120 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

illiterate would not be represented in such a government; therefore, it would be a form of minority rule. The opposition countered by pointing out that the progressive forces were far

broader than the military, and more representative since they

had led the popular movement. It was also argued that a civilian government could not be as strong as a military one, to

which the answer was that any government is only as strong

as its popular support. It was further maintained that Ethiopia's

main problems are economic and not political, therefore political organizations such as parti~s would be a luxury. The opposi tion rejected the artificial distinction between economics and

politics, and argued that unless the political system is restructured, economic problems cannot be solved. 60 In 1975, the

military government announced its intention to establish a

mass political party under its auspices.

The Dergue's decision to pursue a policy of escalated repression in Eritrea further alienated the radical intelligentsia. The

military regime adopted the line favoured by its predecessor,

which attributed the problem to a handful of bandits operating

with foreign help, and with the ·aim of handing Eritrea over to

a foreign state. In his first public appearance, shortly before the

November executions, one of the Dergue strongmen, Major

Mengistu Haile Mariam, repeated this line verbatim, and declared

that the choice for Ethiopians was between unity and death.61

After the death of· Aman, reinforcements were sent to the

province, and the struggle intensified with increasing resort to

he.avy weaponry, which took a high toll among non-combatants

but had little effect on the rebel forces. Ethiopians had grown

weary of the 14 year-old struggle and perplexed by the seeming

impossibility of finding a solution to it. The government's occasional appeals to patriotism evoked a hollow response. The radical

group condemned the policy of repression unequivocally. Taking their stand on Leninist principles, the radicals defended the

untrammelled right of nationalities to self-determination,

including the right of secession. 62 This ~iq not mean, they

60. The arguments are cited and answeredinDemocracia, No.13,-26 October 1974.

61. Ethiopian Herald, 19 November 1974.

62. Democracia, No.18, 2 December 1974.

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121

aued, that they encouraged separatis11:. On the con~rary, they

arc ported unity, and opposed repression because 1t was the

suP test obstacle to unity. They pleaded for a democratic soluarea . t· n that would allow people to decide for themselves. It was

1

iinted out that oppression confused people and focused their

hopes on national rather than ~lass.solutions. It wa~ hoped that

once the right to self-determmatlon was recognised unconditionally, unity could be restored through class solidarity.

However, if separation was the true wish of the majority, it

d 63 must be grante .

The struggle in Eritrea reached a new phase, and its ultimate

outcome may indeed have been decided, in the savage battle

for Asmara which occurred during the first week of February

1975. After a decade of obscurity, the liberation movement

had finally gained international stature and increased support

from wealthy Arab states. Having wrested considerable freedom of move1nent in the countryside, it was able to establish

bases near principal towns such as Keren and Asmara. And

while the military government in Addis Ababa was struggling to

contain civilian and military challenges to its authority, the

two liberation movements, the Eritrean Liberation Front and

the Eritrean Popular Liberation Forces, submerged their differences temporarily to combine their forces in a daring attempt

to capture an urban base that could serve as the seat of a revolutionary Eritrean government. The attack on Asmara took place

during the first week of February 197 5. Government troops were

caught in a crossfire between units attacking the outskirts of

the city and infiltrators holed up in buildings in the centre.

Members of the local police and sympathetic civilians joined

the attack, spreading confusion and panic . among the government forces. In the savage street fighting that took place during

the next few days, the soldiers made little distinction between

their attackers and uninvolved civilians. They took a frightful

toll among the latt er, and the story of atrocities committed in

the process of regaining control of the city shocked Eritreans

everywhere into a reassessment of their position. The liberation movement failed to gain an urban base, but it scored a

63. Voice of the Broad Masses, No.22, 1 January 1975.

122 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

crucial, perhaps decisive success. It achieved the complete

polarization of sentiment among Eritreans, and inost importantly

among Christian Eritreans, whose attitude towards separatism

was until now quite uncertain. After the Asmara battle, practically all Eritreans became convinced that separation is the

only solution, and an increasing number among them became

willing to commit themselves to that goal.

The continuing entanglement in Eritrea had the additional

effect of prolonging Ethiopia's dependence upon the United

States for military assistance. What was a crucial factor in

the maintainance of the ancien regime, seemed to remain

equally important for the military regime, despite the latter's

radical posture in domestic affairs. Though ,American visibility

in Ethiopia was considerably diminished by the phasing out of

the large Kagnew air base in Asmara and the removal of several

other 'missions', as well as the drastic reduction of the Peace

Corps contingent, Ethiopian dependence on the great power

was not reduced. Consequently, the United States reacted

calmly to the nationalization of foreign investment. Ethiopia's

request for continued military assistance in 1975 was favourably received in Washington because, as a State Department

official explained to a committee of Congress, United States

policy makers believed that 'this long-time relationship is

worth preserving. '

64 This relationship came under scathing

attack by the progressive elements in the popular movement.

They had consistently demanded the abrogation of treaties

tying their country to the imperialist camp, and denounced

their continuity as a betrayal of the popular movement and

further proof of the military's insincerity.

Though it became a prisoner of the ancien regime's repressive policy in Eritrea, the Dergue repeatedly stated its abhorence of its predecessor's narrow chauvinism, and declared its

belief in the equality of all nationalities and cultures within

Ethiopia. Such declarations were accepted as genuine by the

Ethiopian people, if only because a good many members of the

Dergue did not belong to the formerly dominant northern

64. 'Recent Developments in Ethiopia', The Department of State, News Release,

5 March 1975.

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Christian group. A beginning was made to implement this

policy. Besides ending the dominance of the Christian Church

and depriving it of its vast landholdings, the government redressed an ancient wrong by recognizing Islam. 65 The large

Oromo population could now hear its language in regular radio

programmes,66 and other national groups were emboldened

to demand the same right. The enforced cultural domination of

the northern Christian group appeared to be nearing an end as

well.

65. Three Islamic and five Christian holidays were officially recognized.

66. A newspaper printed in that language appeared later.

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PART III

The Military

Regime

127

Chapter 9

Reforms and Contradictions · ·

197 5 proved a year of con.tradictions for Ethiopia. During this

year, the military regime sponsored sweeping social ·and econ(}-

mic ref arms demanded by the radical mood of the . popular

movement, and thus dismantled the foundations of the an·cien

regime. In striking a radical pose·, the soldiers· we~e · not simply :

fallowing their social inclinations; though this was undoubtedly

a factor of considerable importance. Political expediency · was · ·

another factor of equal, if not greater, importance~ Having risen

to power on the crest of a popular upheaval, the Dergue could

not hope to remain in control withoutresponding to the ·baSic

aspirations of the masses. By doing so, it .was· hoping to win ·

support among the petty bourgeoisie and the · peasantry~ to

discipline the workers and gain control of the trade -union movement, and to neutralize the opposition of the radical intelligentsia. However, the reforms failed to isolate the Tadical group,

which proceeded to orchestrate an effective campaign'.'.ofpropa~.

ganda and agitation on behalf of popular_· rule. The'. campaign

was joined by labour activists, whose determination to .,defy the

military regime was reinforced by 'the continued attack against

their organization, and the . general deteribratiort · of ·working

class conditions during this period. The Dergue's response to

mounting opposition was a· resort· t'o forceful oppression. Consequently, during this year, the breach between the soldier

rulers and the progressive forces. widened. beyond the .limits of

compromise, and the battleline. for · the ··next .phase of the

struggle was formed. The contradiction b~tween social advance

and political regression spread a pall of confusioti. on.the, sc~ne,

which obscured the real trend of events. This trend· pointed

towards a dictatorship with bonapartist asI?itations~ · ·

128 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

The year began with a number of radical departures in the

socio-economic field undertaken by the military government.

These came as a series of shocks, rather than stages in a planned

programme, for it was clear that the soldiers had certain inclinations, but no inkling of a programme for radical change. From

the very beginning, they came under unrelenting pressure from

the popular movement to dismantle the socio-economic structure of the old regime. Nationalization was bruited about, and

the radical intelligentsia demanded a national economy independent of both capitalism and imperialism, yet no specific programme was forthcoming from any public source. 1 The Dergue's

earlier policy statements were vague enough to allow any interpretation. 2 Thus, the sweeping nation_alization measures announced in January and February of 1975 came as a surprise.

Even the radical group did not seem to have anticipated the

extent of this development. 3 Nevertheless, individual members

of the radical intelligentsia who had attached themselves to the

Dergue as advisers, and others who had recently attained high

administrative posts through promotion or appointment, were

primarily responsible for framing the specific measures. The

chairmen of the Dergue sub-committees, who were. among the

most influential of its members, were susceptible to the radical

viewpoint, and they proved instrumental in promoting its

acceptance among their colleagues.

Beginning with banks, financial institutions and insurance

companies, the government then nationalized 72 concerns

involved in food, beverage, textile, leather, shoe, printing,

chemical, iron and steel processing and production. In February

1975 it issued the first statement on economic policy entitled ' ' 'Declaration on Economic Policy of Socialist Ethiopia'. The

statement envisaged a three-tiered economy with state ownership of basic industries, resources and utilities; a state~private

1. CELU had not asked for nationalization. Democracia. (No.14,' 4 November

1974) recommended the nationalization of big industries, banks and insurance

companies. . . , . . . . 2. An editorial in Addis Zemen (17 September 1974) stated: 'We want foreign

capitalists to invest, helping themselves while helping us ... '. · · · · .

3. The Dergue's declaration of Ethiopian Socialism on 20 December .1974 was

denounced by Democracia (No.20, 25 December 1974) as a 'gimi;ni~k' . .

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. · 1

t sector in exploration and mining of mineral wealth, paper,

JS:~~tics, large con;:;truction and tourism, that is, areas Ethiopia-

\nnot hope to develop without foreign ca_µital; and a private

\ctor of considerable extent which included wholesale and

rdail trade, import and export trade, surface transport other

than railway, food processing, hotels, small scale manufactur- . 4 ing and lesser enterprises.

These and subsequent seizures constituted nationalization

cum Ethiopianization. Non-Ethiopian .managerial and administrative personnel were dismissed or withdrew voluntarily.

Technical posts as well were gradually taken over by Ethiopians.

On the occasion of the second anniversary of the takeover, it

was announced by the Ministry of National Resources that the

total of 200 nationalized units were under Ethiopian management.5 The posts were filled by promotion of.persons already in

place or througi1 hiring of others. In either case, the appointment

represented a significant promotion, and the beneficiaries were,

for the greater part, members of the petty bourgeoisie. This class

also provided the officialdom for three new large ministries -

ational Resources, Industry, Public Works and Housing - and

numerous agencies established to oversee the nationalized sector.

According to one report, about 30,000 posts were added to the

state sector, expanding its size by almost one-third. 6

While capitalism in Ethiopia had come under concerted

attack fairly recently, and then only by the most progressive

gro:1ps of the popular movement, the feudal landowning system

in the southern region of the country had been the foremost

politica! issue for more than a decade. It was brought to the

surface during the 1960 coup attempt, when both the rebels

and their student supporters decried the landle~sness and

deprivation of the peasantry . It was crystallized in 1965, when

the university student movement -began its tenacious attack

on the ancien regiJne with a demonstration demanding the

4. Businesses falling in the third category, but belonging to foreign residents of

long standing, have been nationalized for various reasons; including tax _evasion,

abandonment by their owners, etc.

5. Ethiopia Herald, 3 February 1977.

6. Ibid., 28 December 1977.

I .HI CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

tt·turn of 'Land to the Tiller'. From then on, the students and

th • rndica I intelligentsia never allowed the issue to stray away

from the forefront of the political struggle. The former govemm .n fs abortive attempts in its last years to enact some intHH:uous measures for tenant protection served only to highlight

t'hl• issue in the public mind. The February movement rendered

it a I most obligatory for all progressive groups to include land

ref rm among their demands, and hardly an underground

document appeared that failed to make mention of it. The

arn1ed forces with their large element deriving from the dispossessed southern peasantry were quite receptive to the call.

So that once they came to power, the issue became, what kind

of land reform would they support?

In this instance also, the Dergue opted for the most radical

of the proposals put before it. Shortly before Haile Selassie was

deposed, the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration was

asked to submit proposals for reform. The Minister at the time

was the same person who, in the late 1960s, had tried to make

this ministry live up to its name by proposing some harmless

measures for reform. He had not only failed then, but had also

lost his job in consequence. On the strength of that reputation,

he was reappointed by Endalkatchew to the same post. His

conception of land reform had not changed much in the meantime, and comprised tenancy regulation and a ceiling on landownership of 1200 hectares. A ceiling on holdings around that

level was generally regarded as optimum for economic as well

as political reasons. However, a group of young officials in

the ministry had different ideas. They were, most of them,

local university graduates and veterans of the student struggle

against the autocracy. Their proposal was the one eventually

implemented.

This was based on a recommendation for land reform prepared shortly before by a group of men with the same background, who were employed by the Swedish-sponsored Chilalo

Agricultural Development Unit in Arusi province. Their experience taught them that the maximum area a family can cultivate under present conditions in Ethiopia is no more than five

to six hectares. Taking into account grazing requirements, the

most a family can effectively utilize is a maximum of ten hec-

REFORMS AND CONTRADICTIONS 131

tares. They boldly suggested that land refonn limit ownership

to that figure, and extra land be nationalized without compensation and distributed to the landless. Fragmentation could be

avoided by limiting inheritance to one heir, while sale and renting of land was to be prohibited. These suggestions were sharpened further by the group at the Ministry of Land Refonn, by

eliminating ownership entirely through total nationalization of

land, and making individual allotments possible up to a maximum of ten hectares, provided there is enough land in the

locality, rather than a guaranteed minimum of ten hectares. The

difference is crucial, because there is nowhere near enough

land to give every peasant in Ethiopia ten hectares of land. Until

the redistribution of land took place, tenants were given possessory rights over the land they tilled, and any type of transfer or

alienation of land, other than by inheritance of possessory

rights, was prohibited. Commercial fanns and estates were to

become state farms.

The above proposal was discussed within the ministry, but

was rejected as a candidate for submission to the cabinet and

the Dergue, at the insistence of the Minister, who maintained

that it would not merit a hearing. He then submitted his proposals to a cabinet meeting attended by members of the Dergue's

committee on economic affairs. The meeting took place after

Haile Selassie's overthrow. While the members of the cabinet

appeared to favour the Minister's proposals, a Dergue representative asked the Minister whether any alternative suggestions

had been made. When he replied in the affirmative, he was told

to report back bringing with him the officials responsible for

them. At subequent meetings, the young men defended their

proposal using well-prepared position papers. In the meantime,

the Minister was arrested along with other former officials, and

was replaced by a young lawyer sympathetic to the radical

proposal. This proposal was opposed by the entire cabinet with

one exception, the Minister of Education, a former university

lecturer. The ministers, most of them members of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, characterized the proposed land reform as

extreme and calculated to provoke an uprising in the rural

sector. They also predicted a catastrophic fall in production as

the result of fragmentation of large units. The proposers pre-

I ,I J CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

d ctc d support. for the reform among the masses of peasants

11 nd soldi0rs, more than sufficient to overcome the anticipated

t)ppn~il ion . Th ey argued that production would fall only in the

l'omm •rd al sector, which produced for export and not for

·on~umption. Thjs could also be prevented, since commercial

units wer' to be turned intact into state farms. The· proposers

th ·ms ·lvcs divid ed on the need to make a distinction between

th · northern region, where smallholders predominate and

h >hi land in the traditional kinship tenure and where tenancy

is u minor phenomenon, and the southern region where the

feudal landholding system was entrenched. It was finally agreed

to make no substantive distinction, because not only ought the

tenants in the north, no matter how few, to be included in the

reform, but also because regional distinctions were an odious

practice of the past and should not be continued. 7

The final stage of the debate was attended by the Chairman

and the two Vice-Chairmen of the Dergue. All three were

strongly in favour of the radical proposal and, in the end, the

intimidated members of the Cabinet had little choice but to

agree. 8 Subsequently, the reform was discussed by the full

Dergue, and the proposers from the ministry were called twice _

before it to explain its provisions. Since they were asked only

technical questions, it appears that a decision on substance had

alreadj been taken. The land reform was proclaimed on 4 March

197 5. All rural land became the collective property of the

Ethiopian people, the distribution between owner and tenant

was abolished, and the transfer of land through any means was

prohibited. No compensation was offered to former landowners. No special mention was made of the Church, and it

was taken for granted that it too had been deprived finally of

its ancient privileges. The medieval era had come to an end,

and to celebrate its passing the people of Addis Ababa and

other towns staged the largest, most enthusiastic demonstrations

the country had ever seen. It was a poignant moment in Ethiopia's

7. Nevertheless, some distinction was made between the two regions. See pages

136-137.

8. Immediately afterwards, the Minister of Agriculture manifested his disagreement by fleeing the country. . -

9. Proclamation No.31 of 1975.

RFFORMS AND CONTRADICTIONS 133

\ long history and the greatest achievement of the popular

revolution.

The land reform became also the starting point of a concerted

campaign to radicalize the peasant masses and to promote the

assertion of their class interests, a task seldom undertaken sincerely by urban classes professing solidarity with the peasantry.

The struggle to win total emancipation for the victims of their

country's history was waged with unrestrained enthusiasm by

the student and teacher corps that had already been sent to the

countryside in an officially sponsored campaign to promote

'progress through co-operation'. 10 Its initial aim was to explain

the objectives of the 'Ethiopia First' movement to the people

in the rural areas. Later, the specific tasks of promoting functional literacy , agricultural education, improved health and

sanitation conditions, and community self-help organization

were added.

Initially, the students and teachers opposed the campaign,

viewing it as a stratagem designed to disperse them in order

to give the regime 'breathing space' .1 1 They resisted the call,

pointing out that without adequate preparation and with insufficient ni aterial there was little they could do to close the gap

between the urban and rural conditions of life - a gap that

could be measured in terms of centuries. The Dergue insisted,

using a mixture of persuasion and intimidation, and ultimately

warning those who failed to register for the campaign that

they would be barred from further education and employment.

The students succumbed, and the campaign was officially

launched on 21 December 1974. Eventually, close to 60,000

students and teachers were involved, including those in the last

two grades of secondary school. Most were despatched to the

rural districts throughout the country except Eritrea, where

students steadfastly refused to participate. The campaign was

to last 'as long as required', and the process of e.ducation above

the tenth grade was halted for its duration.

10. The plan for the campaign had been conceived before the Emperor's overthrow. The Teachers Association was urged by the Dergue to undertake such a

campaign early in September 1974.

11. Voice of the Broad Masses, No.12, 5 November 1974.

134 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

Until the proclamation of land reform the following March,

the campaign lacked both morale and the material means

required to fulfil its stated objectives. Land reform gave it

new meaning and tangible goals. Henceforth, the implementation of the reform became the campaign's primary task. The

proclamation provided for the formation of peasant associations to carry out the reforms, to handle land litigation, to

administer public property, and to promote co-operative

schemes and development projects. It was far from clear what

status the associations were meant to have in the governmental structure, or what the peasants, left to themselves, would

make of their new opportunity. The campaigners, on their

part, were determined to make the most of it by promoting

genuine local self-government through the peasant associations.

The organization of the associations became their major preoccupation.

Understandably, the land reform met with rising enthusiasm

in the southern region, where the peasantry emerged, somewhat bewildered, from under the yoke of landlordism. They

suddenly discovered, as one of them put it, that 'we are children of Adam also, and from now on will live like other men'.

After they overcame the peasants' initial mistrust, the campaigners threw themselves into the task of association organization. Once these were formed, they were guided towards

self-assertion vis-a-vis the central government and its local

representatives. They were also urged to take militant action

toward their former oppressors. The students fostered the class

consciousness of the poor peasant, and encouraged him to segregate his enemies and to exclude them from the associations. 12

They occasionally instigated attacks on landlords, judges,

former officials, policemen, merchants and other elements associated with the ancien regime. They encouraged radical peasant

initiatives that led to frequent violations of government policy,

such as refusal to pay rent for the past season, confiscation of

landlord property - stores, houses, furniture, animals, weapons,

mills - and occupation of large commercial farms intended for

12. According to the proclamation, former owners of more than ten hectares were

excluded from membership. ·

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REFORMS AND CONTRADICTIONS 13S

state ownership. They also encouraged a tendency among the

peasants to give the judicial committees of their associations

jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters, which would

have the effect of depriving both the police and judiciary of

any meaningful function in rural Ethiopia. In short, the campaigners sought to foster a large degree of peasant self-government, in order to prevent the bureaucratization of the new

economic and social order, which would subject the peasantry

to the rule of what was derogatorily described as 'petty-bourgeois

socialism'.

The campaign was conducted with self-conscious adherence

to democratic principles. The educated, urban elements seemed

keenly aware of the risk of lapsing into 'commandism', and

tried to avoid imposing themselves on the peasants. They also

saw to it that the peasants themselves recognized and followed

open, democratic procedure in their activities. In many areas

of the south, the campaigners received co-operation and assistance from the newly appointed provincial administrators. In

a more or less thorough sweep of the provincial administration,

all province and district governors were replaced by university

graduates and a few military officers, and most of the subdistrict governors were replaced by school-teachers. 13 The

Ministry of Land Reform also despatched a corps of newly

recruited agents, mostly former employees of the Ministry of

Community Development, to assist the peasant associations.

Thus, a cadre of the petty bourgeoisie was farmed in the

countryside, representing both a hope for ushering in a new

era, and a threat that this hope might be snared and stifled in a

net woven by the new bureaucracy.

The rush of events in the southern region left the military

rulers quite apprehensive. In their eyes, the campaigners were

undermining the authority of the new regime by pushing the

peasants. towards self-government. Furthermore, the unrestrained attacks on former ruling-class elements which had taken

refuge in the provincial towns seemed calculated to provoke a

violent reaction. Indeed, groups of dispossessed landlords and

13. The title 'governor' was changed to 'administrator'.

136 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

former officials took to the forests, from where they launched

occasional forays which took the lives of campaigners and

peasants. Their forces seemed to grow during the summer of

1975, while the Dergue hesitated to take countermeasures for

fear of escalating the level of violence. The police turned

increasingly hostile to the campaign, not only refusing to act

against such elem en ts, but also often taking arbitrary action

against campaigners and provincial officials who sided with

them. A number of clashes occurred, and many campaigners

were arrested and imprisoned in the campaign · headquarters

at Addis Ababa. The threat of armed reaction in the south was

ended, at least temporarily, by a force of peasants led by

provincial officials which swept the forests clean in late June.

That danger faded, but the tension between the military rulers

and the campaigners remained. Citing the fear of landlord

reaction, the progressive elements demanded the arming of the

peasant associations. Not surprisingly, the Dergue balked.

'Today they get guns, tomorrow they refuse · to pay taxes',·

one of its members predicted. Nevertheless, the southern

peasants had taken some guns from the landlords and were

proudly shouldering them, a symbol of their new status as

free men.

Predictably, the land reform did not inspire commensurate

enthusiasm in the northern provinces, where smallholding is the

rule, and large estates and tenancy the exception. The reform

held no promise of immediate gain for the vast majority of

rist-holding peasants. Those who gained comprised small groups

of tenants, members of minority groups traditionally despised

by the Christian majority. The reform also may have awakened

fears concerning the preservation of the customary ,system of

kinship tenure, to which the northern peasantry is deeply

attached. To prevent this, the proclamation dealt with communal lands in a separate article, which confirmed the possessory rights of ristegnas over the land they presently cultivate,

and prohibited any further claims on such land. •M.oreover, the

proclamation did not envisage redistribution of land in these

areas, and the peasant associations here were not assigned the

task of redistributing land 'as equally as possible', as they were

expected to do elsewhere. On the other hand, the ·reform did

REFO RMS AND CONTRADICTIONS 137

not provoke the vio1ent reaction many feared, and others had

hoped for. Initial attempts by members of the former ruling

class to stage counter-revolutionary uprisings in the northern

region were rendered for1orn by lack of peasant support. Nevertheless, the popular movement did not excite a class-conscious

response in this region, whose population, as shown earlier, had

retained its traditional perspective with little modification.

Strong vertical social ties linking the former ruling class with

the peasantry inhibited the overt manifestation of class hostility.

The still formidable influence of the Christian clergy had a

similar dampening effect. Consequently, the campaign in the

north met a cautious response and it proved a relatively subdued -

affair. Peasant associations were duly formed and took up the

task of land litigation. However, with land already minutely

divided, the associations here lacked the challenging task of

redistribution that endowed their counterparts in the south

with exciting vitality. 14

The land reform had least impact on the nomadiCipeople who

inhabit the periphery of the state. The proclamat1-on gave the

nomads possessory rights over the land they use for, grazing and

other agricultural purposes. Since the imperial regime had never

pressed its professed claim to state ownership pver all nomad

lands~ the benefits conferred by the -reform were largely theoretical and scarcely comprehended. However, one area where

the reform had explosive impact was the land of the Afar,

where cotton production had fostered private ownership of

land. Initial1y, the military regime appeared unwilling to alienate

Ali Mira, the Sultan of Awsa, and his chiefs. The Afar occupy a

strategic position on the Red Sea littoral, which could become

the linchpin in a linkup between Eritrean secessionism and

Somali irredentism. Before the land-reform proclamation, Ali

Mira had pledged unconditional support for the new regime,

and was praised in tum by a Dergue member as a ruler who had

always done all he could for his people. 15 After the proclamation, the regime faced the problem of ·~·,1ndling the Afar ruler

14. Asked if he could use more land, an old peasant here replied : 'Certainly. But

where will it come from?' ·

15. Ethiopian Herald, 22 October 1974.

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138 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

and his chiefs, who had recently become the wealthiest landlords

in Ethiopia. While the Dergue procrastinated, pressure to

implement the reform in the Afar region was exerted by the

campaigners stationed in the area and officials of the Ministry

of Land Reform.

In May 1975, the campaigners recruited a deputation of

landless Afar tribesmen and sent them to Addis Ababa to demand

the redistribution of land in their region. Ali Mira countered

this move by despatching a delegation of his chiefs to the capital.

The latter sat glumly through a series of addresses by high

officials who explained to them the aims of the revolution.

Subsequently, Ali Mira was invited to the capital for talks,

but the suspicious traditional ruler declined. Instead, he issued

an invitation of his own to the government. A group of officials,

including members of the Dergue, arrived at Assaita, the Sultan's

capital, at the end of May. However, when they sought to

address a mass meeting there, they were prevented from doing

so by Ali Mira's armed guards. The same evening, the Sultan's

men attacked the local campaign headquarters, and forced

the official visitors and campaigners to evacuate the area hurriedly. During the next few days, Afar bands armed with

modem weapons interrupted traffic on the road to Assab,

where Ethiopia's only refinery is found, and caused a critical

petrol shortage throughout the country. Government forces

cleared the road and forced Ali Mira to take refuge in Jibouti,

from where he vowed to launch a war of liberation. Security in

the area was never completely restored, and the road to Assab

was travelled from now on only by protected convoys. 16

The Peasant Association Organization and Consolidation

Proclamation, 17 issued in December 1975, was a concession

to the insistent demand generated by the campaign for the

strengthening of the associations as instruments of local selfgovemment. Through it, the regime sought to consolidate

peasant support - a factor of crucial importance by this time,

given the mounting opposition against its rule in the urban

16. Petrol rationing was maintained permanently.

17. Proclamation No.71 of 1975.

REFORMS AND CONTRADICTIONS 139

sector. Obligingly, the associations were now granted legal

status in order 'to enable the peasantry to administer itself.

The jurisdiction of association judicial tribunals was extended:

to all civil matters involving no more than l 00 Ethiopian

dollars, property disputes between spouses, and certain · other

categories of civil litigation, as well as criminal cases involving

violation of association regulations and petty offences listed in

the Penal Code. The tribunals were empowered to impose

sentences of imprisonment up to three months and fines up

to $300. Their decisions were enforced by the Peasant Defence

Squad, an armed unit with militia and police functions formed

within each association.

In order to 'lay down the foundations of socialist agriculture',

the associations were given the right to establish (a) service

co-operatives for marketing, credit, supply, storage and other

services, (b) producer co-operatives whose purpose is to 'put

the main instruments of production under the control of, and

when necessary to gradually transfer their ownership to, the

society', and to enable its members to work collectively. The

campaigners had been urging the southern peasants to forego

the redistribution of land in privately owned parcels, and to

farm communes instead. The provision for producer co-operatives in this proclamation was designed obviously to indicate ·

the regime's commitment to socialist principles in agriculture.

However, no clear policy decision was reached on· this crucial

issue. Aside from this provision in the proclamation, . and the

slight inducement offered to co-operative members in the new

agricultural taxation system, no real effort was exerted to

promote collective methods in agricultural production. With ·

the denouement of the student campaign in · early · 1976, the

drive to prevent the institutionalization of peasant dwarfuolding

as the new mode of production among the newly-emancipated

southern peasants was stalled. The subsequent lapse of the

country into disorder left the peasantry to its own devices.

The same proclamation established a hierarchy of Revolutionary Administrative and Development Committees · at the

sub-district, district and province levels. Their functions were

to co-ordinate the work of governmental bodies at each level,

and to enable the peasantry to participate 'in the political, ·

140 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

social and economic movement'. The composition of the committees was mainly bureaucratic, however, and they were placed

under the direction of the Ministry of Interior. Peasant association representation was a small minority at the district and

sub-province level, and non-existent at the province and higher

levels, including the ministerial Permanent Central Committee,

which was given the crucial function of recommending and

executing policy in the rural sector. From this it would appear

that the regime took a narrow view of peasant participation in

the government.

Shortly afterwards, the existing complex agricultural taxation

system was changed. 18 A simpler system was introduced, comprising a fee for the use of land and a tax on agricultural income.

The fee was made lower for members of co-operafives ($3 annually), than for non-members ($4 ). The income tax was set

at flat rates for incomes up to $1,200 per annum, with a minimum rate of $3 for incomes below $600. Incomes above this

level became subject to a graduated tax scale which rose steeply.

Tax and fee collection at the upper income level was assigned ,.

to the Ministry of Finance. Collection at the lower level was

entrusted to the peasant associations, who got to keep two per

cent of the total collected before turning the rest over to the

government.

The nationalization of urban land and extra housing was

another sweeping measure. Urban housing tenancy in Ethiopia

was, if anything, a more widely and evenly spread phenomenon

than agricultural land tenancy. Most Ethiopian towns are of

relatively recent origin because the country historically lacked

an urban culture. Numerous towns were founded during the

last century as capitals of provincial dynasties and garrison

towns - the latter being particularly true for many towns in

the southern region. The land in these towns was claimed

originally by the warrior nobility, whose descendants eventually

became urban landlords. They were joined by many others,

since urban real estate was one area where domestic capital

investment was concentrated. Urban rent was a significant source

18. 4 January 1976.

REFORMS AND CONTRADICTIONS _•· 141

of income for the former ruling classes,· while many less privi- _

leged Ethiopians also supplemented their income . by building

and renting out the mud-plastered wooden shacks which co'mprise the majority of urban housing in this_ country.

Tenancy was widespread among the · educated petty bourgeoisie and almost universal among _ the newly formed working

class. Therefore, it was . bound to give rise to demands for

reform. These appeared first during August 1974, when the

issue was discussed in several articles, editoria,Js and letters

which appeared in the press. It was then alleged that .almost

70 per cent of the housing in Addis Ababa was rented. A

demonstration by tenants followed, and in one of its first acts

the Dergue ordered a rent freeze. Less than a year later, the

regime nationalized urban land and extra housing without _compensation.19 Former owners were given usufruct rights Qver

500 square metres of land, without the right of sale orJransfer.

Usufruct rights, however, pass over to their· descendants:-.ownership of housing was limited to one unit per family or individual,

and all extra units were nationalized without compensation.20

Simultaneously, rents were reduced according to a graduated

scale. Reductions ranged from 50 per cent for the cheapest

housing to 15 per cent for the more expensive, while luxury

rents above $300 per month were not reduced. Urban Dwellers

Associations were formed to admjnister housing and neighbourhood affairs. The associations were -charged ,with the m.aintainance of housing units receiying rent up to $1 QQ per month,

and were allowed to retain the rent income from such housing.

The Ministry of Public Works and .Housing . maintains. and

receives the rent from the more expensive ho,using units. · -

While the land reform and the formation o( peasant associations represent radical attempts . to change the: status· of the

rural proletariat, the positio;n · of urban labour · was hardly. im19. 26 July 1975.

20. Compensation in the form of monthly payment~ was provided : for former

owners for whom rent was the only source of income. Provision was made

also for organizations that may ne~d. extra land · and housi_ng urtit~ forthejr

activities and employees. '· · · ·· · · .. : · · ' · ·

142 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

proved by the labour legislation issued in December 1975.21

The long-awaited proclamation proved a thoroughly conventional document. Although 'socialist principles' were mentioned, the word 'class' did not appear in it. The right of workers

to organize was confirmed, including those employed in government-owned enterprises engaged in production, distribution

and service. Management was excluded from the 'worker'

category, and could not participate in labour organization.

Similarly excluded were the employees of the state administration, judiciary, military, police, and domestic servants.

Workers' rights and conditions of labour were defined according to conventional standards. Aside from a vague reference to

collaboration between workers and their 'allies', the stated

objectives of labour unions were strictly productionist in nature.

More significantly, the provisions concerning dispute settlement

seemed designed to eliminate strikes. Trade-dispute committees,

composed equally of worker and management representation,

were given initial jurisdiction in labour-dispute settlement.

Resort to outside mediation was also provided for. Appeals can

be taken to the Labour Division of the High Court whose determination is final. Strikes are lawful only when the Court fails

to render a decision within 5 0 days.

The military regime's negative attitude towards labour did

not come as a surprise. Following the initial confrontation

between CELU and the Dergue in September 1974, relations

between the workers and the soldiers deteriorated rapidly.

Remarkable as it may seem, the change of regime did not

enhance the abject position of the working class. Despite their

ardent flirtation with socialism and frequent invocations of the

dignity of labour, the military rulers - following their own

political instinct and the advice of the rising petty bourgeois

managerial class - proved exceedingly hostile to the aspiration

of the labour movement for organizational autonomy, and

showed little concern for labour's material welfare. Throughout

197 5, working class conditions worsened steadily, while the

labour movement lay dormant. A wage freeze lowered real

21. Proclamation No.64 of 1975.

REFORMS AND CONTRADICTIONS 143

wages in the face of continued inflation. A virtual ban on dismissals also froze the labour market, since employers discontinued hiring as well. Consequently, the unemployed had no

hope of finding work. 22 Their ranks were swollen due to the

closing of many smaller enterprises, the influx of people from

war-tom Eritrea, the accelerated migration to the larger towns

from the rural areas and smaller provincial towns, and the

massive dropout of young people from the educational system.

Pending the proclamation of new labour legislation, all collective agreements were suspended and new ones could not be

negotiated. Nor could labour organization proceed in places

where it had been disallowed by the imperial regime. Neither

a minimum wage, nor any new social security measures were

promulgated by the military regime during the year. Thus, the

,-vorkers found themselves trapped in conditions created by the

former regime and enforced by the new one.

The future of the labour movement itself appeared uncertain.

Though vague, the attitude of the military rulers on the subject

seemed to verge towards a form of corporatism. The role of

trade unions was challenged by the government's plan for

worker participation, which was to take place within a new

structure called the 'workers' committees'. Since in the government's definition at the time everyone in a given enterprise,

from the top manager downward, was considered a worker, the

familiar corporatist alternative seemed to emerge. 23 Trade

unionists were now intimidated by managers who invoked the

authority of the Dergue, and by Dergue representatives known

as the 'Apostles of Change', who were attached to every agency

and enterprise in order to promote the philosophy of 'Ethiopia

First'. The regime ordered all employees to attend political

22. A bloody incident on 26 October 1974 highlighted the plight of this group,

and offered an early demonstration of the regime's attitude. Oh that day, a

meeting of unemployed persons was held on the premises of CELU headquarters in Addis Ababa, for the purpose of drawing attention to their situation.

Although its organizers had secured permission, the police attacked in order

to disperse the meeting, killing at least two persons. Later, a public works

programme was established in the capital, which employed several thousands.

23. This threat promoted CELU to issue a long statemeii·t in defence of the 'Role

of Labour Unions in Socialist Countries', (undated). The new labour code

revised this definition. ·

144 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

education sessions twice a week at their place of employment,

presumably in order to imbibe the essence of the official creed.

While CELlI's leadership remained in prison, the organization

was torn by factional fights for power incited by followers of

the regime who aspired to capture control of the labour movement. Citing 'factionalism' as the reason, the Dergue ordered

the suspension of CELU activities until the election of a new

congress. Hoping to elect its own followers, the regime was

sharply disappointed. The newly elected representatives met at

the beginning of June, and approved a long list of resolutions

indicating a broad range of government policies, reiterating

labour's demands for social security and minimum wage standards, and demanded a new labour law. The meeting also declared labour's solidarity with the peasantry and the progressive

forces in the urban sector, it severed relations with the ICFTU

and AFL-CIO, the main financial backers of CELU until now,

and concluded with a warning: 'The patience of the proletariat

is at the snapping point. Unless these demands are met immediately, the proletariat will take appropriate measures. '

24

Having found it impossible to manipulate CELU, the Dergue

rendered the organization defunct and kept its old leadership

in prison. 25 At the sa1ne time it tried to infiltrate the trade

unions with its own agents in order to divide and weaken the

worker opposition. Worker actions, such as strikes and demonstrations, were viewed as attempts at insurrection and were

treated accordingly. Imprisonment and brutal treatment of

worker activists became routine. Undaunted·, CELU's last congress held in September 197 5, approved militant resolutions

which repeated earlier demands, and also called for the restoration of civil rights and the formation of a proletarian political

party. On 25 September, security forces fired on persons distributing CELlI's resolutions at the Addis Ababa airport and

killed seven of them. Following this' incident, a state of emergency was declared, and a wave .of arrests swept into prison an

undisclosed number of trade unionists, members of the radical

intelligentsia and students. ·

I ..

24. 'Resolutions of the Congress of CELU', 5 June 1975. ·

25. They were not released until March 1976.

REFORMS AND CONTRADICTIONS 14S

The new labour legislation replaced the confederate structure

of CELU with a hierarchical organization named the AllEthiopia Trade Union. Barely sketched, the new organization

was designed to facilitate the regime's efforts to control the

labour movement, for the law dictates that 'lower trade unions

shall be subordinate to higher ones', and 'lower trade unions

shall be obliged to accept and implement the decisions of higher

trade unions'. 26 The Dergue then proceeded to impose a leadership of its own choice on the higher levels of the trade union

movement, while also continuing its efforts to undermine worker

solidarity at the base. The regime's open attack on labour,

waged in the cause of building socialism, was the year's crowning

contradiction.

26. Article 50, paragraphs 4 and 7.

146

Chapter 10

Dictatorship and Counter-Revolution

The confusion created by the contradictory behaviour of the

military regime in 1975, was dispelled during the early part of

the following year. Having exhausted the socio-economic

reform programme inspired by the popular movement, the

Dergue proved unable to devise further initiatives in these fields,

which could have served to stimulate support and distract the

opposition. Consequently, the demand for a people's government, the basic and unfulfilled aspiration of the popular movement, rose to confront them with renewed force. Undisguised

and stunning in its ferocity, their reaction in this confrontation

revealed the rulers of Ethiopia in a universally familiar role -

that of an unprincipled, violently oppressive military dictatorship. Discarding pretences, the military government used massive violence against the vanguard of the popular movement;

that is, the radical intelligentsia, labour activists and students.

In trying to blunt its spearhead, the regime was undermining

the movement and was performing, therefore, a counter-revolutionary task. During the same time, the Dergue underwent an

internal transformation which further clarified the character of

the regime. In a series of violent purges that decimated its

membership, power was increasingly concentrated within a

clique led by an aspiring dictator. The initial amorphous rule of

the 'Committee' gave way to a Junta of faction leaders, which

in tum was eliminated to clear the way for the emergence of a

ruthless dictatorship with bonapartist aspirations.

The evolution of the regime in this direction did not come as

a surprise to many Ethiopians. In the eyes of the public> an

aura of uncertainty concerning its true ideological balancedoubts about the depth of its commitment to the goals of the

...

.

DICTATORSHIP AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION 147

popular movement, and suspicion of the individual motives of

its membership enveloped the Dergue from the beginning. The

indirect, if not devious, path followed by the soldiers in arriving

at their revolutionary vocation, the ruthless purging on the way

of radical elements in their own ranks, and their readiness to use

similar methods against opposition in the civilian sector, were

early ill omens correctly interpreted by Democracia. Even before

Haile Selassie's removal, this paper predicted that the shadowy

Co-ordinating Committee of the Armed Forces would emerge as

a Junta to capture power for itself. 27

Quite remarkably, although it soon established itself as a

ruling Junta, the Dergue never quite emerged from the shadows.

Its composition remained a secret, and its mode of operation

something of a mystery. Shortly after it assumed power, General

Aman disclosed that the Dergue - now officially styled the

Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) - numbered

120 men ranging in rank from plain soldier to major. Since

then, its size decreased steadily as members were purged and

not replaced, and was less than one-third that number in early

1977. Many of its leading members became known to the public,

and no effort was made to conceal the identity of those who

performed public functions. Yet, the full composition of this

body was never disclosed.

Little also became known of the Dergue's mode of operation

and decision making process. A number of sub-committees were

formed to oversee major areas of governmental concern, such as

administration, economic and social affairs, defence, and foreign

affairs. These were chaired by officers who, by virtue of education or experience, claimed some competence in these fields.

With the exception of the officer trio who held the chairmanship and vice-chairmanship of the Provisional Military Administrative Council itself, the sub-committee chairmen emerged as

the best known and most influential members of the military

regime.28 They maintained direct contact with the agencies of

27. No.6, 22 August 1974.

28. The Dergue and the PMAC were identical bodies, with one significant difference. The chairman of the PMAC was not the chairman of the Dergue. Who,

if anyone, was the chairman of that faceless body was never made clear. How-

148 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

government functioning in their area of concern, and attempted

to exercise a haphazard form of control over their operations.

They took an interest in administrative matters, and dictated

the widespread turnover of personnel which occurred at the

middle and upper levels of the state administration during 1975.

Ministers and heads of agencies, who were mostly civilians until

the beginning of 1977, accepted the instructions of the subcommittee chairmen unquestioningly. A letter from the latter

sufficed to secure the appointment, dismissal, or promotion of

a civil servant. In matters requiring policy decisions, the subcommittee chairmen attended bureaucratic meetings, where

their preference, if expressed, normally proved decisive. Alternatively, officials were summoned by the sub-committees to

be issued orders concerning decisions reached by the Dergue

on its own. According to the testimony of officials with firsthand experience, the non-commissioned officer and plain

soldier members participated only nominally in the substantive

work of the Dergue sub-committees.

Plenary meetings of the Dergue were held infrequently, when

extraordinary matters had to be communicated to the membership. The members would be asked then to support proposals

submitted by the leadership, or to approve decisions already

made and executed. Such sessions, often called without advance

notice, were attended only by members who happened to be

in Addis Ababa. Those posted outside the capital, or on tour,

did not attend. The plenary sessions became increasingly limited

in size, as the original membership was decimated by the

purges, and many others were removed from the centre through

appointment to the provinces and abroad. Such postings were

not unrelated to the power struggle inside the Dergue, as the

leading faction sought successfully to limit the arena within

which this deadly contest was being waged. Generally, policy

decision making remained a subordinate process dependent

on the shifting power pattern formed by the contending factions within the ruling body. This pattern became quite unstable

ever, in practice, Major Mengistu was regarded from the beginning as its de

facto leader. The Dergue sub-committees were referred to also as committees

of the PMAC.

DICTATORSHIP AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION 149

during 1976. As a result, the decision making process was

paralyzed, and the regime lost the initiative in almost every

field .

The symbolic prize of the contest was the chairmanship of

the Provisional Military Administrative Council, to which the

positions of head of state and government were also joined.

Following the killing of General Aman Andom in November

197 4, this position was occupied by Brigadier General Teferi

Ban te. 29 A man in his early fifties, he had served in the ranks

before entering the Holeta Military Training Centre, from

where he graduated in 1944. His career until now had been an

uneventful one. He had served as instructor and director of

training at Holeta, and was appointed commandant of the Harar

Military Academy in May 1974, following the early mutinies

in the armed forces. Consequently, he was known and apparently

well regarded by the younger officers. Unknown to the public,

unassuming, and without personal influence within the Dergue,

General Tef eri appeared to have a~cepted the role his predecessor had found too confining. Deprived of initiative, he was clearly

overshadowed by the two vice-chairmen, who were among the

prime movers of the Dergue and had emer min~t

figures of the re ·

-.._ · s vice-chairman, Mengistu Haile Mariam, was also a

Holeta graduate. Not yet forty years of age, a major in rank, 30

and with limited education, Mengistu possessed an extraordinarily forceful personality which established him as the

leader of the dominant faction within the Dergue. A compelling speaker, professing a simple creed of populist nationalism

and a nihilist conception of social revolution garnished with

crude marxist slogans, he gained a following among the less

~ --- __ ,,...._ ...... ,, ... ,.,._, _.q_ --------- - • . , .,,_ 4 , --'"'r.~~-.

29. The post was previously offered to, and declined by, a eas · senior

officers. There weren't many to choose from. The purge of the military hierarchy had left in active service only one Lieutenant General, who had been

shunted to the command of the Territorial Army, one Major General, who

served as Chief of Staff, and half a dozen Brigadier Generals holding divisional

commands. The police hierarchy was also decapitated. Only two provinces

had Brigadier Generals commanding their police forces in 1975; the rest had

colonels.

30. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in November 1976.

1 50 VOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

sophisticated, lower ranking element in t e Dergue. Extremely

ambitious for personal power, he soon clas ed with the educated

officer contingent who rejected his cat clysmic solutions to

the mounting problems facing the regi and who sought to

block his drive for personal power. Ho ever, the opposition

failed to unite against him, and Mengist was able to eliminate

it with cunning and spectacular ruthlessn ss. ·

Atnafu Abate, slightly senior to Me gistu in age and rank . ' was the second vice-chairman. A graduate of the Harar Military

Academy, he was among the founders of the Dergue and one of

its initial leaders. A bland personality, h~ was soon outdistanced

by Mengistu, who ha'd joined that bodyiwhen all military units

were invited to send representatives. Elected to the second

level post, Atnafu was long considered Mengistu's most serious

rival. However, in the brutal elimination contest that followed

Atnafu ' threw in his lot with the winner and ended up permanently in the second position.

The Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen of the Provisional

Military Administrative Council became the highly visible and

publicly inseparable collective leadership of the regime throughout 1975 and 1976. Photographs of the trio graced the front

pages of the daily press with a monotonous regularity reminiscent of the Haile Selassie days. Flanked by the sub-committee

chairmen and a few other influential members of the Dergue,

they formed a conventional Junta. True to its genre, it lacked

cohesion and stability. Increasing pressure on it during 1976

produced a series of violent convulsions, which finally transformed the Junta into a personal dictatorship.

Pressure was exerted on the Junta from a variety of sources,

but the most intense was produced by the unrelenting opposition of the radical intelligentsia, labour activists and students.

Supported by the majority of the working class and a growing

section of the petty bourgeoisie, the unbending determination

of the vanguard became the regime's nemesis. The campaign in

the countryside disintegrated during the early part of 1976,

as a result of student hostility towards the military government

- an attitude that was more than reciprocated on the latter's

part. The character of the provincial administration was transformed once more, as the university graduates and school-

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DICTATORSHIP AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION 151

teachers who had replaced the ancien regime officialdom in

1975 were dismissed, transferred, or resigned during 1976.

Their pl~ces were taken by military men and civilian supporters of the Dergue, who took harsh repressive measures against

student activists. An unknown number of campaigners lost their

lives in clashes with the authorities, and many others were

imprisoned. Hundreds fled across the borders into neighbouring

countries, while many thousands abandoned their posts and

returned to their homes. The campaign was brought officially

to an end in July 1976.

The campaigners returned grimly determined to struggle

against the Junta. Student leaders opposed the reopening of

schools until the goal of a popular government was attained.

Indeed, the University was never able to resume teaching, and

secondary schools in the capital and other major towns functioned only intermittently since then. The students formed

informal study groups for political education, discussed tactics,

and sought ways to harass the government. The newly formed

Urban Dwellers Associations became the focus of their activities,

as the students tried to infiltrate them in order to mobilize the

urban masses in the same way they had rallied the southern

peasantry. The regime reacted forcefully to this threat, and

largely succeeded in turning these bodies into its own blunt

instruments for urban mass control.

The Dergue's strategy was to enlist the cities' lumpen population element on its side by putting it in control of the associations. In the name of the class struggle, this element was

granted a near monopoly of association elective office, and was

recruited to man the militia units formed within each association. Former rentiers were deprived by the nationalization

proclamation of the right to vote in the associations for one

year. This ban excluded not only members of the old ruling

classes, but a good many humble Ethiopians as well, former

owners of inexpensive rented housing. Among them were

many members of the self-employed petty bourgeoisie. Dependents of householders were also deprived of the right to vote,

thereby eliminating the older student group and youth in

g_eneral. Normally, association office-holding held little attraction for the salariat sector of the same class, since it involved

I ~ i CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA.

long hours of unpaid labour and endless intra-community

nlkrca I ion . Ful1y employed workers were similary disinclined.

Moreover, as association officials became implicated in the

regime's oppressive policies, class conscious workers shied away

from openly identifying themselves in this manner with the

dictatorship. Nevertheless, in the first elections, held after the

nationalization of urban land and extra housing in July 1975,

a time when student participation in the organization of urban

associations was at its peak, many members of the educated

petty bourgeoisie, including some radicals, were elected to

such posts. A year later they were purged. In view of the developing struggle in the urban sector, the regime moved to gain

secure control of these units. A decree issued in October 1976

reorganized the urban associations, extending their jurisdiction

and empowering them to form armed militia units. Declaring

that the leadership of the associations had been infiltrated by

bourgeois and reactionary elements, the Dergue ordered new

elections to be held.

Carried out under the supervision of POMO A* agents, the

elections secured the desired result. Persons of dubious character, indeterminate occupation, busy-bodies and opportunists of

all sorts seized the chance to distinguish themselves by claiming

office in the associations. Militia units charged with local security

mustered the perennially unemployed, the shiftless and hangerson, young toughs and delinquents, who were instantly transformed into revolutionary proletarian fighters. Sporting uniforms

and wielding wooden clubs they were relied upon increasingly

to police the urban districts, to spy, inform against and harass

dissidents, and generally enforce the dictates of the Dergue.

On every required occasion, the associations provided mass

audiences by herding people together in 'spontaneous' demonstrations and rallies. Later on, when the struggle in the urban

sector began in earnest, the association leaders and the militia,

armed by the government, were to play . a murderous role.

Cunning though it may appear initially, the use of the urban

lumpen element was bound to prove disastrous in the end. Not

unexpectedly, corruption soon became rife in the affairs of

*See page 156 below.

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DICTATORSHIP AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION 1 53

the associations, particularly in the process of housing allocation. The nationalization of extra units created a serious housing shortage in the major towns. Former rentiers who had

lived in small towns, flocked to the main centres to claim the

one, and more expensive house to which they were entitled

under the law. Many families that had formerly lived together

in one unit while letting another, now split in order to claim

the additional unit, in violation of the law. Moreover, no one

dared vacate a dwelling for fear of not being able to find another.

Consequently, housing became unavailable almost overnight,

except at the luxury range. This situation created irresistible

inducement for bribery and abuse of authority among association officials whose task it was to allocate housing. Generally,

the attitude of these officials progressed from overbearing to

threatening, while the riff-raff association guard units became

a menace to the peace and security of urban dwellers. The

result was spreading alienation among the petty bourgeoisie,

marking the commensurate failure of the military regime to

establish itself as a political force in the urban sector.

While the officially sponsored All-Ethiopian Trade Union

leadership stood by impotently, the Dergue fought another

losing battle for control of local union organizations at the

work place level. The objective was control of the factories and

enterprises themselves, which was being contested by a reinvigorated labour opposition. Working underground, this opposition sought to reinforce working class solidarity, and to reestablish CELU's authority in defiance of the government

imposed hierarchy. The Dergue in tum organized groups of its

own supporters in the factories and enterprises, and authorized

them to combat its opponents. Labour resistance was manifested in continuous strikes and demonstrations, which inevitably

turned into violent clashes with Dergue agents in the factories

and security forces. The industrial belt extending along the

railway line southeast of Addis Ababa became the scene of almost daily incidents pitting the workers against the authorities. 31

31. During the May Day parade, numerous placards appeared bearing the demand

for a peoples government. One person was killed during this event. A month

earlier, two persons were killed at a demonstration organized by the personnel

of the National Theatre in Addis Ababa.

154 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

\ orking da hostility was fuelled by the continuing deterioration of its ei.;ono1nic position. The demand for minimum

wage frgislation remained unfulfilled. Although employers in

the private sector were being forced by labour pressure to

incr~ase wages and salaries, the vast nationalized sector held

fa~t ~upported by the might of the government. With inflation

running at an estimated 20 per cent,32 real wages diminished

proportionately. The price of teff, the staple food grain, nearly

tripled during 1976, and supply of it often fell short of demand.

Pepper. another staple item of the Ethiopian diet, also ran short

at ti1nes, and its price skyrocketed. Wheat disappeared pernrnnently, and sugar was chronically in short supply. The regime

sought to deflect public anger towards the merchant and trader

group, who1n it accused of hoarding, profiteering and economic

sabotage. A barrage of strident propaganda was directed against

this section of the petty bourgeoisie, and the masses were

urged to take direct action against them. In July, the Dergue

matched action to words by executing several merchants, and

packin° prisons throughout the country with hundreds of

others.j3 The long term effect of official terror was to disrupt

further the distribution process and to heighten the uncertainty

of the market. It also sealed the political alienation of the merchant and trader community.

The diverse and growing opposition to the rr.ilitary dictatorship was integrated into the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary

Party (EPRP), a clandestine organization whose formation had

been announced in August 1975. Its founders were the same

group of radical intellectuals who had consistently opposed

military rule from the pages of Democracia. When the Dergue's

betrayal of the popular movement became amply demonstrated,

this group launched the first organization aspiring to lead the

movement, and indeed the first political party in the history of

Ethiopia. Complete lack of organization and leadership had

cost the popular movement the political price of the revolution,

by allowing the military to seize power practically unopposed.

32. Economist (London), 22 May 1976.

33. At mid-summer, almost all the merchants of Makalle, capital of Tigre province,

were incarcerated simultaneously.

DICTATORSHIP AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION 155

Subsequent resistance to the dictatorship was manifested in

spo.ltaneous, isolated incidents of very limited impact. Now the

EPRP sought to organize the opposition on a mass basis, and

to guide it on a co-ordinated, direct assault against the Dergue.

During the early part of 1976, radical activists went underground to lay the foundations of the organization. When the

campaign in the countryside distintegrated, returning students

provided enthusiastic recruits. With their help, the EPRP

cadre strove to revive the alliance of social groups which had

comprised the popular movement. Existing organizations, such

as trade unions, professional associations, student unions - now

all closely monitored by Dergue agents - were duplicated

underground and affiliated to the EPRP. Urban associations,

peasant associations, even military units became targets of

EPRP infiltration. During the first half of 1976, the party concentrated on organizational and propaganda work, continued

its corrosive criticism of the military rulers, and prepared for a

forceful confrontation. Its youthful supporters embarrassed the

authorities by hoisting critical placards at public gatherings,

painting hostile slogans, and periodically festooning street poles

with red flags. By mid-1976, the party had made its presence

felt, though its capacity for action had not been tested yet.

Although the Dergue did not ignore the new threat, it grossly

underestimated its potential. Initially, it attempted to blunt the

EPRP's political drive by sponsoring a rival group with political

aspirations. This comprised the coterie of radical intellectuals

who functioned as informal, yet quite influential, advisors to

the dominant faction of the Dergue led by Major Mengistu.

They had fashioned the ideological rationalization for military

rule, according to which such rule was essential for the consolidation of the socialist revolution, which was menaced by a

host of domestic and foreign enemies. This basic theme was

elaborated and reinforced to serve as the ideological facade

screening the raw reality of the military dictatorship. Ideological

props were essential in order to attract support outside the ranks

of the military. These en~owed the regime with a purpose, a mission, and a claim to legitimacy which could serve to deflect the

demand for popular rule. Without rejecting this demand, the

regime's ideologues circumvented it by placing it low on the

156 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

scale of revolutionary priorities. Highest priority was accorded

to crushing the four enemies of the revolution: feudalism,

imperialis1n, capitalism and bureaucracy.

34 In the absence of

any existing political organization in the country, this task

inevitably fell to the armed forces. They had become 'the

vanguard of the revolution' by historical necessity. 35 Accordingly, the soldiers were not solely fighting men, but political

activists and leaders of the masses as well. They weren't called

soldiers any longer but 'men in uniform'. As one member of

the Dergue put it in a public speech, 'men in uniform are not

confined to military duties alone, but have also to politicize,

organize and arm the masses in line with the programme of the

National Democratic Revolution'. 36 The logical deduction was

easy to reach; whoever opposed the military government was

an enemy of the revolution. The label 'adhari' (reactionary)

was applied to all indiscriminately. 37

The official creed was formulated in the 'Programme for the

National Democratic Revolution', announced on 20 April

1976. It contained little that was new or illuminating. It envisaged a peoples democratic republic under the leadership of

the proletariat, acting in close alliance with the peasantry and

supported by the petty bourgeoisie, and promised the formation of a working class party. At the same time, the first step

was taken to construct political organizational supports for the

ideological facade. A Provisional Office for Mass Organization

Affairs (POMOA) was created to propagate the April Programme, and to prepare the masses for political action. It was

staffed with 15 members of Major Mengistu's radical intellectual

entourage. 38 This group had until now functioned in an un34. The inclusion of the bureaucracy in this apocalyptic team, by the defenders of

the most rigid bureaucratic establishment of all, i.e. the military, represents

ooth a conditioned radical reflex and a facile defence to EPRP charges.

35. This claim was first made by the Dergue on the occasion of Haile Selassie's

deposition.

36.. Ethiopia Herald, 6 January 1977.

37. It was coined from a Geez verb meaning 'to walk backwards'.

38. A high percentage of this group comprised persons educated in Europe. This

gave rise to speculation concerning a possible rivalry between European and

U.S. trained radical intellectuals. More likely, it was the result of a congregation of persons with personal ties formed during their stay together in Europe.

They were dubbed 'Fidists', after their leader, Haile Fida.

DICTATORSHIP AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION 157

official advisory capacity, while also sharpening its ideological

weapons in a series of turgid propaganda articles published in

the daily press. Earlier, it had announced the formation of an

All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement, which had failed apparently

to capture the fancy of the Dergue. Now this group acquired an

official base for its activities, and it quickly expanded in size

and influence. Staff was recruited and branches established

in many parts of the country. Its cadre were assigned the

function of co-ordinating the political activities of all organizations, including urban and rural associations, trade unions,

etc. POMOA's major task was to meet the challenge of the

EPRP. In the autumn of 1976, this challenge took a violent

form, and the radical supporters of the Dergue found themselves involved in a deadly struggle with their erstwhile comrades. Farced to act as an additional security unit, they were

given no opportunity to fulfil the political task they had been

assigned. Consequently, the attempt to construct a political

front for the military dictatorship failed.

Paragraph 5 of the Programme of the National Democratic

Revolution recognized 'the right of any nationality existing in

Ethiopia to self-determination', and accepted the principle of

regional autonomy and self administration of local affairs. On

16 May, a nine point policy declaration addressed itself specifically to Eritrea, offering to implement the promise of regional

autonomy and to assist in the rehabilitation of the war-tom

province. 39 The declaration invited the Eritreans to join the

united revolutionary front of the Ethiopian people. The invitation came too late, and the offer contained far too little

to merit serious consideration by the embattled Eritreans.

Obviously its sponsors were aware of that. Quite probably

they counted on its rejection to strengthen the demand for

escalating the war against the secessionist · forces. This was

proposed by Major Mengistu who, in. fa~t; contemplated a

national crusade to reverse what had beco:qie by now a hopeless situation. ·

39. In August 1976 a proclamation was issued establishing a Special Commission

for Eritrean Region Affairs.

158 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIO . . PIA

The quixotic scheme known as the 'Peasant Red March'

was indicative of the government's quandary, and an illustration

of the future dictator's ruthless nihilism. The plan called for

peasants from the northern provinces to march into Eritrea

and occupy the province in order to rid it of its rebelliou~

element. Following traditional Ethiopian practice, the crusaders

were offered the land of the vanquished as their reward. Twenty

to thirty-thousand peasants were mobilized in May 1976, and

were transported in requisitioned vehicles. to Eritrea. They

didn't stay there for long. Forewarned, the Eritrean liberation

forces had ample time to prepare a suitable reception. After a

few harassment raids by the Eritreans, the peasants abandoned

their camps and wisely fled across the provincial border.

Increasing pressure from the liberation movements in Eritrea

exacerbated tension within the Dergue, and sparked a major

convulsion in the ruling body in July 1976. The Ethiopian

command in Eritrea had developed serious doubts concerning

the wisdom of the uncompromising policy it had been ordered

to pursue. The effort to subdue the rebellion through the

massive use of heavy weaponry had come to nought. On the

contrary, without having resolved their factional differences,

the two liberation movements had managed to affect a degree

of co-operation in the field, and their forces had taken the

offensive. Having wrested control over most of the countryside,

they were now pressing against the smaller provincial towns

where the government forces had been withdrawn. A number of

officers of the Second Division in Eritrea had been arrested, and

a few had been executed, for voicing their misgivings. Their

concern was shared by some of Major Mengistu's rivals in the

Dergue, and it was heightened by the debacl~ of the Peasant

Red March.

During the third week of July, the military administrator

of Eritrea, Brigadier General Getachew Nadew came to Addis

Ababa ' for consultations. He had been the Dergue's choice, first

as ~o~man?er of the ground forces, then as its top representative m Entrea. Reportedly he quarrelled with Major Mengistu,

and_ de1?anded a plenary session of the Dergue to review its

poh~y m Eritrea. On the night of 14 July, a detachment of

soldiers surrounded General Getachew's home in the capital and

I

)

l

,

I

)

DICTATORSHIP AND COUNTER-·REVOLUTION 1 S9

killed him after a struggle. At the same time, a prominent

member of the Dergue, Major Sissay Habte, was executed. A

sophisticated air force officer and chairman of the foreign

\

affairs sub-committee, Major Sissay was also considered the

regime's expert on matters of ideology. The executions were

1 officially announced two days later, together with the killing

/ of several merchants.40 The two officers were accused of a

1

wide assortment of counter-revolutionary activities, including

/

the preparation of a coup d'etat. Another prominent Dergue

member, Major Kiros Alemayehu was arrested at this time.

He had been the director of the student campaign since its

inception. His death, allegedly by suicide, was reported some

time later. Immediately following this purge, four of the five

army divisional commanders were replaced, as were also the

chief and deputy chief of staff and the heads of the two military

academies. They were replaced by officers considered loyal to

'- the f actign.Jieaded.J2y __ M~j9.sJ~.e.ngi&a1~4

:..-;. 1 _______ _

Negligible during the previous year, the tempo of opposition

activity on the part of ancien regime elements also picked up

considerably during 1976. Such activity had never ceased completely. Thus far however, it had been local, unco-ordinated

and without serious potential, given the attitude of the peasantry,

which was uniformly hostile in the south and generally noncommittal in the north. During 1975, government forces

managed to contain all insurrectionary episodes and to eliminate

most of the prominent rebels. The progressively deteriorating

situation throughout the country in 1976 created favourable

conditions for a renewed effort. Its focus naturally was in the

north, where it was thought possible still to manipulate the

traditional reflexes of the peasantry. The Ethiopian Democratic

Union (EDU) was formed in London by leading members of the

40.

41.

It had become by now an established and macabre characteristic of the Dergue

to provide a mixed bag of victims in order to confuse the public. ·

The emerging strongman had already consolidated his position by creating a

new army unit known as the 'Flame' Brigade. It was formed by loyal, hand-·

picked followers from existing army and police units, and was used to enforce

Mengistu's will throughout the armed forces. He also controlled the security

force of the Dergue, which was under the command of his faithful collaborator, Major Daniel Asfaw. Its members were responsible for innumerable

murders.

160 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

imperial regime, to organize an insurrection and provide it with

material support from abroad. Its founders were two of Haile

Selassie's grandsons-in-law; Mangasha Seyoum, the traditional

prince of Tigre province and its longtime governor, and General

Nega Tegegne, whose last post had been the governorship of

Begemdir & Semien province. Another general, and former

ambassador to Britain, Yasu Mangasha, was named chairman of

the organization.

Given the pedigree of its leadership, the EDU was concerned

to refute the inevitable conclusion that its goal was the restoration of the ancien regime. To this end, it renounced any connection with the royal family, and declared that it 'neither

desires nor intends to return to the past' .

42 It even went so far

as to claim spiritual, if not actual, kinship with the popular

movement that had toppled the monarchy. Accordingly, it

attacked the Dergue for having betrayed the popular movement

' and for depriving the Ethiopian people of their right to a democratic form of government. It claimed to have no fixed political

ideology, and no goal other than to overthrow the Dergue. It

invited support from all groups across the entire span of the

political spectrum.

While claiming tQ have no political ideology other than a

commitment to democratic principles, the EDU nevertheless

took a stand on some crucial issues. It denounced the rural land

reform for turning the peasants into tenants. of the state, and

for imposing collective schemes on agricultural production. It

also condemned the nationalization of urban land and extra

housing, because it deprived thousands of .Ethiopians of a

major source of income. The EDU pledged to construct an

'equitable and workable' scheme of land reform. 43 Concerning

the economy, it envisaged a mixed system, combining state and

private control and providing opportunities for foreign investment. The problem of Eritrea, it was stated, would be solved

through negotiations, the basis o( which would be the recognition of the right of the Eritrean people to determine democratically their own destiny, balanced · by 'the interests of the

: .

42. 'E.D.U. What Does it Stand For?' (London, Septemb~r 1976), p_.4.

43. Ibid., p.3. .

DICTATORSHIP AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION 161

rest of Ethiopia'.44 Concerning the form of the future political

system of Ethiopia, the EDU offered no specific proposals.

However, its statements harked back to the draft prepared by

the constitutional commission during the last days of the old , 45 regime.

In practice, the EDU launched guerrilla operations in two

northern provinces, where a number of factors combined to

give it some hope for success. Tigre province borders Eritrea,

whose highlands are inhabited by closely related Tigrinyaspeaking people. The longdrawn conflict across the border

offered a vivid example of successful defiance of the central

government. Mangasha Seyoum's appeal to traditional Tigre

provincialism was counted upon to stimulate peasant support

in an armed struggle against the ruling clique in Addis Ababa.

Not adverse to helping the enemies of their enemy, the Eritrean

liberation forces allowed material aid despatched from the

Sudan to reach Tigre by traversing their territory. EDU operations in the western border province of Begemdir, led by

General Nega Tegegne, a native son, benefited from a direct

connection with Sudan. Sudanese assistance for the EDU, and

the resumption of open support of Eritrean secessionism,

marked the reversal of a policy that had been agreed upon in

1972. In return for Ethiopian pressure on the southern Sudanese rebels - who had used Ethiopian territory as a sanctuary -

and direct assistance in helping to negotiate an end to the civil

war in the Sudan, President Numeiry had agreed then to terminate his country's active support of the Eritreans. Now, in

1976, Numeiry's disenchantment with Ethiopia's professedly

radical regime manifested itself not only in renewed backing

for the Eritreans, but also through unconcealed encouragement

of EDU activities. This organization was allowed to operate

freely in the Sudan and to use its territory as a staging area for

incursions inside Ethiopia. It was also granted facilities for daily

radio broadcasts from Khartoum beamed into Ethiopia. By the

autumn of 1976, EDU units had made their presence felt in

northwestern Ethiopia, forcing the military government to

44. Ibid., p.6.

45. 'Ethiopia: the State of the Nation', (E.D.U., London, September 1976) .

A

162 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

recognize the existence of a new opponent and to commit its

shrinking forces to yet another battlefront.

The most serious and immediate threat to the Dergue was

posed by the offensive launched by the EPRP in the urban

sector during the autumn of 1976. Regrouped underground,

the radical opposition now moved towards a direct forceful

confrontation with the dictatorship. The new, violent phase of

the struggle began exactly two years following the overthrow

of Haile Selassie, when the EPRP called for a boycott of the

official celebrations commemorating the event. The urban

associations were mobilized to collect an audience for the

rulers on this occasion. These units were not able to prevent

a wave of labour strikes instigated by the EPRP towards the

end of September. The strike wave acquired additional momentum in October, as a result of the change of currency, during

which notes of 50 Ethiopian dollars and above were discounted

by 20 per cent. Bank, insurance, and supermarket employees

joined the factory workers in striking.

At the same time, a series of raids on armouries and police

stations for the purpose of collecting weapons, alerted the

government to the EPRP's intention of waging urban guerrilla

warfare. The prime targets of the underground opposition were

the radical intellectual contingent of POMOA and highly

placed petty bourgeois collaborators of the Dergue.46 The

EPRP struck selectively, and even gave its enemies advance

warning. Letters were sent to numerous persons advising them

of the consequences if they remained at their posts. The first

victim was a prominent member of POMOA. In the following

months, three ministry pennanent secretaries were assassinated.

Trade union officials imposed by the regime and urban association officials also became targets of the underground opposition. According to one account, 20 POMOA cadre and 20

urban association officials were killed during the month of

November 1976.47 The building of a school for political educa46. An alleged unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Major Mengistu, on 20 September, is widely believed to have been staged by the dictator himself in

order to justify the campaign launched against the EPRP at this time.

47. Ethiopian Herald, 20 March 1977.

DICTATORSHIP AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION 163

tion operated by POMOA was burned down at the end of

October. Sabotage of public installations, transport and coml municati~!.:..f!PJ1ili1/s.,~~~Uw ....--- . _ .. 1 - Tne ct1ctatorship's reaction was immediate, savage and 1n-"\

1_ discriminate. Declaring war on the EPRP, it vowed to physically \\

· exterminate its adherents and sympathizers. The faction led by \

. Major Mengistu prepared to make good this vow. The 'Flame'

1

. l Brigade was brought into the capital to provide support. The

\ security unit of the Dergue, commanded by Mengistu's hench- f

\ man, Colonel Daniel Asfaw, assumed direction of the campaign. l

\It was seconded by the officials and cadre of POMO A who were !

111 0w armed. Arms were selectively distributed also to groups of f_

[supporters in the associations, trade unions and other organiz- 1

lations. Members of the radical intelligentsia who had not gone i

/

!into hiding, were herded into prisons, where many of them were I

to be murdered later. Suspected EPRP members were summarily l

(

executed, but the campaign had no success in unearthing the \

underground organization. Unable to strike directly at the j'

EPRP itself, the government forces turned savagely against a

group they knew to be sympathetic to the opposition movement, i.e. the students. Their steadfast refusal to resume their

studies under military rule, branded this group as an irreconcilable enemy of the regime. Two groups of young people,

numbering 23 and 27 respectively were massacred in November.

From now on the slaughter of Ethiopia's youth continued

unabated. Students were killed on the s ot for shoutin slo ans

. and painting~l!L.921..~a~ e . ;e$~ ndishing

· red flags, distributing pamphlets, sometimes simply for congregating together. 48

A.Jlla . ~t&M@iseredit

!h,e EP-RP ,-a&"'a....,G.QJ.ll)i,~.c!-~Y2}2Ji~f¼c-.JD.9 . . __ It was based

on an elementary technique, that is, an attempt to confuse the

radical opposition with a host of other groups which were fighting against the regime. On the most basic level, the EPRP was

simply coupled officially with the rest, and every insurrection48. POMOA managed to recruit a small number of students and put them in

charge of officially sanctioned associations. They became a target for their

colleagues in the opposition and suffered many casualties.

164 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

ary act was attributed to the 'paid agents of the EPRP, EDU

ELF and CIA'. On a different plane, the ideologues of POMOA,

wielding ' 1narxist semantics with abandon, classified the underground moven1ent alternatively as an offspring of the bourgeoisie, the right wing of the petty bourgeoisie, or the fighting

arm of the bureaucracy. The EPRP was accused of being in

league with feudalism through an alleged connection with the

EDU, of favouring the partition of Ethiopia because of its

support for self-determination in Eritrea, of elitism due to its

attraction for the intelligentsia and students, and of opposing

popular government because of its attacks on urban association

officials. Ironically, the regime's inept propaganda effort gave

the EPRP massive publicity, and unwittingly exaggerated the

underground party's capacity by giving it credit for every actual

subversive incident and a host of imaginary accomplishments.

Thanks partly to this effort, the EPRP soon appeared to have

become omnipresent.

The manifold conflict enveloping the regime exacerbated

the in tern al strain in the Dergue. It is possible that several influential members did not approve of the murderous tactics

used indiscriminately in the struggle against the EPRP. They

also realized that the new situation had allowed the aspiring

dictator to concentrate his military support in the capital and

to arm his civilian followers, thus putting himself within one

step of his goal. Indeed, Mengistu, now promoted to Lt.Colonel,

was preparing to take that step. In a secret letter to his supporters in the provinces, dated 1 September 1976, he accused unnamed members of the Dergue of personal ambition, incompetence, promotion of EPRP policies, susceptibility to CIA

influence, and of attempting to limit his (Mengistu's) power. In

a subsequent letter, dated 12 September, he reminded his

followers that they had agreed to make preparations. and emphasized that the only solution was to form a new Provisional

Military Advisory Council.49

Mengistu's rivals won a first, very brief, round, by putting

through a plan for the reorganization of the PMAC. Invoking

49. The text of the letters appeared in the underground paper Oppressed Soldiers

(undated).

DICTATORSHIP AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION 165

the leninist principle of collective leadership, they argued that

since all members of the Council were equal, power ought to

be exercised collectively through bodies in which all members

had equal voice. Introduced on 29 December, the new structure

was a pyramid with three levels. Its base was a Congress representing the full membership of the Dergue. A central committee

of 40 members and a standing committee of 1 7 completed the

edifice of the renovated PMAC. The plan was attributed to two

young captains, who enlisted the support of General Teferi

Bante, and persuaded many of the less influential members to

accept the more equitable pattern of power distribution. so

General Teferi himself acquired new prominence by being

named chairman of all three bodies, as well as commanderin-chief of the armed forces. He was thus placed directly in

Mengistu's path. The latter was sidetracked to the chairmanship

of the powerless council of ministers. It was a dangerous setback for the aspiring dictator. If the situation were allowed to

1

! last, control of the army threatened to slip from his hands.

This situation was not allowed to last for long. Mengistu's

rivals did not press their advantage. They allowed him time

to complete his preparations, and then mindlessly walked into

a trap that was sprung with characteristic ruthlessness. A little

over one month later, on 3 February 1977, during a meeting

of the PMAC, General Teferi and four other officers hostile to

Mengistu were killed by the Dergue's security troops. The dead

included the two captains who had masterminded the reorganization of the PMAC, a Lt. Colonel who had been chairman of

the Press and Information sub-committee, and a captain who

had been second-in-command of the security unit. Reportedly

the latter, before being killed, managed to slay his superior,

Col. Daniel Asfaw, and two of his men, as well as the vice

chairman of POMO A, Dr. Senay Lique. A weird scenario was

enacted subsequently to make it appear that a fierce struggle

was taking place. Shooting was continued for hours and con50. They were Captain Mogus Wolde Mariam, chairman of the sub-committee for

social and economic affairs; and Captain Alemayehu Haile, chairman of the

sub-committee for administration and organization and subsequently elected

secretary general of the standing committee of the PMAC.

166 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

flicting announcements were made. It was finally declared that

an attempted coup d'etat by General Teferi and his clique

had been defeated. The group was accused of being members

of both the EPRP and the EDU, and of having conspired to tum

over power to those groups. 51 Colonel Mengistu assumed the

chairmanship of the PMAC and was acknowledged its undisputed master. 52 The soldiers' revolution had taken almost three

years to run its course. The consolidation of the dictatorship

dissolved the last contradictions within the military regime ..

Unrestrained at last, the dictator was able to embark on a

campaign of extermination against the opposition. On the day

following the purge of his rivals in the Dergue, Colonel Mengistu

addressed a mass meeting in the capital. In a wildly emotional

speech, he declared war until death against all domestic and

foreign enemies, and promised to arm all his supporters and lead

them in the struggle. Death became a byword in official statements and speeches, and the slogan 'Revolutionary Ethiopia or

Death', was hoisted on the masthead of the newspapers. In an

atmosphere of mounting hysteria, the regime's propaganda

extolled the use of revolutionary terror and quite openly

incited its supporters to murder suspected dissidents. The

distribution of arms to the militia units of the urban associations and the defence squads of the peasant associations

was accelerated. Armed 'revolutionary defence squads' were

farmed also in the factories. 53 ·

When the preparations were completed, the dictator moved

against the stronghold of the EPRP, the capital city itself. Addis

Ababa was declared the 'last stronghold of counter-revolution',

and the regime's forces were deployed for a massive clean-up

51. In a public speech several days earlier, General Teferi had condemned political

strife and called for unity among the progressive forces. According to his

killers, this was a signal for an uprising led by the EPRP and EDU.

52. Colonel Atnafu, who was out of town during the purge, returned to offer his

support, and was retained in the vice-chairmanship.

53. The underground opposition retaliated by assassinating the Chairman of the

All-Ethiopia Trade Union in his office, on 25 February. The Secretary General

of the organization was also wounded in the same attack. His turn came in

November 1977, when he was executed for 'counter-revolutionary' crimes.

DICTATORSHIP AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION 167

operation. On 23 March, a strict curfew was imposed, vehicle

traffic \Vas banned, places of public entertainment were closed,

and a house to house search of a city containing a population of

more than one million began. The search was carried out by

reruns composed of soldiers and members of urban and rural

association defence squads. They were given power to administer

instant 'revolutionary justice' whenever they uncovered evidence

of ·counter-revolutionary activity'.

A wave of unprecedented terror and bloodshed engulfed the

capital and spread to the towns in the industrial belt south of

Addis Ababa, until it reached the city of Dire Dawa in the south-

\vest. The search teams, and the thugs of the association militia

units who manned roadblocks and enforced the curfew, rose to

the occasion by killing and looting at will. The first day's toll

was five persons killed and two wounded. 54 In the weeks that

followed, the newspapers daily carried grisly statistics adding to

the rapidly mounting number of victims. Their names were no

longer given, nor were their kin notified. The hapless relatives

of missing persons haunted the police stations where lists of

the dead were posted.

55 The number of persons arrested rose

rapidly, and their fate became highly uncertain. Execution of

prisoners occurred frequently enough, so that arrest involved

a serious risk to life. The victims were never brought before a

court, nor were their deaths publicly announced.

The capital remained under siege throughout the spring of

1977. The EPRP suffered heavy casualties, but fought on undaunted. Gunfire echoed throughout the night in the city, as

the underground opposition defended itself. Cornered during

the search, its members fought to the death rather than surrender. Their comrades counter-attacked, taking a heavy toll

among the association militiamen and POMOA agents. The

struggle was waged in many towns of Ethiopia, and over the

countryside as well. Judging from the official announcements

about the number of people whom the regime had to force

to 'renounce their mistaken beliefs and join the ranks of govern54. Ethiopia Herald, 24 March 1977.

55 . In order to get their bodies for burial, relatives were charged 40 Ethiopian

dollars to meet the cost of the bullets that killed them.

168 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

ment supporters', the radical opposition had made its presence

felt in several southern provinces, particularly Arusi, Sidamo

and Gemu Goffa. In Tigre province in the north, a radical

guerrilla group reportedly led by a graduate, calling itself the

Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Army, had been active at

least since early 1976.

The students remained in the forefront of the battle and

paid a horrible price. Despite intense pressure, the dictatorship

had failed to force them to return to school. 'Quite frankly',

lamented the Ethiopian Herald, 'the reality in the areas where

the process of learning should continue without any obstacles

is disturbing, to say the least ... Days, weeks, and even months

of teaching time are known to have been wasted. '

56 Unarmed

and uncovered, the students confronted the regime with reckless

courage. Their harassment tactics continued without let up and

their effectiveness as counter-propagandists made them the

major identifiable opponent of the military dictatorship. Unable

to cow its youthful opponents, the regime seemed intent on

exterminating an entire generation of Ethiopians. Group executions of youths, carried out publicly and in secret, continued

throt1;ghout the spring months of 1977. During the last weekend of April, the students set out to sabotage the official May

Day celebrations through an overt campaign of propaganda in

the neighbourhoods of Addis Ababa. In a paroxysm of savagery,

the dictatorship's military and civilian support units machinegunned hundreds of youths in the streets, hunted them and

killed them inside houses where they had fled, and herded an

unknown number· into a camp. Parents who showed up at the

camp with food were told that their children no longer needed

it. Indeed, the entire group was massacred inside the camp.

Estimates of the number of victims claimed by the dictatorship

during that weekend ranged from 600 to over 1,000.57

56. 24 February 1977. In fact, secondary and university level education had not

resumed normally since the beginning of 1974. In the spring of 1977, the urban

associations implemented a daily check-in system designed to enforce school

attendance.

57. Addis Ababa became a city in mourning as funeral processions criss-crossed

the city's streets. The _urban associations were instructed to discourage women

trom wearing black. By way of diversion, the dictatorship announced at the

same time the killing of nearly 300 'counter-revolutionaries' in Sidarno.

DICTATORSHIP AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION 169

The marxist element in the radical opposition had the saddening experience of seeing the dictator embraced by the representatives of the world's socialist nations. The first to congratulate Colonel Mengistu for his triumph over his rivals in the

Dergue on 3 February was the ambassador of the USSR.

58

Closely behind came the ambassador of China and the representatives of Eastern European socialist states. Fidel Castro arrived

in mid-March to bestow his own blessing on the dictator. This

spectacle was symbolic of a major international power reshuffle

in the Hom of Africa, in which Ethiopia figured as a bartered

pawn. For reasons of their own - which had nothing to do with

ideology - the world's major powers moved to realign their

position vis-a-vis Ethiopia. Reversing an initial appraisal, the

United States decided that the longtime relationship was no

longer worth preserving. The Soviet Union, on its part, rushed

in to assume the liabilities just shed by its arch rival.

The disengagement of the United States from Ethiopia followed the rapprochement of this power with the formerly

'radical' Arab regimes in the region, Egypt and the Sudan

among them. The restoration of American influence among

Arab states of all political stripes diminished Ethiopia's strategic

value for its longtime patron. Ethiopia had become a dispensable

ally since the American presence in that country already had

been reduced drastically, the giant Kagnew air base in Asmara

had been dismantled, and private capital investment had been

nationalized. Moreover, Ethiopia had become a liability in the

long range plans of the United States for the region. The Ethiopian connection complicated American policy on two volatile

fronts. Eritrea was one of them. American aid over many years

had enabled the Ethiopians to contain the determined drive

for independence in that province, while · Arab support, on the

other hand, had sustained the Eritrean liberation forces through

58. A Russian journalist's report on Ethiopia commemorated that purge in a single

line: 'On 3 February, 1977 another counter-revolutionary plot was crushed

in Ethiopia'. The same report described the radical opposition distastefully

as 'petty-bourgeois, anarchic and leftist groupings'. (Koronikov, V., 'A New

Life Comes to Ethiopia', International Affairs (Moscow), 3 March 1977,

pp.127-134.)

170 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

the most difficult periods of their struggle. The cessation of

American military aid to Ethiopia cemented the new relationship of the former with the Arab states in the region.

It was a small price to pay. Despite American support, the

Ethiopians were obviously losing the contest anyway. Reinvigorated by the resumption of Sudanese backing and support

from many other Arab states, and further strengthened through

an agreement between the rival liberation movements for

tactical co-operation in the field, the rebel forces launched a

successful drive against the smaller garrison towns at the end

of 1976. 59 In April 1977, Colonel Mengistu. admitted the loss

of seven towns in Eritrea and acknowledged that the situation

in the province had become critical. So much so, in· fact, that

his regime was reduced to undertake a second Peasant Red

March into Eritrea, despite the monumental failure of the first

attempt in 1976. More arms and a modicum of military training

were counted upon this time to turn the peasant rabble into a

victorious legion. In fact, the fate of Eritrea seemed sealed.

Facing the imminent collapse of Ethiopian rule in that province,

United States policy makers might well have reasoned that a

well-disposed, independent Eritrea with two Red Sea ports,

would make afar more valuable ally than a landlocked Ethiopia.

Ethiopia's hostile relationship with Somalia was the other

complicating factor. The latter had been driven initially to seek

Soviet support because of the United States commitment in

Ethiopia. American policy makers had long regretted the initial

rejection of Somalia, which had resulted in the Soviet Union

obtaining a valuable base at Berbera. Now they were hoping,

with the assistance of the Arab states, to wean Somalia away

from the Soviet patronage. Severing the Ethiopian , connection

was a prerequisite step toward this goal. At the very least, the

United States would avoid being drawn into a potentially violent

59. Still another split among the Eritreans produced the Eritrea11 Liberation

Front-Popular Liberation Forces (ELF-PLF) in 1976. This faction constitutes

the largely personal following of veteran nationalist and forrrier' Eritrean Liberation Front leader, Osman Saleh Sebbe, who formed this organization after

having lost a power struggle within the ELF, attached himself to the ELPF

in 1972 as the head of its Foreign Mission. He formed · his own organisation

after breaking off from the EPLF in 1976. ·

DICTATORSHIP AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION 171

conflict between the two African states over the disputed

Ogaden territory and the port of Jibouti. Somalia was actively

supporting insurgent groups throughout the southeastern

region of Ethiopia. These groups included Somali irridentists

in the Ogaden, and Oromo rebels in Bale and Sidamo provinces ·

who had revived a movement that had bedeviled the Haile

Selassie regime in the late 1960s. A so-called Western Somali

Liberation Front was touted as their common representative.

In the east, an Afar Liberation Front, led from Somalia by one

of Ali Mira's sons, kept nomad sharpshooters active in raids

against traffic on the Assab road and the rail line to Jibouti.

Conflict loomed also over Jibouti, which similarly fell within

the boundaries of Somali territorial claims. Ethiopia, most of

whose foreign trade passes through this port, vehemently

opposed these claims. With Jibouti scheduled to gain independence from France in 1977, the likelihood of adding belligerent

actions to words had increased considerably.

The Soviet Union rushed into Ethiopia apparently heedless

of Somalia's probable reaction. At the end of 1976, it commit--

ted itself to underwrite the Ethiopian dictatorship through

military and economic aid, and Soviet personnel began arriving

in the country. In March 1977, the United States suspended

further aid to Ethiopia, citing 'its concern for the violation

of human rights under the military regime. The following

month, all American agencies and personnel, with the exception

of the embassy in the capital, were ordered to leave Ethiopia

at short notice. The announcement of complete cessation of

United States aid to Ethiopia followed. On May Day, while

the student massacre was taking place in Addis Ababa, Colonel

Mengistu arrived in Moscow to sign . various agreements. Even

before this visit, Cuban instructors had appeared in Ethiopia

to train its soldiers in the use of Soviet weapons. ·

The weapons initially demanded and received by the dictatorship were small arms. Their do~ors were unmindful of the fact .

that they were used exclusiv~ly against the Ethiopian population

itself. Heavier weapons were to be used in the battle for Eritrea.

However, Ethiopia's predicament in that province obviously was

not caused by a shortage of weaponry. It seemeq therefore; that

the regime was counting on active Soviet and/or Cuban inter-

172 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

vention to retrieve the situation there. 60 Its new patrons appeared willing to try, unconcerned over the impact of their

actions on the Eritreans and their Arab supporters. The dictatorship's difficulties were not limited to Eritrea. From Bale in the

south to Tigre in the north, from the Afar lowlands in the east

to the mountains of Begemdir in the west, rebellion had become

endemic in the land. With its forces committed to maintaining

a tenuous hold in the cities, the regime had relinquished control

over large parts of the countryside to the multifarious opposition. In Begemdir province, abandoned garrisons began surrendering border towns to the EDU forces in the spring of

1977. Bereft of popular support in the urban sector, the dictatorship relied solely on massive violence and mindless terrorism to retain a semblance of control in the cities. Incomparably

more than the ancien regime, the successor military regime

required propping by a foreign power in order to avoid imminent

collapse. The extent of this requirement provided the standard

for measuring the failure of the soldier's revolution to join the

popular movement.

During mid-summer of 1977, the simmering conflict with

the Somali in the southeast erupted into full scale conventional

warfare, posing the threat of dismemberment for the Ethiopian

state. Earlier in the year, the Western Somalia Liberation Front

(WSLF) had infiltrated thousands of men into the vast, arid

Ogaden region and contested control of the countryside with

the Ethiopian forces. According to what had become standard

practice by now, the latter seldom ventured outside their fortified garrison towns, and left it to the air force to monitor and

harass the movements of the enemy. It was against these towns

that the government of Somalia decided to move openly in

mid-summer. The time was thought appropriate, because it

would deny the Ethiopians the opportunity to assimilate the

newly-arriving Soviet weaponry and to tum the peasant militia

into a viable military force. Conversely, the probable drying up

of the Soviet source in the near future promised to present

60. The expulsion of Western nation consulates from Asmara, in April 1977, was

a preparatory measure.

l

l

i

I

I

I

I

DICTATORSHIP AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION 173

Somalia with an arms sup~ly problem of its o~n. Even ~he

. rninent victory of the Entreans, who were rapidly cleanng 1

:t Ethiopian garrisons in the north, would have a negative

~[feet from the Somali point of view, because it would release

Ethiopian forces from that battlefront.

Reinforced by Somali army regulars, the WSLF commenced

operations during June preparatory to the invasion, by blowina up road and railway bridges in order to disrupt the transp;rtation of Ethiopian reinforcements to the area. The railway

line to Jibouti was shut down permanently. A full scale invasion by the regular forces of Somalia followed in mid-July.

By the end of the same month, the WSLF, in whose name the

war was being fought, claimed the capture of numerous small

towns in the Ogaden. By-passing the stronghold town of Jijiga

near their border, the Somali spearhead penetrated deeply to

the west to attack Dire Dawa, the principal urban centre in

southeastern Ethiopia. Following preliminary harassing .attacks

by guerrilla groups in late July and early August, a full assault

was launched during the third week of August. The Ethiopians

hurried reinforcements to the town by air, and managed to

repulse the attack after sustained fighting and heavy casualties

on both sides. The Somali retraced their steps and contracted

their lines, then threw the full weight of their armour against

Jijiga, a town that served as a tank base for the Ethiopian Third

Division and as a radar installation site for the air force. Jijiga

fell during the third week of September after a 10 day struggle.

The Ethiopians fell back in disarray and sought refuge in the

town of Harar, without attempting to block the Somali advance

at the Gara Marda pass, the gateway to the highlands. As· a

result, Harar itself was besieged soon afterwards, . and Dire

Dawa, which lay only 60 kilometres away, became a target

once again.

The Somali thrust was spectacularly successful-in the Ogaden

and Harar regions. However, its scope was not limited to this

area. The WSLF officially claimed not only · all lands east of

the Awash river, but most of southern Ethiopia as well, including the provinces of Arusi, Bale and Sidamo. The westernmost

extension of the Somali people in Ethiopia lay across the

Gannale river into the province of Sidamo. However, neither

174 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

this province nor Arusi are predominantly Somali. An affiliate

organization, called the Somali Abo Liberation Front, represented the secessionist drive in this region . .Its guerrilla forces

managed to gain control of Ba~e J?rovince by autumn and, by

October, had besieged the Eth1op1an troops in the provincial

capital Goba. Among their leaders was the same Wako Guchu

who had headed the rebellion in Bale province during the l 960s.

The eruption of pan-Somalism inevitably alarmed Kenya,

whose northern district is represented by one point in the fivepointed star of Greater Somalia which adorns the flag of the

Republic of Somalia. Overcoming its distaste .for the professed

radicalism of the Mengistu regime, the Kenyan government

denounced the invasion of Ethiopia and affirmed optimistically

that 'Ethiopia's victory over the enemy will be a victory for

Kenya'. More to the point, Kenya~s protestations helped dissuade the Western powers from undertaking to supply Somalia

with arms directly. Such a course was contemplated in July,

when it was disclosed that the United States was prepared 'in

principle' to sell arms to Somalia. Britain and France indicated

a similar willingness. However, the uninhibited force of the

Somali offensive caused the French to have second thoughts.

Jibouti, over which France retained residual responsibility,

following its independence in June 1977, is represented by yet

another point in the star of Greater Somalia. When the United

States and its allies declined to put the principle into practice,

the ruler of Somalia travelled to Moscow, at the end of August.

He was given a frigid reception and some stem advice, which

he refused to heed. Siad Barre was better received at several

Arab state capitals. With funds from Saudi Arabia and the

United Arab Emirates, and the tacit consent of the United

States, Somalia was able to purchase arms through friendly

Arab regimes acting as intermediaries.

Thus, following a newly devised strategy, the United States

chose to avoid direct confrontation with its arch rival in the

Horn of Africa. Open intervention on its part could have simplified the task of the Soviet Union. As things stood, the Soviets

were attempting an improbable balancing act. They preserved

a tenuous relationship with Somalia, and continued to provide

a measure of military aid even after the, attack on Ethiopia.

DICTATORSHIP AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION 175

This juggling act came to a predicta?le end in November 19~7,

hen Somalia expelled all the Russians, save a handful of d1p-

~~mats and broke diplomatic relations with Cuba. Nevertheless,

the sdviet Union had committed itself fully to the cause of

the Ethiopian regime. The delivery of military supplies accelerated rapidly following the opening of the Somali offensive.

Aden in South Yemen and Benghazi in Libya were used as

staging areas for an emergency airlift into Ethiopia. The Libyan

regime provided funds, and additional aid came from East

Germany and Czechoslovakia. The Israeli connection, which

had never been severed by the military rulers, was reinforced

through the employment of Israeli maintenance crews for the

overworked American planes of the Ethiopian air force. Cuban

military personnel arrived in large numbers to train the newly

formed militia units. Even South Yemen was pressed by the

Soviet Union to dispatch a military contingent to . Ethiopia.

Despite massive material support from abroad, the battered

regime in Addis Ababa could not regain its balance, militarily

or politically. Besides being routed by the Somali in the south

and southeast, its forces had practically surrendered Eritrea

in the north as well. When the town of Agordat fell to the

Eritrean liberation forces at the beginning of September, only

three towns in that province remained in Ethiopian hands. The

road link to Asmara from the port of Massawa was cut, and

both towns were besieged by the Eritreans. Renewed aggressiveness on the part of the Afar in the mid eastern lowlands imperiled

the road link between Addis Ababa and Assab, the only seaport

that remained accessible. After having been driven across. the

Sudan border in mid-summer, in the regime's sole sticcessful

operation, the EDU resumed its incursion in the west during the

autumn. Despite the heavy loss of life suffered by its memb.er~

ship, the EPRP continued the struggle in the major towns of

Ethiopia, taking a regular toll from among the prominent

regime personalities and henchmen. 61 . . .

The petty bourgeois element that had supported the military

government now found collaboration increa~ingly less attractive,

61. Included among them was the chairman, the second incumbent: of -the All

Ethiopia Trade Union. ·

176 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

and defection became epidemic.62 New appointees were conscripted 'to serve the revolution', and took up unfamiliar tasks

with great apprehension. The final blow to the regime's political

pretensions was the disaffection of the coterie of radical intellectuals grouped in POMO A, who had provided ideological

cover for the dictatorship, and were counted upon to erect a

political facade as well. As the military clique headed by Colonel

Mengistu stumbled from one pitfall to another, the radical

intelligentsia clique in POMOA, headed by the regime's political

eminence grise, Haile Fida, grew increasingly critical a·nd assertive.

Criticism was focused on their particular bete noire, the bureaucracy, which POMO A aspired to supplant with parastatal organizations under its direction. When groups such as the peasant

and worker militias were formed, which offered countervailing

power to the military establishment itself, the assertiveness of

its radical collaborators became a clear threat to the soldier

rulers. The break occurred in August 1977, when Haile Fida

and his cohort vanished from the scene. Reported~, they

went into hiding, only to be captured soon afterwards. 3 Many

of their followers went underground to form yet another source

of violent opposition to the regime. The defection of this group

tore away the flimsy politico-ideological facade that had been

designed to screen the raw reality of a brutal and mindless

military tyranny. 64

The dictatorship's reaction to the maelstrom of calamity

that befell the country was characteristically shrill and largely

purposeless. Sweeping mass mobilization measures were proclaimed, which were obviously impracticable and had to be

countermanded almost at once. Colonel Mengistu's hysterical

addresses to the population seemed designed to spread panic

rather than to stir patriotic enthusiasm. However, the dictator's

62. The Foreign Minister and seven ambassadors defected in March 1977. In

August, two ministers and a permanent secretary vanished from their posts,

while the chief administrator of Gondar province crossed into the Sudan at the

same time with a large number of followers.

63. This particular drama was played entirely in silence, save for a single announcement concerning the capture of unnamed persons 'who used to pretend they

were revolutionaries'.

64. Feeling exposed, the dictator now promoted the idea; mooted earlier of

forming his own political organisation which he called Sechet (Wildfire).

 - ·-

DICTATORSHIP AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION 177

calls to the masses elicited neither panic nor enthusiasm. Profound , paralyzing apathy was the prevailing mood among a

people stunned by manifold misfortune, for which their own

government's utter incompetence was held chiefly responsible.

Nevertheless, large numbers were pressed into military service.

A workers' militia was formed to supplement the peasant units.

Retired officers were recalled to duty, and were followed by

former soldiers up to the age of 60. Untrained and often unaware

of their destination, militia groups were thrown pell mell into

battle to serve as cannon fodder. To facilitate their transportation, all commercial vehicles were requisitioned, and automobile

mechanics were conscripted to service them. Predictably all this

proved to be of little effect. The Ethiopian regime's last and

bloodiest act of deception was its attempt to create the illusion

of a peoples' war in defence of their country. In order to foster

this illusion, it sacrificed thousands of civilian lives in a futile

attempt to stop an offensive mounted by a professional army; a

task its own professional forces had failed to accomplish.

~ · .. ·

V

-:,;: •'

I ? ~

Conclusion

Though no longer a novelty, military interventions which upset,

rathe.r than bolster, the domestic status quo are still difficult

to categorize. The freely assumed 'revolutionary' designation

covers a 1nultitude of varied instances which are not easily

reduced to a common analytical denominator. The case of

Ethiopia appears more baffling than most, because there the

revolution levelled the social structure close enough to its base

to make it rather difficult to discern the lines dividing the social

groups which are now engaged in a continued struggle for predo1ninance. In attempting to depict the situation that developed in the aftermath of the overthrow of the ancien regimet

the most promising path to follow is to trace the changed relationship among the social classes which had participated in that

historic event.

As we have noted, the principal role in that episode fell to the

educated etty bourgeoisie, a social group which, in that historical moment, concen ra e 1n itself the revolutionary aspirations of the underprivileged classes in the old regime. This

group was strategically placed in the structure of the state, both

its civil and military components. As a result, its passing over to

the opposition paralyzed the administrative and repressive

apparatus of the ancien regime and sealed its fate. The vanguard

role was assumed by a section of the educated petty bourgeoisie,

i.e. the radical intelligentsia, closely supported by a generation

of politically conscious and highly militant secondary and

university level students. This vanguard formulated the credo of

the popular movement, incorporating the aspirations of the

working class for recognition and the southern peasantry for

lan_d. Thus it paved the road for a joint march of these social

CONCLUSION 179

classes against the feudal establishment. However, the radicals

did not constitute a political organization, but simply a forum

for political discussion. They could not, therefore, aspire to

lead the march, but only to guide it. Nor was there even a

modicum of political organization within the educated petty

bourgeois class itself. This deficiency was not simply the result

of rigid proscription under the old regime. It was also due to

the fact that this social group had only quite recently felt the

need for political action to stem the erosion of what was

initially a relatively privileged position in the structure of that

regime.

The active participation of the working class broadened the

base and reinforced the momentum of the popular movement.

In view of a general tendency to make exaggerated claims upon

it, the role of this class must be seen in correct perspective. It

was a newly formed, loosely organized, indifferently led group,

with a developed sense of economic deprivation and social

oppression and a rising level of political consciousness. This

ensured that worker class consciousness would develop rapidly

once the struggle was joined, and that the radical message

would meet an eager response in the ranks of the proletariat.

Though quite small in size, this social group was concentrated in

the urban centres, particularly the capital, where the struggle

took place. However, worker participation in it, was effected

through their trade union organization, which pursued economic

rather than political goals. Even though the conventional leadership of the labour movement was jolted into a radical posture

by the momentum of the popular movement and the instigation

of the radical intelligentsia, the political consciousness of the

Ethiopian working class in general, and of its leadership in

particular at that time, lagged behind the radical vision of a

peoples democracy led by workers and peasants. Its situation

did not permit this class to play the leading role in the popular

n1ovement.

The self-employed section of the petty bourgeoisie was

another urban social group which provided significant support

for the popular movement. Quite different though it was, the

socio-economic position of this group made it a willing ally of

the 'salariat' sector of the petty bourgeoisie in the attack against

180 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

the coalition of Ethiopian feudalism and western capitalism. A

thoroughly atomized social sector, its contribution to the

struggle was necessarily amorphous and unheralded, with the

exception of the transport strikes and the great Muslim demonstration. More significantly, beyond the immediate goal of

overthrowing the ancien regime, the political aspirations of the

merchant and trader community remained largely indeterminate.

In Africa, more often than not, the peasantry remains uninvolved and seemingly unaffected by short term developments,

such as abrupt changes of political regimes. Adhering still to the

traditional mode of life, this class cannot be expected to compete for control of the state, which is a modem structure and

the bone of contention among urban groups. Therefore, the

peasantry seldom plays anything more than an uninspired supporting role on the political stage. In Ethiopia's case, the

peasantry was propelled closer to the centre of the stage by

historical forces, and the conscious desire of the radical vanguard

to bridge the chasm between city and countryside. Recent

history had predisposed the peasantry in the southern region

to react favourably to the opportunity proffered to them, and

they joined the popular movement spontaneously and with

great effort. In contrast, the peasantry in the north, whose historical experience and current position differed markedly, displayed a more characteristic forbearance.

The popular uprisi~g that began in February 1974 was

spontaneous, unpremeditated and unplanned. It was totally

lacking in organization and leadership. The popular movement represented a conjunction of interests among several

social classes opposed to the imperial regime, but not an established alliance of the same classes. There was no history -of

co-operation or even communication between them. Moreover,

there were precious few intra-class organizations capable of

playing any role at all, save for the professional associations

of the educated petty bourgeoisie, student associations and

trade unions. As things were, these organizations had to provide

the stimulus required to maintain the momentum of the movement during the spring and summer of 1974. During those

crucial months before the military takeover, the popular movement failed to develop any form of political organization, or

CONCLUSION 181

to produce any type of leadership. Until the overthrow of Haile

Selassie, his opponents were adhering still to the rules of his

regime. Although they were making political demands, they did

not take upon themselves to create a political organization to

pursue them. Their immediate tactical goal was to force the

government to permit political activity and to hold elections.

This was a miscalculation, since the thrust of the popular movement aimed to topple not to reform the regime. When this

appeared to be imminent, due to the defection of the armed

forces, a vacuum was in the making which made the intervention of the military practically inevitable.

This intervention was not an unwholesome prospect to the

enemies of the old regime. On the contrary, it was generally

assumed that without the participation, or at least, the sanction

of the soldiers, it would have been impossible to carry out a

political revolution in Ethiopia. This assumption was logical

enough, given the fact that an army whose mission had been to

defend the regime could not, in any case, be expecte~ to remain

neutral. Ever since the abortive coup d'etat of 1960, just such

an intervention was hopefully anticipated by the foes of the

imperial regime. 1 In their periodic confrontations with the

imperial government since then, the students often sought to

incite the soldiery to rise against their masters. From the very

beginning of the February Revolution, a barrage of propaganda

was directed towards them inviting them to join the popular

movement. The hope, of course, was that the soldiers would

topple the unpopular regime, not succeed it; a fanciful notion

under any circumstances, and a highly unrealistic one in the

given context.

Initially, the solders' revolution in 1974 was not an unwelcomed development for the petty bourgeoisie in particular. Not

only was the old regime vanquished al,mo~t eff9rtlessly as a

result, but the leading element among the military rebels was

definitely petty bourgeois in its social ·makeup. Most of the

1. A study of the ancien regime, completed two years before its downfall, noted

that 'Ethiopians who desire to see radical changes effected in their political

system have increasingly focused their hopes on the military'. Markakis, John.

Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity, op.cit., p.259.

182 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

members of the officer contingent in the Dergue, who emerged

to establish contact with groups in the popular movement, had

a reassuringly familiar background and appeared to share fully

the aspirations of this class. Noting the class origins of the rebel

officers, Democracia, at the beginning of 1975, analyzed the

political ambivalence of the petty bourgeoisie, and warned the

progressive elements not to be confused by contradictory

developments, nor to lose sight of the basic trends. 2 The paper

was voicing the already crystalized opposition of the radical

sector. However, it recognized that an element in the popular

movement supported the military regime on the basis of the

reforms it had proclaimed, while the majority was confused and

undecided. 3

The statements and actions of the Dergue throughout 1975

were designed, wittingly or not, to attract support among both

sections of the petty bourgeoisie. The recent radical_ization of

this class stemmed from the fact that the evolving structures of

the Ethiopian state and economy had trapped it into an inferior

position from which it had no hope of emerging. It was quite

natural for this class, therefore, to advocate the dismantling

of these structures, and to play a leading role in the movement

that accomplished this task. The educated petty bourgeoisie

played a similarly leading role in drafting the design of the new

'socialist' socio-economic structure, and persuaded the military

regime to impose it in short order. It has become obvious by

now in the Third World, that nationalization is the safest and

quickest, if not the only, way for this class to gain control of

the national economy and, thereby, rise to social and political

predominance. Nationalization created a large number of

executive posts for the educated petty bourgeoisie, whose members replaced the former owners, managers, and higher level

administrators of the nationalized enterprises. In the state administration, the purge of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie created

2. It was pointed out that the petty bourgeoisie is not a principal class, but lies

wedged between labour and capital. Consequently, it lacks a fixed ideology,

and tends politically to swing back and forth between these two. It also

thinks that it can rise above classes, and aspires to create a social system

favourable to all social groups (No.23, 24 January 1975).

3. Ibid.

CONCLUSION 183

a vacuum at the upper levels of the apparatus, which was

quickly filled with promotions from. below and appointments

from outside. All such posts were claimed also by members of

the educated petty bourgeoisie.4 The self-employed sector of

the petty bourgeoisie also gained through the forceful elimination of foreign capital competition and of expatriate control

of the domestic market. Finally, the regime's blueprint for the

'socialist' economy reserved ample room for the self-employed

and entrepreneurial class.

Promoting petty bourgeois class interests, as it were, the military regime might reasonably have expected strong support

from this social group. The fact that ultimately it was disappointed stems from a combination of factors. A basic one

concerned the distribution of power. The military caste claimed

exclusive rights of control over the stat~, and denied a share of

power to other groups. While memben, of the educated petty

bourgeoisie were appointed to high office, including the cabinet,

they lacked standing vis-a-vis the all-powerful Dergue. The

latter's members had unchallengeable authority over all civilian

officials. The brusque and · overbearing manner in which the

military rulers exercised this authority, made it painfully clear

to the bureaucrats that their status was diminished regardless

of office and title. Many of them found their new position demeaning as well. 5 In addition to the officer contingent, the

Dergue included a good many simple soldiers and uneducated

non-commissioned officers. Derisory remarks about 'illiterate

corporals' were the first sign of petty bourgeois disenchantment

with military rule. The educated petty bourgeoisie which had

resented its subordination to the bureaucratic-bourgeois and

feudal elements of the ancien regime, now found itself subservient to a caste whose rule was no less imperious, though a lot

less predictable. Yet, as long as the long range intentions of the

Dergue concerning its tenure in power were not made quite

4.

5.

It is worth noting that suggestions for higher income tax rates and/or saJary

reductions for the higher income brackets were never adopted.

The Dergue drove this point home by sending its representatives known a

the 'Apostles of Change' to every state agency to teach the bureauc~ts the

elements of the 'Ethiopia First' doctrine, to examine their work habits and

investigate complaints against them.

184 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

clear, alienation among this social group was mitigated by the

implementation of socio-economic reforms, and was muffled

by the general confusion formented by the contradictory

developments during 1975.

The Dergue's insistence on retaining a monopoly of power,

conceivably need not have proved an insurmountable obstacle

in its relationship with the petty bourgeoisie. The educated

sector of this class might have reconciled itself to a stable and

efficient military dictatorship which would have safeguarded

this group's newly attained socio-economic position. However,

the opposite proved to be the case. The ruling Junta showed

signs of extreme instability in 1976, and its behaviour deteriorated from being erratic and unpredictable to becoming hysterical and absurd. Manifold opposition engulfed it in a maelstrom of violent conflict, and the military caste wa~ ·obliged

to commit its own and the state's resources to the struggle for

its own survival. In this situation, the position of the petty

bourgeoisie began to erode even before it had become consolidated. Faced with the opposition of the major classes in the

urban sector, the regime was forced to rely heavily on two

marginal groups, in order to retain a semblance of popular support in this sector. These were the small faction of the radical

intelligentsia that was mobilized through POMOA, and the

urban lumpen element that took over the urban · associations.

The ideologues of the former group waged a secondary campaign

against the bureaucracy, which was added to the list of enemies

of the revolution. Since this structure was. now manned mainly

by the petty bourgeoisie, the campaign had an intimidating and

unsettling effect on this group. Furthermore, as the alienation

of the petty bourgeoisie hardened, and was manifested in

continuous resignations, defections, as well as dismissals, replacements were chosen increasingly from the ranks of the military,

particularly for the highest posts. 6 The rise of the lumpen

element to urban prominence was another setback for the petty

bourgeoisie. As the associations gained tighter control over

urban community life, the petty bourgeoisie found itself daily

6. In March 1977, following the defection of the Foreign Minister and several

ambassadors, military officers were appointed to the posts of minister and

permanent secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

CO CLUSION

185

. Josed upon by their officials and militiamen. Its helplessness uni bl d h . . d • 1 an increasingly unsta e an t reatenmg environment un er-

:1.0red the precariousness of the petty bourgeoisie's position in

~he socialist mode a la Dergue, where the highest priority was

(liven to safeguarding a monopoly of power for the military

~aste. Consequently, in time, the petty bourgeoisie was to

disassociate itself from the rule of this caste and to join the

opposition.

The majority of the radical intelligentsia - those who thought

of themselves in Cabral's terms as being ready to commit class

suicide - and the students were driven into early militant

opposition by the conviction that they had divined the true

nature and intentions of the military rulers. They had perceived

the contradiction between the interests of the petty bourgeoisie

on the one hand, and those of the workers and peasants on

the other, in the new order of things. This contradiction had

effectively dissolved the conjunction of interests that had

brought these groups together in the popular movement. The

radical group believed that only by renouncing its class interests could the petty bourgeoisie rejoin its farmer allies and

revive the popular movement. A small group of radical•intellectuals rallied to the side of the Dergue drawn by the conviction

that the soldiers could be guided in the desired direction. Their

conviction was not entirely misplaced. They were indeed able to

guide the Dergue, but only in the direction where the soldiers'

instincts led them. This pointed towards a military dictatorship with petty bourgeois aspirations, which is hardly surprising

given the class background of both the dominant officer element

in the Dergue and its intellectual advisers. This also seemed the

optimum course politically, since in their formulation s.uch

aspirations subsumed the hopes of other social groups, in the

popular movement. In the given historical moment, during

which the Ethiopian petty bourgeoisie was able to assert itself,

its aspirations found fulfilment in a 'socialist' mode of socioeconomic organization. By adopting this creed for its own, the

military caste was seeking to place itself at the head of the

popular movement, and thus gain a popular foundation for its

rule. The contradictions inherent in the popular movement

itself foiled this move.

J 86 CLASS AND REVOLUTiON IN ETHIOPIA

The economic reforms upset the alliance which had ranged

the working class and the petty bourgeoisie side by side in the

popular 1nove1nent. The nationalization of the urban sector of

the econo1ny dissolved the ephemeral conjunction of interests

that had brought these two classes together, and highlighted the

contradiction between their respective interests in the 'socialist' economic structure. The incorporation of the process of

production into the state sector catapulted the 'salariat' stratum

into the role of management. In order to safeguard the dominance of this role, the petty bourgeoisie must prevent the active

participation of the workers in the management of the economy.

The workers must be regimented and controlled by the state

bureaucratic structure also manned by the petty bourgeoisie.

The opposition of interests between these two classes is clearly

manifested and a clash is inevitable.

In this case, the clash occurred almost immediately, when

CELU made an initial but futile effort to prevent the consolidation of military rule. Since it became clear afterwards that

the workers would not be given a role in the management of

the enterprises, the trade · union movement fought to retain its

autonomy, in order to best represent worker interests vis-a-_vis

the petty bourgeois management. This concern found expression in a long exposition published by CELU def ending the role

of trade unions in socialist countries. The regime, on the other

hand, did all it could to reduce the organized labour movement

to the status of a state agency, and succeeded i:t~ driving labour

activism underground. The new management naturally inherited

the concern of the old one about labour productivity, costs

and discipline. The actions taken, or not taken, by the regime

subsequently fully reflect this concern. The freezing of wages

during a period of continued inflation, the failure to set minimum wage standards or to enact any form of social welfare

measures, the character of the new labour proclamation, the

determined effort to divide the workers into opposed factions,

and the systematic violence with which worker actions were

met, all these delineated the true position of the Ethiopian

proletariat in the new 'socialist' order.

The total and almost immediate alienation of labour restricted considerably the regime's base of urban support. This base ·

coNCLUSION 187

S further narrowed by the quick disenchantment of another

wa f b .. sizable group, the self-employed sector o the petty ourgeo1s1e.

Although nationalization removed foreign capitalist and expatriate community competition, the potential range of action

for this group was definitely curtailed by the greatly expanded

sphere of state economic activity. While this did not immediately

effect the bulk of this class, it did eliminate a small group of

Ethiopian entrepreneurs who had managed to insert themselves

into the lower interstices of the capitalist economy. Perhaps .

more significantly, the new scheme dashed the hopes of many

aspiring domestic capitalists for the future. This was the first

worm in the apple. Moreover, the readiness of the military

regime to impose economic sanctions, such as confiscation of

property and closure of businesses, for any conceivable infraction, created apprehension among this property-conscious group.

The trader and merchant community were given plenty

additional cause for worry During the height of the student

campaign, it became a target of radical attacks for its middleman role between city and countryside. Traders were denounced

as exploiters and class enemies of the peasantry. Many traders

in the southern region owned land, which they lost through the

land reform, because they could not qualify as cultivators. The

proposed schemes for marketing co-operatives in the peasant

associations threatened the very existence of the trader class

in the rural areas. The position of this group in the urban sector

deteriorated also. Many of its members were owners of inexpensive rented units, which they lost in the nationalization of extra

housing. As former landlords, they were deprived of a voice

in the urban associations and were excluded from the management of community affairs. Furthermore, the urban associations were encouraged to establish co-operative retail stores

in direct competition with the local merchants. Whenever possible, the state authorities favoured those co-operatives in the

distribution of scarce products. Sugar from the state production

monopoly, for example, was allocated mostly to the association

stores. The trader and merchant group was also penalized by the

discount of large notes during the change of currency, because

they normally kept cash reserves on hand rather ~_han in bank

accounts. Above all, the trader community became a scapegoat

o•AA•

188 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

for a regime seeking to shift the blame for inflation and shortages caused by a production slowdown and the disruption of

the distribution process. The campaign of terror against this

sector of the petty bourgeoisie was designed to seal its alienation

from the military regime and its brand of socialism.

The rural land reform created an important base of support

for the military regime among the southern peasantry, who had

joined enthusiastically the popular movement in 1974. Land

reform had long been advocated by the educated petty bourgeoisie, a group that had nothing of its own _to lose from the

elimination of landed property. On the contrary, the proclamation which emancipated the peasantry in the southern region,

also destroyed the foundation of the landlord class-, thus removing a powerful rival from the scene. However, emancipation

need not mean freedom for · the peasantry from any form of

tutelage. It would not do to grant a real measure of self-government to the peasantry, any more than it would to allow worker

participation in the management of the economy. In an underdeveloped country with a predominantly agricultural base, the

peasant producer must be compelled not only to maintain the

non-productive state sector, but to pay also for the cost of

any development that is to take place. In other words, the conjunction of interests that had turned the petty bourgeois into

a champion of the downtrodden southern peasant, also proved

ephemeral.

That is why the role of the peasant associations became a

bone of contention from the beginning. As originally conceived,

they were intended to implement the land reform, particularly

the immense task of land redistribution which was beyond the

capacity of any state agency. The redistribution of land 'as

equally as possible' was designed to produce a smallholding

pattern in the south, similar to what already existed in the

north. This form of land tenure, which preserved the atomization of the peasant community, did not contradict the interests,

nor endanger the predominance of the petty bourgeoisie in the

state, socialist or otherwise. This design was attacked by the

radical intelligentsia on the grounds that it served to promote

petty bourgeois, not peasant, interests. The student campaign

in the countryside proved effective in infusing the newly eman-

r

CONCLUSION

189

cipat~d peasantry in the south with a strong feeling of self- assertion h. h · th , w ic was translated into a demand for transforming

e _P~asant associations into true instruments of local selfadm1n1stration.

. The regime ~esisted this demand throughout 1975. Finally,

it ~eie1:ted, anxious not to alienate this source of support, something it could ill afford in view of its rapidly shrinking base in

the urban sector. The broadening of association jurisdiction was

a concession counterbalanced by the imposition of a hierarchical pattern of rural development administration - the Revolutionary Administrative and Development Committees - in

which the peasantry was to play a minor role. At the same time,

the provincial administrative structure was staffed with military

and petty bourgeois types who were hardly likely to encourage

peasant self-assertion.

The rapid erosion of its position throughout the country in

the first months of 1977, forced the dictatorship to lean heavily

on the southern peasant element, its only sizeable source of

support. Peasants were brought into the cities, particularly the

capital, to augment the size of the crowds in the staged demonstrations, and to join the hunt for the underground opposition.

Promised more than a year earlier, the arming and training of

the peasant association defence squads was begun now. A major

programme was launched to raise a peasant militia on a massive

scale to def end the regime. Driven to distraction by a swarm of

foes, in May 1977, the dictatorship began despatching ill armed,

hastily instructed peasant contingents against the heavily armed,

seasoned forces of the Eritrean liberation movement, and

against the variegated opposition throughout the northern

region. Unlikely though it was to deter the opposition, this

desperate move held a deadly danger for Ethiopia, for it threatened to exacerbate ethnic animosities and to provoke a catastrophic civil war. The land reform, as we have noted, gained the

regime little credit in the northern provinces. Its subsequent

actions transformed the initial forbearance of the northern

peasant into growing hostility. This was proved by the resur-

?ence of rebellious activity on the part of ancien regime ele~ents

m this region. As of old, in times of crisis, the peasantry in the

north sought refuge in provincialism. At the other end of the

190 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

country the upsurge of secessionist activity in the south indicated

that peasant class sentiment, once again, found forceful expression in nationalism.

Quite obviously, the soldiers' revolution in Ethiopia was not

an ordinary military intervention in the political life of that

country. Its social basis and aspirations were evident in the

spontaneous and sustained role played by simple soldiers and

lower ranking officers, the demands made of, and actions taken

against, the ruling classes of the ancien regime, the elimination

of the military hierarchy, and the fact that the revolt was

spawned in the womb of the popular movement, many of

whose aspirations the soldiers shared and promoted. The peasant

and petty bourgeois class elements in the social background of

the military were identical with the same elements in the popular

movement. As was the case with the latter, the petty bourgeois

element assumed the leading role in the soldiers' movement, and

emerged as the dominant element in the military regime. The

congruence of class explains the readiness of this regime to

espouse a 'socialist' mode of socio-economic organization best

suited to the interest of the petty bourgeoisie. Its unwillingness

to share political power is a caste characteristic, as is the readiness to use force as an antidote for dissent.

et, the regime aspired to win support beyond the tip of

bayonet. It entertained bonapartist aspirations of building

ase for its rule which would extend beyond the narrow

limits of the military caste. 'Socialism' seemed an opportune,

congenial and essential device for this purpose. However,

'Ethiopian socialism' failed to reconcile its major beneficiary,

the petty bourgeoisie, to the permanent reality of military rule,

and proved unable to propitiate the hostility of the workers,

a class that had gained nothing from it. The support' of the

southern peasantry was gained through a land reform that was

radical, though not essentially socialist in nature. As the hope

of mobilizing popular support dimmed, the regime was forced

to rely increasingly on the· sole resource, i.e. brute force, of its

natural constituency, the military caste. However the ideological

device was retained, even elaborated and reinforced. A savage

mpaign of repression was advertised as a crusade for 'Ethiopian

So · lism'. Since the blows were directed mainly against the

~

\

)

CONCLUSION 19 I

vanguard of the popular movement, the campaign secn1ed

designed to bury the vision of true socialism along w