeated all sectors of Ethiopian society. Particularly

conspicuous was their presence in the educational sector, where

the largest Peace Corps contingent assigned to an African

country was engaged in teaching, while the country's sole university was completely dominated by United States funds and

personnel. Generous scholarship and travel funds brought

hundreds of Ethiopians to the United States each year. That

country also became Ethiopia's most important trading partner,

taking the bulk of its coffee exports. American private investment followed the initiative of its government, and by the late

1960s more than two hundred American firms were active in

Ethiopia. In return for its aid, the United States secured a

supine ally in a region where it was almost without any friends.

In more practical terms, it was able to establish a huge air base

at Asmara devoted to communication and electronic intelligence

functions, which was completely self-sustained and wholly

outside Ethiopian jurisdiction.

Supported by timely assistance from abroad, the structure of

a centralized bureaucracy soon took shape and firmness. Its

growth acquired new, powerful momentum by giving rise to a

new social class of civil and military officialdom. The character

of this group was stamped by the unique aspects of the situation that gave it birth. The institutionalization of the governmental process was cast in the conventional bureaucratic form.

However, the structures were designed to function as appen6. For details see Hearings before the Sub-committee on United States Security

Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.

Senate, 91st Congress, Part 8, 1 June 1970. Ethiopia had at least 40 000

men under arms at that time. '

IMPERIALISM AND TRANSFORMATION 35

dages of the throne, which now reached the zenith of its power.

To mana~e these institutions, a class of civil and military officials

was required who could fulfil the exacting role of royal retainers,

that is, to wield great power without possessing it. For more

than three decades, this task was meticulously performed by a

group of men especially recruited and groomed for this purpose

by Haile Selassie himself. Of diverse social origin, their common

denominator was modem education and a strong patrimonial

bond linking them to the monarch. This quite small group of

men monopolized the top offices of government and the armed

forces for the entire postwar period.

The class we shall call the bureaucratic-military bourgeoisie

grew around this inner core of retainers. Its members were

recruited initially from graduates returning from abroad, and

subsequently from local graduates. The process of recruitment

remained a personalized one involving the throne and its top

retainers. Consequently, while education remained a primary

qualification, it was seldom sufficient in itself. Traditional

status, patronage and nepotism were crucial factors in the

recruitment process. The educated sons of the aristocracy

enjoyed the highest preference, while relatives and clients of

inner core members followed closely behind. Thus, the dominant characteristics of the older retainer group were reproduced

in a constantly widening circle and became typical of the entire

class. The character of the military hierarchy was not different.

It included men trained abroad in the pre-war period, and

others trained at home later. Promotion to the top of the

hierarchy was basically a matter of patronage, and depended

mainly on a man's connections and political trustworthiness.

As the new institutions developed and the pre-eminence of

the centre was secured, this class rose to the heights of political

and social power. Since the strengthening of the centre was

accomplished at the expense of the provincial aristocracy, the

two classes were placed initially in a position of active rivalry.

Supported by the throne and counselled by foreign advisers,

the bureaucrats promoted various measures which undermined

the traditional autonomy of the aristocracy and curtailed some

of the customary privileges enjoyed by that class. The process

of taming the feudal nobility proceeded at a snail's pace. It

36 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

began in 1941 with the first decree issued by the restored

regime. This listed a set of administrative regulations for the

provincial government, an area over which the aristocracy exercised complete control. The restrictions imposed on provincial

officials by the decree provide a clear indication of the broad

power they had enjoyed previously. The new regulations forbade them to raise military forces, to maintain their own police

units, to negotiate and sign treaties with other states, to impose

and collect taxes and dues other than those fixed by tffe central

government, to accept money and other gifts from the people,

and to appoint, dismiss, or transfer subordinates on their own

authority.

One significant provision was for the payment of salaries to

provincial officialdom from the central treasury, and the concomitant proscription on the collection of gifts and other dues,

a traditional euphemism for bribery. Although official venality

was hardly affected, the provision of salaries meant the elimination of gult attached to office. A multitude of other forms of

gult held by individuals and institutions was not immediately

affected. However, subsequent measures undermined all forms

of secular gult and eventually abolished it entirely. It proved a

long and tortuous process. Another decree, issued in 1941 ,

abolished labour service and other customary forms of tribute

owed to the gultegna. In 1942, a uniform rate of taxation was

imposed, payable in the newly issued official currency. In 1944,

the taxation system was revised, and all customary forms of

tribute were outlawed. Henceforth, taxes were collected on

behalf of the Ministry of Finance, and receipts were issued to

the taxpayer. These measures did not spell the end of gult. What

they did was to expose its parasitic nature and render it vulnerable to further attack. The rise of an administrative structure

gradually made the gultegna superfluous. The only meaningful

function he continued to perform was that of local judge, and

this was valued for the income it provided in fees and fines. As

long as gult existed, the feudal class continued to receive a share

of the peasant produced surplus. This was represented by a

portion of the land tax which the gultegna was allowed to keep

for himself. It should be noted that four different taxes were

imposed on the peasantry during the postwar period. These

IMPERIALISM AND TRANSFORMATION 37

included the land tax, the tithe, a tax for education and another

for health services, although the rural areas had preciously little

of either service. The gultegna 's share came out of the land tax.

Moreover, the gultegna was exen1pted from the payment of land

tax on his own rist or personally claimed land.

The various sections of the feudal ruling class were affected

differently by these measures and related actions of the central

government. This is not surprising, for they were calculated to

have a differential impact . To begin with, the position of the

Church was not in the least affected, because none of these, or

subsequent, measures applied to Church gult or to the landholding rights of the common clergy. Initially, the government

made an attempt to deprive the Church of administrative and

judicial jurisdiction within itsgult and to transfer these functions

to the provincial administration. This move provoked serious

resistance and had to be abandoned. The decree of 1944, which

eliminated traditional forms of tribute, did not mention the

Church, and peasants in many areas refused to provide labour

service and other customary dues. Heeding the complaints of

the clergy, the government issued another decree in 194 7,

ordering the continuation of customary services and dues owed

the Church. Later, the Church benefited from the imposition of

the taxes for education and health, because it was allowed to

collect both within its gult, and to retain the former. It appears

that it also retained the latter tax, although it was supposed to

be turned over to the government. In addition, the Church collected and retained the tithe, as well as its own tribute on the

land. Moreover, although taxes to the government were paid in

cash, the Church continued to collect its own in kind, and as

the currency gradually diminished in value, the impositions of

the Church became more onerous on the peasant than those

of the government.

The landowning class in the southern region was only minimally affected. The abolition of gult attached to office proved

of no concern to this class in view of its reliance on landholding

rather than officeholding as a guarantee of privilege. Because

these landholdings were held as personal property, and the

peasants settled on them were regarded as tenants, the abolition

38 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

of the feudal obligations by the 1944 decree did not apply to

them, for these obligations represented payment of rent to the

landlord rather than tax due · to the state. The landlord was

legally obliged to pay the tithe, but normally collected this tax

from his tenants. The tenants were liable to all the other taxes,

in addition to the rent collected by the landlord. Landlords who

held gult grants collected a share of the land tax as described

above, and enjoyed exemption from this tax on their personal

property. Finally, the landlords paid no tax on the rent income

they received from their tenants.

The northern provincial aristocracy was affected by the

elimination of gult attached to office and the curtailment of

feudal obligations rendered by the peasantry to secular gult

in the past. Its position was further undermined by the institutionalization of the provincial administration, and the threatened displacement of the feudal governor by a cohort of civil

servants, army and police officers controlled by the central

government. The trend presaged not only loss of established

privilege, but also a corresponding loss of control over the

peasantry, the source of all privilege. The feudal class resisted

tenaciously and with considerable success. This success was due

to its ability to manipulate peasant sentiment and have it

ranged on its side in every confrontation with the centre. For

obvious reasons, the clergy provided inestimable help in cementing provincial solidarity against the growing threat to the feudal

structure. The peasant's susceptibility to such manipulation

stemmed from the age old fear for the security of his rist. This

fear was greatly exacerbated by the fate that befell the southern

peasantry. Ever since then, the intentions of the central government remained highly suspect, and any state action impinging

on land was likely to provoke misunderstanding among the

extremely wary peasants. In this situation, the curtailment of

gult privileges, although of obvious benefit to the cultivator

was ' not likely to be properly appreciated. Gult and rist were

twin features of the traditional system. A threat against one

could easily be made to appear as a common danger for both.

The northern aristocracy normally had little difficulty in manipulating appearances in this respect. As a result, almost every

initiative taken by the centre elicited disturbing reaction in the

IMPERIALISM AND TRANSFORMATION 39

northern provinces, and numerous uprisings occurred during

the postwar period.

The aims of provincial uprisings in the north were quite

limited and entirely reactionary, reflecting mainly the aristocracy's concern over the encroachment of their domain by the

central government. In this respect, they were far from unsuccessful. The ultimate result was the regime's failure to gain full

control of the provincial administration in the northern provinces. This key branch of government remained the bastion of

feudalism. Although appointments were made at the centre,

they were reserved for members of the local aristocracy; a rule

that admitted of few exceptions. Contrary to regulations, low

level appointments continued to be made locally and the centre

was simply notified of the fact. The central government's

control over appointments in the provincial administration of

the southern provinces was unhampered by such restrictions.

Yet here also, office was reserved for the aristocracy and imperial retainers, with the Shoa branch enjoying decided preference. The continued dominance of the feudal ruling class in

this branch of government ensured the continuity of traditional

methods of rule. No attempt was made to further modernize

the provincial administration, and nothing was added to the

regulations issued in 1941 during the next three decades.7

Governors continued to rule the provinces like minor satraps,

and did little to diminish the traditional reputation of their

office for insatiable venality. The judiciary was the other branch

of government which remained the domain of the aristocracy,

and it also preserved undamaged its legendary reputation for

corruption.

According to the taxation system that prevailed until the

mid-l 960s, the gultegna and landholding class was taxed neither

on its holdings nor on the income derived from them, while the

cultivator was subject to no less than four different taxes. Moreover, the privileged class was still able to appropriate part of the

land tax revenue, though not as large a share as previously. As· a

7. A scheme for local self-administration, concocted by the bureaucrats in the

late 1960s, was turned down on the grounds that it would impose heavier

financial obligations on the local communities.

40 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

result, the state's share of the revenue from land remained

stagnant throughout this period. However, it wasn't simply

concern with revenue that led to the last round of reforms in

1966-67. By this time, capitalism was gnawing at the roots of

the feudal plant. Goaded by foreign pressure, its domestic

sponsors were anxious to sweep away the last vestiges of the

traditional system. Land had to be freed from the remaining

feudal constraints in order to enter the market as a commodity.

In 1966, gult in all its secular forms was finally eliminated.

Only the Church continued to enjoy this feudal privilege. This

meant that former gultegnas now lost the share of the land tax

they had previously appropriated, as well as the tax exemption

they had enjoyed on their own land.

This was not an unmitigated loss. Since tax payment established title to land, the former gultegnas were given the opportunity to acquire modern legal title to those parts of their

former gult which they claimed as personal property. The

implementation C1f the reform had only begun when the regime

itself passed into history. Nevertheless the gultegnas in the

southern provinces were claiming large portions of their former

gult as personal property, and no objection was raised to the

validity of their claims. In 1967, an agricultural income tax was

imposed to replace the former tithe, leaving the other three

taxes in effect. The income tax was graduated and it applied

to all forms of income fro.m land, including rent. Thus, the landowning class was to be taxed on its income for the first time.

These measur~s confirmed and enshrined in modern legal

form the dispossession of the southern peasantry. The removal

of the last feudal trappings surrounding property relationships

revealed the stark fact of massive and irredeemable land alienation. Its natural corollary was tenancy. The extent of this condition in the:; southern region was staggering. According to the

regime's own surveys, it exceeded 50 per cent of the holdings in

three provinces and 40 per cent in four others. Another corollary was absentee landlordism. The same surveys intimated

the massiveness of this phenomenon as well, although the nature

of the data was far from precise. 8

8. In the late 1960s, the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration made an

attempt to Jive up to its name, by proposing legislation which would have

RIA LISM AND TRANSFORMATION

rMPE 41

The combined effect of these measures was markedly different in the two regions of Ethiopia. Tenancy in the north was

a minor phenomenon, the burden of oppressed minorities,

especially Muslims. The ristegnas tolerated such groups as long

as they disclaimed any right to land. They became explosively

resentful of any intimation to the contrary, hence, they were

highly opposed to any effort to regularize or improve the

tenant's status through governmental action. The ristegna's

position was strengthened considerably during the postwar

period. Rist was freed of all feudal liabilities and obligations,

and emerged as unencumbered freehold, though still within the

traditional kinship system. I ts status was recognized and safeguarded in a special chapter of the Civil Code. Nevertheless,

peasant mistrust of government motives barely diminished

during this period, and neither did peasant susceptibility to the

manipulative influence of the aristocracy and clergy. Disgruntled

by the abolition of gult and the highhandedness of a Shoa

governor, the feudal ruling class in Gojjam province seized the

occasion of the imposition of the agricultural income tax in

1967 to fan peasant suspicion by misinterpreting its objectives.

They were ably assisted by the government's mindless haste to

implement the measure immediately without any attempt to

communicate its import to the peasantry. The result was a

spontaneous uprising which pitted the peasants against every

branch of the regime's repressive apparatus, the Air Force

included, and lasted nearly a year. Having stayed on the sidelines, the Gojjam notables then offered themselves as intermediaries, and a number of them won local appointment. They

then set about energetically and successfully to suppress the

uprising.

While the retreat of feudalism left the northern peasant

essentially a smallholder, it sealed a luckless fate for the majority

of soutltern peasants as landless proletarians. In the traditional

affected landowner interests adversely. One proposal was for a graduated tax

on unutilized land, which was designed to force the cultivation or sale of _such

land. Another offered minimal protection to tenants in the form of wntten

leases a ceiling of one-third on rent - the Civil Code allowed rent up to twothirds' of the produce - and a ban on other landlord exactions. -~e proposals

were never seriously considered by the government, and the Minister responsible for them was dismissed shortly afterwards.

Nlfttlf

42 CLASS AND R EVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

mode of production, the disadvantages of that position were

concealed to a considerable extent by the landowner's inability

to exploit the land without the mediation of the tenant, a fact

that gave the latter security of tenure. In the 1960s, the advent

of capitalist commercial agriculture in the southern region

swiftly exposed the precariousness of the tenant's position on

the land.9 The peasant's earlier sullen resentment against landlord exploitation was now transformed into an increasingly

clear awareness of the antagonism between these two classes.

In the nature of the situation, where class and national divisions

largely coincided, it seemed inevitable that corresponding

forces would combine and engage their opposites in violent

conflict. The potential for convergence of class and national

antagonism was rife in southern Ethiopia, and had already

manifested itself at the periphery of the state, particularly

among the Somali people in the Ogaden region.

The struggle of the Somali against the old regime spanned

the entire postwar period. The widely ranging pastoralists in

the southeastern corner of Ethiopia never reconciled themselves to the rule of the ancien regime, which sought to restrict

their movements, imposed a livestock tax on them, and laid a

claim on all their land, without offering the slightest return for

such impositions. Sporadic clashes steadily exacerbated the

situation throughout the 1940s and 1950s. Somali resistance

inevitably turned to irredentism once the Somali Republic

across the border attained independence in 1960. The conflict

escalated and kept Ethiopia and Somalia on the brink of war

for several years. A state of emergency was declared in the

Ogaden which was placed under military rule for the duration.

The government tried to suborn the Somalia chiefs with money

and titles, while doing nothing to allay the hostility of the

people. In the early 1960s, a rebellion broke out in the adjacent

province of Bale. It began with incidents of resistance against

taxation among the Oromo peasantry, and escalated into attacks

on local towns where the landlords were congregated. The

government in tum mobilized the landlords and despatched

them against the rebels, with license to loot as their reward.

9. See below, section on 'Capitalism and Agriculture', pp.55-60.

IMPERIALISM AND TRANSFORMATION

43

Since the landlords were mostly of northern origin, the confrontation represented a neat conjunction of class and national

antagonisms. The landlords proved no match for the peasants,

and a succession of military expeditions had to be mounted to

contain the rebels who resorted to guerrilla tactics. The uprising

persisted on a reduced scale until 1970, when its leaders negotiated an amnesty for themselves. Nevertheless, the peasantry

suffered grievously. No less than 36.5 per cent of the measured

land in the district where the rebellion had centred was classified

as confiscated in 1968.

44

Chapter 3

Peripheral Capitalism

and Development

L pia's legendary isolation preserved t?e indigenous feu?al

,{';~~~~ system until well into the twentieth century. Havmg

ended this isolation and linked itself with the aggressive forces

of capitalism, the ancien regime exposed itself as an anachronism

condemned to extinction. However, its demise was not the

result of a bourgeois revolution. In fact, the chances of a bourgeois succession in the classic manner were buried along with

the ancien regime. The explanation for this must be sought in

the nature of the capitalist intrusion that occurred during the

reign of this regime.

The new mode of production embodied all the defects of

peripheral capitalism, many of them in an exaggerated form. In

order to compensate partially for the lack of conspicuous

economic attraction, the regime enacted an Investment Code

which was described as 'one of Africa's most liberal'.

10 In

addition, it gave land practically free, provided monopoly protection for any industry, and prevented the organization of

labour in order to maintain low wages. It also invested heavily

in the infrastructure required to sustain profitable investment,

and in numerous joint ventures with foreign capital. Stimulated

by the appearance of a domestic market - the state itself

emerged as a major consumer - western capital was attracted

into manufacturing for import substitution. By 1970, the

number of industrial enterprises employing more than 20

persons rose to 300. As a result, Ethiopia acquired a modern

economic sector which was mostly foreign owned. By 1967 7 5

per cent of the private paid up capital in manufacturing w;s in

10. TheNew York Times, 17 June 1967.

PERIPHERAL CAPITALISM AND DEVELOPMENT 45

foreign hands.11 The drain of profits from the country was largely

unchecked, since even the very liberal restrictions of the Investment Code were normally evaded. The management of this sector

was in the same hands. In 1968, out of 7 6 member concerns of

the Federation of Employers of Ethiopia, only eight had Ethiopian management.

12 The situation in trade was no different.

Foreign owned firms controlled both import and export trade,

while foreign communities resident in the country dominated the

intermediate trade sector. Thus instead of promoting the

development of an indigenous bourgeoisie with a base in the

modern economic sector, intruding capitalism pre-empted this

role and precluded the development of such a class.

Capital could not avoid creating its counterpart, wage labour.

The Ethiopian working class began to form in the 1950s with the

appearance of manufacturing industry. It grew to a very modest

size by the mid-l 960s, when countervailing trends set in to

block further growth. 13 The bulk of the labour force was of

rural origin, uneducated and unskilled. In the given situation of

unlimited supply of labour of this kind, Ethiopian workers were

easily and harshly victimized. The average daily wage for unskilled labour in Addis Ababa remained between 1 to 1. 25

Ethiopian dollars from the early 1960s to the mid-l 970s,

despite the inflationary trend in prices during the latter years.

Skilled workers commanded higher wages because of their

scarcity, but they were a small minority of the labour force.

There were no training programmes to upgrade worker skills.

No effort was made to compel employers to localize their

work force, and numerous foreign artisans continued to enter

the country. Ethiopia never had a minimum wage law, nor any

11. Eshetu Chole, 'The Mode of Production in Ethiopia and the Realities Thereof, Chalienge (N.Y.~ Ethiopia Students Union, North America), XI, 3, 1971,

p.11.

12. Seyoum Gebregzhiaber, 'The Development of Some Institutions Concerned

with Labour Relations in Ethiopia', (Addis Ababa: Haile Selassie I University,

1969), p.81.

13. The official figures for the 1960s converge on an estimate of 400,000 persons

in urban productive employment. Approximately half this number were in

small scale industry and are not precisely accounted for in official statistics.

Among the rest, construction employed 100,000 manufacturing 51,000, and

other sectors employed a combined total of 40,000 workers or so.

46 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

other form of effective protection for its workers. Employers

were free to use any method designed to cut labour costs, and

they used all the familiar ones, and then some more.

14