Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 16:269–289, 2010

Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN: 1353-7113 print / 1557-2986 online

DOI: 10.1080/13537113.2010.526837

Nationalism in Historic Ethiopia

ALEMSEGED ABBAY

Frostburg State University

Historic Ethiopia (now Eritrea and Ethiopia) has suffered from extreme forms of ethno-regional nationalism for far too long. By focusing on the interactions between state nationalism, which engendered a plethora of counter nationalisms, and Eritrean separatism

(Eritreanism), this article shows the futility of excessive nationalism

as the politics of imagined identities that do not necessarily reflect

realities and the urgent need to chart a fresh road of dealing with

the conditions that engender it rather than blaming those who are

forced by circumstances to embrace it as “narrow nationalists” or

“tribalists.”

INTRODUCTION

[Nationalism is] an infantile disease, the measles of mankind. Albert

Einstein1

[N]ationalism ... Naturally Appears as “Neurosis.” Tom Nairn2

The metaphor of disease for nationalism, particularly in its extreme version,

is apt since it tends to give a community an imagined collective image and

false hope, not quite reflecting prevailing realities. Too often, blame has been

hurled against the nationalisms that have been nurtured by centrifugal forces.

However, this does not present a complete picture of the region’s problems

because it does not include state nationalism as conceived by the country’s ruling elite, the Amhara. State nationalism orchestrated twin projects:

cultural homogenization—assimilation into the Amhara melting pot—and

centralization. State nationalism, a vital aspect of Ethiopia’s nation- and statebuilding process, was the epicenter of the ethno-regional nationalisms that

have mushroomed in the region during the last five decades. For instance,

it was singularly responsible for transforming the Ethiopian sense of identity

Address correspondence to Alemseged Abbay, Department of History, Frostburg State

University, Frostburg, MD 21532. E-mail: aabbay@frostburg.edu

269

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270 A. Abbay

of the Eritreans to secessionist nationalism, Eritreanism. The latter evolved

out of a nationalism that had sought union with Ethiopia (1941–1952) and a

moderate and pragmatic variant of Eritrean nationalism that sought the retention of Eritrea’s autonomy within the Ethiopian empire-state (1952–1962).

When the latter failed, Eritreanism, in its secessionist format, developed

(1961–1991). Eritreanism was thus a reactive nationalism.

Towards the end of the 19th century, the Amhara political elite of Shewa,

central Ethiopia, took the helm of power in the country. Simultaneously, the

late-bloomer colonial power, Italy, amputated northern Ethiopia to establish its “first-born-colony” of Eritrea by transforming the river Mareb into an

international boundary dividing the Tigrayans between Emperor Menelik’s

Ethiopia and Italian Eritrea. If not by design, by default, historic Ethiopia

was, to a limited extent, exposed to forces of modernity that were introduced by colonialism. And Ethiopia, though not formally colonized, was

not insulated from the glimmers of modernity that were penetrating the region. Ethiopia’s ruling elite, the Amhara, effectively utilized the glimmers

of modernity to build an Ethiopian state in their image. Not only did they

launch the process of political centralization but they were also determined

to eliminate the country’s sociocultural diversity in the Amhara melting pot.

A nascent bureaucracy, which was filled primarily by Amhara elites, diluted

the power base of regional elites. The promotion of Amharic as the sole

official/national and academic language did not only relegate the other languages to social, political, and economical irrelevance but also, in effect,

subjected their speakers to amharanization.

In the meantime, the northern Ethiopians who were subjected to Italian

rule in what became Eritrea in 1890 had little access to forces of modernity

and, consequently, could not develop an identity different from that of the

Ethiopians. Thus, when the Allies of World War II freed them from Italian

colonialism in 1941, Eritreans yearned to return to Ethiopia, which they did

in 1952. But, the Ethiopia they were returning to was different from the one

they left at the end of the 19th century. The latter was being ruled by their

co-ethnic Tigrayans under Emperor Yohannes IV and his legendary general

Ras Alula who earned immense reputation as a just ruler of the Eritrean

highlands (Kebessa). And the former was being ruled by the Amhara of

central Ethiopia. More importantly, unlike Yohannes’s Ethiopia, the Ethiopia

that was run by the Amhara political elite during the 20th century was

engaged in the process of nation-building. Thus, when Eritreans returned

to what they called “mother Ethiopia” in 1952, state nationalism, as seen

through the Amhara elite prism, could not spare them from its twin projects

of cultural homogenization (amharanization) and centralization despite the

autonomy that was given to them by U.N. Resolution 390 A (V).

Although Eritreans returned to Ethiopia in 1952 with alacrity, they

were not prepared to give up their political autonomy, official languages (Tigrinya and Arabic), and culture. Notwithstanding Eritrea’s peaceful

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Nationalism in Historic Ethiopia 271

resistance, the state’s twin projects of homogenization and centralization

were tenaciously maintained throughout the 1950s. By 1961, State nationalism’s relentless assault on Eritrean particularities engendered a virulent and

lethal nationalism—Eritreanism.

Unlike the political actors of the 1940s and 1950s who had a realistic understanding of Eritrea’s identity and resources, the post-1961 political actors

imagined an Eritrea that was detached significantly from reality. Imagining

an exaggerated community, Eritrean nationalist leaders did not want to see

goals other than secession. In fact, as the armed struggle raged and more

blood was spilt, their commitment to the goals became sacrosanct and they

became monomaniac. People did not pause to ask whether an independent Eritrea could ever be economically viable. Put differently, Eritreanism

evolved to be too idealistic and too quixotic to see what was in the best

interests of the Eritrean people.

By the same token, state nationalism did not heed the peaceful Eritrean

demands for the maintenance of the UN-granted federation. Nor could it

pause and reconsider its policies of amharanization and centralization at any

moment during the 30 years of debilitating war. The zero-sum game ended

in 1991 when state nationalism ran out of gas and Eritreanism managed to

split Eritrea from Ethiopia. Understanding the interactions between the two

stubborn nationalisms is germane to making informed policy decisions in

the troubled region.

IDENTITY AND NATIONALISM IN BRITISH ERITREA (1941–1952)

We Eritreans—Muslims and Christians, Kebessa [highlanders] and Metahit

[lowlanders] —... are all one in lineage, history, and race. We are

brethren; we are Ethiopians; we are not Italians; we are not English;

we are not Sudanese; we are not Egyptians. Our land is Ethiopian since

the ancient times... . The whole world knows that we are Ethiopians.3

Eritrea’s Ethiopian identity was constructed by the traditional moral systems

of the Orthodox Church, the monarchy that harked back to the legend of the

Queen of Sheba and King Solomon, the rich “three-thousand-year” history

and a land tenure system. Further, although a collective identity can be

formulated as a counterimage to alien rule, no distinct Eritrean-ness came

into existence in opposition to Italian colonialism. It was the preexisting

Ethiopian image of Eritrea that was growing in opposition not only to the

Italian colonial masters but also to the Sudanese and Egyptian neighbors,

as well as the English custodians. The colonial hiatus could not rupture the

Ethiopian identity of the people.

The defeat of Italy in 1941 brought British custodianship to Eritrea that

was welcomed by the people. According to Walde-Ab Walde-Mariam, the

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272 A. Abbay

most celebrated Eritrean political activist of the 1940s, “We were happy to

see the English. In fact, we were ready to welcome anyone except the

Italians. We preferred the devil to the Italians.”4 British rule, which did not

disappoint the Eritreans, gave them better education, free press, and freedom

to organize in political parties; civil liberties that were outside of the purview

of the Ethiopian state-building process. This decade-long British rule was

responsible for laying down the cornerstone of Eritrean distinctness.

In British Eritrea, different ethnic and religious groups used different

paradigms of imagining their communities. Since Italian colonialism did not

let the forces of modernity disrupt the peasant world and allow the rise

of a market economy and a middle class, it was primordial elements of

history, culture, and religion that became the markers of the mental map

and memory space of the people. The emergent political parties projected

those paradigms. The Muslim League identified itself with the Islamic/Arab

world and was apprehensive about merging with “Christian” Ethiopia. Based

in Kebessa, where the Orthodox Church played a vital role, the Unionist Party

strongly identified itself with Ethiopia. People swung to the familiar world

and distanced themselves from the unfamiliar space. In a liberal political

atmosphere under the British rule where the people could freely express

their political fate, there was no Eritrean nationalism that transcended the

primordial markers of identity. Ultimately, backed by the socially dominant

Orthodox Church, it was the Unionist Party that won the battle of paradigms

through a UN-managed voting, federating Eritrea with Ethiopia. For this

party, identity other than the Ethiopian was baseless because it contradicted,

among others, the history of the region that was at the heart of the transMareb identity.5

The liberal political atmosphere that the British introduced, however,

did not keep Ethiopia out of meddling in the Eritrean political landscape.

Given its eagerness to acquire an outlet to the sea, it was actively involved

in channeling the political flow to its favor. Yet, it is difficult to fathom

how much Ethiopian money, which used to pour into Eritrea, and the proEthiopia shiftas (bandits) and the Unionist thugs known as “Andinet,” who

used to terrorize the anti-Unionists,6 influenced the public to support a union

with Ethiopia. Many, not all, Eritrean shiftas were being trained in and dispatched from Tigray across the Mareb by two Eritrean governors of the

Tigrayan districts of Axum and Adua—Nebrued Gebremesqal and Colonel

Isaias Gabre-Selassie, respectively.7 Depending on the eyes of the beholder,

the shiftas were concurrently brigands and patriots. Bandits to the Italian

residents, the British administrators, and anti-Unionist Eritreans, the Shiftas

were patriots to the Unionist Eritreans and their Ethiopians sponsors.

Not only the Kebessa, but an increasing number of Muslims in both

the eastern and western lowlands of Eritrea were also showing more inclinations towards unity with Ethiopia so much so that they were displaying

the Ethiopian flag and Emperor Haile Selassie’s portrait in their homes and

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Nationalism in Historic Ethiopia 273

shops.8 Even Muslim shiftas in the western lowlands, such as Idris Hamid

Awate, who is currently iconized as “pioneer of the revolution” (“felami

sewra”), were pro-Ethiopian unionists. In 1943, an American historian, who

had been observing the Eritrean political situation for eight months, informed

President Franklin D. Roosevelt that Eritreans entertain an Ethiopian sense

of identity. Even the Muslim shopkeepers “in Asmara, Massaua, Keren, and

other cities display photographs of [Emperor Haile] Selassie on their walls.”9

Identification with Ethiopia was also advanced by the few Eritrean elites

who had managed to sneak out of Italian Eritrea and to get a Western

education abroad such as Lorenzo Taezaz, Dawit Oqbazghi, and Ephrem

Tewolde-Medhin. Those who managed to get a Western education, as in the

American University of Beirut, had no place in Italian Eritrea. They landed

key positions in independent Ethiopia and promoted the unionist agenda

and spearheaded its movement.10 Some of them established the Society for

the Unification of Ethiopia and Eritrea on 27 February 1944.11

The emergent home-educated elite too, almost in unison, favored unity

with Ethiopia. For instance, the Catholic-mission-educated Asfaha WaldeMichael was an arch unionist who argued that Eritreans, including those living in Nakfa, the northern tip of the region, saw themselves as Ethiopians.12

Even the Protestant-mission-educated Walde-Ab Walde-Mariam, an arch opponent of unity without conditions, argued that

In language, ethnicity, culture, and history Eritrea is part of Ethiopia. If we

are thinking for posterity let us not dislike unity [with Ethiopia]. Unity is

strength. Unity is prosperity. Unity is dignity. Unity is victory. Our goal is

to bring about a new and Greater Ethiopia where Muslims, Christians and

pagans, leaders and followers, peasantry and gentry, Tigrayans, Amhara,

and Galla [Oromo] would live in justice and equality.13

Walde-Ab Walde-Mariam omitted “Eritreans” as one of the distinct components of Ethiopia. It was an omission by commission, intended to underline the fact that Eritreans were an integral part of the Tigrayan unit. Yet,

the regime in Shewa was unsure whether acquiring Eritrea was not going to undo Emperor Menelik’s victory of weakening the power base of

the Tigrayans. It was going to give the Tigrinya-speaking people—historical

power contenders to the Amhara—strong political clout. Indeed, the transMareb commonality and solidarity was still intact as the future of Eritrea was

in the balance in the 1940s.14

Ultimately, Emperor Haile Selassie opted to entice the Tigrayan nobility through marriage diplomacy, rather than relying exclusively on crude

force as a means of establishing an enduring peace and legitimacy in the

north. This, he believed, would avert separatist tendencies by the reunited

Tigrinya speakers. It was in this vein of thought that he wed his favorite

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274 A. Abbay

granddaughter, Aida Desta, to Mengesha, the son of Ras Seyoum,15 who was

the grandson of the Tigrayan Emperor of Ethiopia, Yohannes IV.

Indeed, the apprehension that the emperor had about the potential for

the rise of a reinvigorated and reenergized centrifugal Tigrinya-speaking bloc

was not a baseless paranoia. Although both the unionists and conditional

unionists (federalists) strongly identified themselves with Ethiopia, the latter

did flirt with centrifugal tendencies. The federalists, who established the Liberal Progressive Party and later the “Eritrea for Eritreans” movement, argued

that “The geographic position, its culture, its history and its trading are a clear

proof that Tigray is part of Eritrea—as it was before the Italian occupation of

1889 and in the years 1935–1941.”16 And they had a clear preference to be

ruled by the Tigrayan ruling class, as Walde-Ab Walde-Mariam stated. “In my

opinion,” he said, “when Eritrea merges with Ethiopia, it should be ruled by

a Tigrinya-speaker from Ethiopia.”17 The other noted leader of the “Eritrea

for Eritreans” movement, Dejach Abraha Tessema, also explicitly stated that

Ras Seyoum Megesha was the only surviving person from the Tigrayan ruling

house who could possibly have led the trans-Mareb Tigray-Tigrignie. Simultaneously, by referring to history, the federalists did not trust the Amhara

ruling house enough to commit themselves to their fold unconditionally.

What was still fresh in their collective memory and remained imprinted in

their psyche was the feeling of having been ejected from Ethiopia and “sold”

to the Italians by the Shewan Amhara ruling elite. The conditional unionist (federalist) Liberal Progressive Party extolled the precolonial historic role

of the Tigrayans under Yohannes IV in the Ethiopian body politic and expressed its grievances about how the Tigrayan core was mistreated by the

Amhara to the Four Power Commission for the Former Italian Colonies (USA,

USSR, Britain, and France):

During the time King John IV ruled Ethiopia he did not sell or give away

any part of his empire. It was looked after on an equal basis. But after he

died and Emperor Menelik ruled the country, he sold us to the Italians

and he accepted a price for us. You can not claim goods or materials

which you have already sold. We are people: we are still people and can

not be compared with animals.18

They impressed upon the Four Power Commission of Investigation for the

Former Italian Colonies that the trans-Mareb Tigrinya-speaking unit was an

indivisible whole. Their response to the question of the U.S. delegate of the

Commission “Do you sincerely believe that Eritrea without the Tigray could

ever become a viable state capable of being self-supporting economically

and financially?,” was that “We and the Tigray are the same people: We have

the same language, and the freedom we ask is for ourselves and the Tigray

united. The Shoans have plenty of land, and they can have their own.”19

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Nationalism in Historic Ethiopia 275

On 18 February 1947, a tiny political party that brought Christians and

Muslims together, the Eritrean Independence Party, was founded. It sought

independence by uniting all Eritreans, irrespective of religion. As a symbol

of religious unity, the founders went to the home of the Muslim Saleh Kekiya

and had a chicken that was slaughtered by Saleh Kekiya himself for lunch.

They took an oath on the Koran to work for the independence of Eritrea

irrespective of religious attachments. Then they went to the home of the

Christian Dejach Abraha Tessema and had a chicken that was slaughtered

by Abraha Tessema himself for dinner and swore on the Bible not to be

divided on the basis of religion and to work together for the independence of

Eritrea. However, with its slogan “Eritrea for the Eritreans,” even the Eritrean

Independence Party could not imagine an independent Eritrea separate from

Tigray. In 1987, Walde-Ab Walde-Mariam reminisced:

Tigray was going to join Eritrea. Both shared the same language, history,

and ethnicity. Italy, too, ruled both Tigray and Eritrea together after it

colonized Ethiopia. It was also a unity that the world knew... . Both are

one and should not split.... Also, only if they were united could they

form a force that could challenge Ethiopia. Economically, a united entity

of both regions could be strong.20

Referring to the united entity of Eritrea and Tigray as “Tigray-Tigrignie,” both

leaders and followers of the “Eritrea for the Eritreans” movement argued over

and over in Nay Ertra Semunawi Gazetta,21 and especially in Hanti Eritra,

the organ of the Eritrean Independence Party, that the trans-Mareb Tigrinyaspeaking region was an indivisible whole.22 Unsurprisingly, the leaders of

this movement were targeted for deadly attacks by unionist thugs. The vice

president of the party, Grazmatch Berhe Gabre-Kidan, was assassinated on

16 May 1950.23 Such terror did not fully succeed in silencing all the opponents

of Ethiopia’s drive to completely annex Eritrea. Not all acquiesced. In fact, the

intrepid Walde-Ab Walde-Mariam, who survived seven attempts on his life,

was defiant. Surviving the fourth attempt on his life, after being hospitalized

for five months, he vowed that even if he had a hundred lives he would

not have hesitated to sacrifice them for his beloved Eritrea.24 The attempts

on his life ended up making Walde-Ab Walde-Mariam larger than life. One

article that appeared in the organ of the Eritrean Independence Party was

titled “The Resurrection of Mr. Walde-Ab Walde-Mariam, Martyr of Eritrea

(Tigray-Tigrignie).”25

It was against this background that Ethiopia started seriously reconsidering its claim over Eritrea. On 28 March 1948, the Emperor told a British

Member of Parliament, Tom McPherson, that he would be content if he were

to get a port for his country. Further, a former Swedish Minister in London,

Ambassador Pritz, told the British Chief Administrator of Eritrea, F. G. Drew,

that Ethiopia was not going to press its claim of Eritrea for two reasons.

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276 A. Abbay

First, the emperor feared that Eritrea was going to be a financial liability to

Ethiopia—a fear that was also shared by the Americans who believed that,

financially, Eritrea was going to be a “net drain” on Ethiopia.26

Indeed, Eritrea had never been economically self-sustaining. It relied

upon food from northern Ethiopia so much so that problems used to arise

whenever the flow of food encountered difficulties. For instance, in the

1910s, there was a shortage of food in Tigray and the regional leaders, Ras

Sebhat and Dejach Seyoum decided to stop sending food to Eritrea. Upset,

the Italian governor of Eritrea reciprocated by forbidding foreign manufactured goods from reaching Tigray; a decision that forced the Tigrayans to lift

the food embargo on Eritrea.27 Despite the determined efforts of the Italians

to develop agriculture to mitigate the chronic insufficiency of food production, the region remained perennially dependent upon northern Ethiopia. In

the British era too, Tigray continued to be the chief granary of Eritrea.28

Second, as stated earlier, the Emperor suffered from an intense fear

about the possibility of Eritrea joining Tigray and seceding from Ethiopia,29

derailing the absolutist state’s obsession with the project of amharanization,

which was the active pressure exerted by Ethiopia’s dominant ethnic group,

Amhara, upon the country’s plethora of ethnic groups.

In sum, during the British era (1941–1952), a distinct sense of identity

and a separatist ideology was not predominant among the inhabitants of

the region to the north of the Mareb. Since Italian colonialism did not help

the region nurture a personality distinct from that of historic Ethiopia, most

Eritreans could not imagine going it alone. The forces of modernity that

Italian settler colonialism introduced to Eritrea did not integrate the native

population that would have allowed the formation of modern social classes.

The existence of a formidable middle class and a dynamic intelligentsia

is an indispensable prerequisite for a separatist nationalism.30 Furthermore,

the Eritrean people had no historical enmity with their kin south of the

Mareb. On the contrary, they relied upon the primordial factors of language,

religion, culture, and, above all, history, to relate with the Ethiopians. Thus,

by and large, the handful of politically enlightened individuals of the 1940s

could not find a distinct Eritrean folklore with its own martyrs and heroes.

The more they scoured the past, the more Eritrea seemed historyless and

too Ethiopian to imagine its own distinct community. And, when Italian

colonialism abruptly came to an end in 1941, these organic intellectuals

could only think about returning to their “mother” Ethiopia. They harked

back to the past and could not find the Eritrean adi abo (“fatherland”)—what

volk is to German, vatan to Turkish, al-Watan to Arab, and la patrie to

the French nationalisms. The picturesque Ethiopian history that goes back

to the misty past of the mythic union of the Queen of Sheba and King

Solomon contrasted too markedly with the historyless Eritrean past. In the

subsequent federal decade, however, Eritreans encountered an aggressive

state nationalism that was orchestrated by the Amhara elite against which

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Nationalism in Historic Ethiopia 277

they reacted by developing a moderate nationalism that sought to maintain

the UN-granted federation according to its letter and spirit.

IDENTITY AND NATIONALISM DURING FEDERATION (1952–1962)

On 2 December 1950, the UN General Assembly recommended Eritrea be

federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown. The

decision was put into effect in September 1952. As a way of devolving power

from the center to the periphery, federalism is a democratic political formula

that intends to solve/manage conflict between centripetal and centrifugal

forces. As such, linking tiny Eritrea, which had been amputated from historic

Ethiopia by Italian colonialism in 1890, with a massive feudal and monarchical empire-state by a federal arrangement and expecting the federation to

survive was unrealistic. Unsurprisingly, from the outset, Ethiopia was determined to leave no latitude for Eritrean particularities to survive and Eritrean

personality to flourish. As such, no sooner was the “federation” enacted

than Emperor Haile Selassie started trampling over it since centralization,

not devolution of power, unitary state, not federation, had always been the

regime’s modus operandi—a system that incorporated the grand design of

homogenization (amharanization).

However, Ethiopia’s policies in Eritrea backfired. Indeed, the federal era

(1952–1962) was a decade of budding anti-Ethiopian resentment, a season

of sowing the seeds of Eritrean secessionist tendencies. With its own flag,

parliament, official languages, free press, and political parties, Eritrea was

granted autonomy within the Ethiopian empire-state by a UN-administered

federal arrangement. Many Eritreans, the Muslim reluctant partners in particular, wanted the federation to be implemented according to its letter and

spirit. Instantly, Eritreans—Christians and Muslims, as well as unionists and

conditional unionists—were alarmed at the crude and tactless behavior of

the Ethiopian rulers. Only a few days after the enactment of the federation,

Ethiopia dispatched an entire brigade of troops to peaceful Eritrea. This was

not taken well by Muslims and Christians, unionists and federalists, alike.

Even before the enactment of the federation, as rumor had pervaded Eritrea

that Ethiopia was preparing to deploy troops in Eritrea, the Muslim League

vehemently opposed it in its organ Voice of the Eritrean Moslem League.

It argued that sending troops would violate the very letter and spirit of

the federation and would be understood as the first step towards annexing

Eritrea.31 The leader of the Muslim League, Ibrahim Sultan, warned in 1952

that if Ethiopia was going to annex Eritrea, the United States would have to

be held responsible.32

Early on, Ibrahim Sultan had correctly predicted that even the Christian unionists, who so anxiously worked for the Ethiopian annexation of

Eritrea, would reject the loss of Eritrean autonomy because they “would

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278 A. Abbay

dishonor their ancestors if they permitted themselves to become slaves of

the Shoans.”33 Indeed, arch unionists, such as Blatta Gabre-Igziabher GabreMichael, one of the five Eritrean members of the Imperial Federal Council,

resented the fact that Ethiopia stationed its army in Aqordat because there

was not a need for it.34 Unionists were also unhappy with Ethiopia’s heavyhanded policy from the outset and protested to the emperor about the “excessive number of Amhara officials sent to Eritrea to hold federal posts.”35

Furthermore, the Ethiopians failed to assuage Muslim sensibilities when only

Christian, and not Muslim, holidays became official. In fact, the Eritrean government blatantly refused to make the end of Ramadan an official holiday.36

How tactlessly the Ethiopians treated Eritrea’s Muslim population can also

be illustrated by small things such as not serving Muslims alcohol. For instance, on 13 September 1952, a palace reception was held in the Eritrean

capital, Asmara, for the emperor’s representative. Champagne and other alcoholic drinks were offered to the guests, Muslims and Christians alike. Ali

Radai, Chairman of the Eritrean Assembly, bitterly told the American Consul,

Edward W. Mulcahy, at the reception, that the Ethiopians had to understand that half of the Eritrean population, which was Muslim, did not drink

alcohol. Such tactless behavior by Ethiopia’s Christian Amhara ruling elite

foreshadowed the rupture between the Ethiopian federal government and

autonomous Eritrea as the American Consul regretted that “the blots on the

new leaf were not avoided with a little more tact and consideration.”37

Ethiopia’s policy towards Eritrea was formulated by the state-building

process that was anathema to the decentralized political model. In the postWorld War II era, the Ethiopian state was preoccupied with the process

of state- and nation-building, a task that was accelerated by the increasing

exposure of the country to the forces of modernity. The state, which had

been centralizing power for a long time, now certainly assumed an absolutist format, anxiously promoting cultural homogenization in the name of

Ethiopian nation-building. Thus, realistically, it was going to be difficult for

the centripetal forces, which were preoccupied with diluting the centrifugal

tendencies in the country, to abide by the UN resolution that gave Eritrea

an autonomous status. Indeed, only in a completely restructured and decentralized political system could an Eritrean autonomy find an abode. In

this regard, Eritrea’s most famous political activist of the 1940s, Walde-Ab

Walde-Mariam advised that the federal formula had to be applied in the rest

of Ethiopia in order to

counteract the unfortunate tendency by the Amhara to centralize the

imperial power at Addis Ababa, especially since the time of Menelik

II. The historic tendency among the people of the Ethiopian Plateau

has always been toward decentralization ... a principle already existing

which should make the modern concept of the federal state an easy one

to expand in this part of the world.38

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Nationalism in Historic Ethiopia 279

On the contrary, the Ethiopian absolutist state, which had no stomach for

a decentralized political system, sensed a threat in Eritrea’s autonomy to its

policy of state centralization and national integrity. Eritrea’s political and sociocultural distinctiveness was perceived as an inevitable slippery slope to

secession and a bad model to Ethiopia’s various ethno-regional entities that

were subjected to state centralization and cultural homogenization. Extending autonomy to the various components of the empire, the state believed,

would not keep the country united; it would undo it. From the very outset,

therefore, Ethiopia was determined to kill the federation. No sooner did the

emperor’s representative and son-in-law, Andargachew Messai, arrive in Eritrea than he conveyed to the American Consul his opposition to the flag

raising ceremony when the UN-granted Eritrean flag was unfurled for the

first time. He firmly stated that “Legally no Eritrean flag exists.”39

Ethiopia was so impatient with Eritrea’s autonomous status that, immediately after the enactment of the federation in 1952, it began undermining

it. The emperor’s messages were being delivered in Amharic in the Eritrean

Assembly by Amdemikael Desalegn, Ethiopian Liaison Officer, and later by

Andargachew Messai.40 A language that the Eritreans did not understand,

Amharic, was replaced Tigrinya and Arabic as Eritrea’s official language; Eritrea’s flag was lowered; free press was no more; the political parties were

banned; and by the middle of the 1950s, Ethiopia made its intention to kill the

federation explicit when Andargachew Messai told the Eritrean Parliament

that Eritrea’s autonomy was meaningless and its internal “affairs are fully

the affairs of Ethiopia and the Emperor.”41 Such arrogance of the emperor’s

son-in-law gave the people the feeling that the emperor gave their beloved

Eritrea to Andargachew Messai as a dowry for marrying his eldest daughter,

the widowed Tenagneworq. In the tradition of the Tigrinya-speaking people,

the family of the bride gives dowry to the newlywed couple.

The twin state projects of centralization and amharanization were imposed upon the Eritreans who were progressively denied the civil and political liberties they had enjoyed for a decade under British rule. They reacted

by regarding the Ethiopians as unfit to administer Eritrea. The contempt they

had towards their new rulers was summarized by what was supposedly uttered by Walde-Ab Walde-Mariam: “It would be quite a challenge to rule the

Amhara, let alone to be ruled by them.”42

Further, the Kebessa, who had been lured by their primordial attachments to Ethiopia, were going to be rudely awakened by the premodern

living standards of the Ethiopians who had not been under European colonial rule. At sociological level, the Eritreans did have a taste of the European

urban life that was subsidized by the Italian taxpayer.43

The federal era was thus a decade of Eritrean disenchantment. It was

not only the Muslim lowlanders, who had cautiously and reluctantly joined

Ethiopia, who were unhappy with their new rulers. The Christian Kebessa,

who had actively sought merger with their southern kin by sloganizing

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280 A. Abbay

“Ethiopia or death,” were also increasingly alienated by Ethiopia’s tactless

behavior. Political disorders and strikes were now being organized by former members of the Unionist Party, the bulk of whom became disenchanted

with the Ethiopian administration. Among those who were active participants

of the anti-Ethiopia agitation was a certain Abraha Futur. Reminiscing about

his unionist activities and slogans, he asked a rhetorical question: “Did we

say ‘Ethiopia or Death’ or ‘Ethiopia and Death’?”44 Even Tedla Bairu, among

the top unionists, gave up his unionist commitments and began to entertain the idea of secession. In this vein, he tried to woo the Americans by

arguing that the independence of Eritrea was also in the best interests of the

United States.45 Accepting an ambassadorial portfolio to Sweden, en route to

self-exile, Tedla Bairu regretted that “The Shoans in general, without exception, could not care less” about Eritrea as long as they proceeded with their

annexation.46

Under a cloud of fear, the Eritrean leadership was pressurized to acquiesce. Many preferred self-exile. In exile, Eritrean leaders, such as Ibrahim

Sultan, Idris Mohamed Adem, and Walde-Ab Walde-Mariam, sought external

help to resuscitate the dying federation. From Cairo, on 30 June 1959, the

trio sent a memorandum to the UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold,

saying “Eritrea is being swallowed up by Ethiopia.” They pleaded for UN

intervention to stop the annexation of Eritrea by Ethiopia and to restore the

federal arrangement. They prophetically warned that

It is easier to prevent the outbreak of fire than to extinguish it once it has

broken out. Likewise it is easier to weed out the seeds of dissension and

conflict between peoples and Nations than to run hither and thither in

an attempt to reconcile them while the dispute is raging between them.47

In addition to political crisis, economic hardships characterized the federal

era. The Ethiopian government raised the tariff of imports on some of the

vital items from 17% during the British era to 35% during the federal decade.

Worse still, whereas the British tariffs were intended to protect local industries, such as shoe manufacture and chinaware, the federal government did

not particularly care about the protection of the local market from invasion

by foreign goods. Such policies of the government led to the closure of some

factories and the exodus of the Italians and the flight of some of their badly

needed capital from Eritrea. This was compounded by the absence of foreign

subsidies. The direct and indirect subsidies that had been flowing from both

Italy and Britain dried up with their departure. The Ethiopian government

had no desire to help Eritrea with subsidies especially during the federal

era. On the contrary, it was not giving the Eritrean government the proper

share of customs revenue.48 It appears that the Ethiopian government was

deliberately inflicting economic hardships on the Eritrean people to impress

upon them that the federal formula was not good for them.

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Nationalism in Historic Ethiopia 281

Despite the prevalence of immense political problems and an “artificially

inflated” economy that caused extensive unemployment and popular dissatisfaction, there was not a fully developed and clearly articulated Eritrean

nationalism yet. Unlike in 19th century Europe, Eritrea lacked a formidable

middle class that could have constructed a secessionist ideology. Thus, even

the Eritreans who were most repulsed by Ethiopia’s crude behavior knew

secession had a feeble prospect.49 At long last, though, the incremental dissolution of autonomy, which culminated in disbanding the parliament and

reducing Eritrea to a provincial status on a par with 12 others, ended up

being a time bomb that spawned the Eritrean armed struggle for independence. Eritrean nationalism was, thus, being conceived in the wombs of

progressive resentment against the twin projects of amharanization and

centralization. State nationalism, as the custodian of the project of homogenization, spawned Eritrean counter nationalism. Until the rise of the collision

between Eritrean expectations and realities during the federal era, there had

never been an Eritrean sense of collective identity, much less secessionist

nationalism.

In sum, during the federal era, not only were Eritreans rudely awakened by the premodern socioeconomic and political life of the Ethiopians,

in contrast to that of the Italians and the British, but they also strongly resented homogenization and centralization. Against the background of limited

exposure to the European life, Eritreans began to build the edifice of difference vis-a-vis the premodern Ethiopian “others.” Resenting the offensive `

state policies was gradually metamorphosed to Eritreanism—a separatist nationalism that rejected the Ethiopian sense of Eritrean identity and sought an

unconditional secession. Eritreanism was thus a reactive nationalism to state

nationalism that cannot be understood without the latter.

SEPARATISM (1961–1991)

As the death of the federation became imminent, a bandit in the western

Muslim lowlands, Idris Awate, was attracting political dissidents. Awate did

not take arms for political reasons, as stated by Walde-Ab Walde-Mariam:

“He was a bandit, living out of banditry... . The Eritrean Liberation Front

(ELF) approached him because they wanted to use him. So they made him

a leader of the first group of combatants.”50 Before being co-opted by the

ELF in 1961, Idris Awate , like the Mosazghi brothers of the Kebessa that

Hobsbawm described in “Portrait of a Bandit,” an introductory piece to

his masterpiece, the path-breaking Bandits,

51 was advancing the unionist

agenda. A fellow shifta reminisced that both were

carrying the Ethiopian flag and yearning to join Ethiopia. Idris Awate

was with us carrying the Ethiopian flag... . After federation, he was

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282 A. Abbay

living peacefully in his home near Oma Hajer in Gash and Setite (western lowlands). Then contradictions surfaced between him and the Chief

Executive, Asfaha Walde-Michael, when the latter wanted to disarm his

former followers. He went back to the jungle.52

As such, Awate’s banditry, which was increasingly better organized in the

western lowlands of Eritrea, clearly got the attention of the Ethiopian government. The American Consul in Asmara observed that, although the Awate

group lacked any clear philosophy, it could attract disgruntled Eritreans with

the possibility of foreign support coming from Muslim countries such as

Egypt and Saudi Arabia.53

The Muslim Eritreans, who had not been clamoring for unity with

Ethiopia, now became more vocally anti-Ethiopian. Some of them were paying attention to the Awate banditry, which underwent a metamorphosis into

a vortex of nationalist liberation struggle. A Muslim movement in the Muslim

western lowlands, it took an Islamic and Arab slant. Its Islamic image became more apparent during the second session of the World Islamic League,

which was convened in Mecca during the week of 13–18 December 1963.

The league protested Ethiopia’s absorption of Eritrea and declared its commitment to help the Eritrean Muslims preserve their rights. The Saudi press

also kept on criticizing Ethiopia for converting Eritrean Muslims to Judaism

and Christianity.54 The Islamic and Arab world took it for granted that Eritrea

was an Arab and Islamic entity.55

Eritreanism was thus being conceived in the interplay between the centrifugal and centripetal forces. In the post-federation era, the putative enemy

in Eritrea was no longer a rival Eritrean nationalism—no longer Unionist

Party versus Muslim League, for instance. It was the imperial Ethiopian state

whose actions were repulsive to the Eritreans, including many unionists and

federalists, hitherto in rival nationalist camps. Yet, during the 1960s and

1970s, Eritrean nationalism did not have much success in the Kebessa. The

dominant custodian of Eritrean nationalism, the Eritrean Liberation Front

(ELF), espoused a pan-Arab and Islamic agenda, alienating the dominant

Kebessa Christians. And imperial propaganda significantly neutralized the

ELF influence in Kebessa. However, the ascendency of the military junta,

Derg, to the helm of power in Addis Ababa in 1974, radically altered the

political climate in the region. The switch of power from feudal monarchy

to a near-fascistic Derg rule gave Eritrean nationalism a badly needed legitimacy as a political force with an image of “democratic” resistance. The

Derg’s policy of using force to deal with Eritrean insurgency, which entailed

pogrom-like killings of innocent civilians and erasing villages, almost completely alienated the Eritrean masses. The progression of resentment against

the Derg ended up radicalizing Eritrean nationalism and transforming the

“Eritrean Question” into a zero-sum game. It gave Eritrean nationalism a

broader appeal that transcended primordial hurdles, clearing the way for the

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Nationalism in Historic Ethiopia 283

rise of a pan-Eritrean nationalism. Former arch rivals in the Eritrean political

landscape, such as Tedla Bairu, Idris Mohammed Adem, Ibrahim Sultan, and

Walde-Ab Walde-Mariam, all sought the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia,

irrespective of the economic consequences of going it alone.

Ethiopia’s state policies of cultural homogenization and centralization

pushed these nationalists to become champions of Eritreanism—a counter

nationalism to state nationalism. Soon they were going to be joined by

college graduates and dropouts, such as the first president of independent

Eritrea, Isaias Afwerki. Well versed with modern nationalism that imagines

Eritrea outside of the primordial context, which ties it with historic Ethiopia,

the populist nationalists of the post-1960s have been qualitatively different

from their nationalist predecessors of the pre-1960s.

Imagined Eritrea dropped the Ethiopian (Geez) calendar that the Kebessa

used, as observed in the 1940s newspapers. For instance, Nay Ertra Semunawi Gazetta, which presented 11 September as “our new year,” used to post

New Year greetings. Furthermore, the dates were written in Geez numerals.56

Since the armed struggle, though, Eritrean identity continued to be constructed in earnest on a newly minted culture and history. The Ethiopian

New Year has been replaced by 1 January and the Geez numerals replaced

by Arabic numerals. The region’s history, from Axum to Yohannes IV—a history that straddles the Mareb, which used to be published accurately in Nay

Ertra Semunawi Gazetta57—has either been deleted or altered. The emergent Eritrean intelligentsia has joined the political entrepreneurs not only in

cherry-picking facts from the memory pool but in summoning the past in

order to kill and bury it. Furthermore, they have not only acquiesced in the revised history of the political actors but have also participated in its reworking.

Carefully designed to buttress Eritrean distinctness, the revised history

has been freely orchestrated.58 Giving Eritreans a deformed nostalgia that

never was, it stresses Eritrean separate identity, far from the hard realities.

Yet, the revised history has not always been embraced by the popular masses

whose collective memory shares a “golden” past with their Ethiopian kin.

Consequently, since summoning the past frequently portrayed Eritrean nationalism as illegitimate, forgetting history became the modus operandi of

creating an Eritrean distinct identity,59 based on new imaginings.

Besides deleting and forgetting history, a brand new Eritrean identity

required transforming Tigrayans, across the Mareb, into the relevant other.

Alarmed by the manufactured rupture between the people on both sides

of the Mareb, Blatta Gabre-Igziabher Gabre-Michael, who used to be an

Eritrean member of the Imperial Federal Council in the 1950s, pleaded with

one of the two principal custodians of Eritrean nationalism, the Eritrean

People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), in 1987, to get along with their kin, the

Tigrayans. He reminded them that all Eritreans have Tigrayan ancestry by

rhetorically asking whether “there was any combatant in the [Eritrean] field

who is pure Eritrean on both sides of his parentage?60

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284 A. Abbay

The Blatta was echoing the 1940s feelings of the Kebessa. When the

unionist Tedla Bairu attacked the conditional unionist Walde-Ab WaldeMariam that, as a Tigrayan, he had no right to meddle in the Eritrean politics,

the latter retorted that he was very proud to be a Tigrayan and that “Except

for some individuals such as Mr. Tedla Bairu, there was no [Eritrean] without Tigrayan parentage.”61 In a small survey I conducted in the Kebessa

town of Mendefera in 1994, too, all the informants said that the historical

and marital ties between the two sides of the Mareb were solid. An elder

said that “We all have Tigrayan parentage ... Even Walde-Ab’s parentage

is from Tigray.”62 Another informant boldly stated that “Which Eritrean does

not have a Tigrayan parentage? Which Tigrayan does not have an Eritrean

parentage? All the people of the region are intermarried and intermingled.”63

It is, therefore, hardly a coincidence that the Tigrayan Prime Minister of

Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, is partially Eritrean and the Eritrean President, Isaias

Afwerki has Tigrayan parentage.

Since Eritrean history is unintelligible without Ethiopian history, Eritrean political actors, in their craving to be different, have come up with

a new mythology that is not shared by the popular memory. Shunning the

millennia-old history as a treacherous ground, it is the notion of an Eritrea

that is founded on colonial hiatus and state violence that feeds the nationalist mythology. In the process, Eritrean history is rewritten with a zero-sum

mentality. For instance, during the Italian colonial era, the Kebessa grieved

for having been “sold” to the Italians by Emperor Menelik and for remaining “lost in the hands of the Italians.”64 They yearned for the reunification of

trans-Mareb Tigray and their return to Ethiopia. Their grievances had nothing

to do with the statelessness of their region north of Mareb. They felt no sense

of an Eritrean national identity different from that of their kin south of the

Mareb. The current mythology twists this fact so that it becomes serviceable

to the secessionist agenda. Even the most revered of the Eritrean nationalist

leaders, Walde-Ab Walde-Mariam, late in his life, completely reversed his

earlier belief that Eritrea was Ethiopian, arguing that the “Shewan regime”

“sold” Eritrea for 500 rifles and money to the Italians simply because Eritrea

was not regarded as Ethiopian.65 As such, it is not the “nation” that created

Eritrean nationalism; it is Eritrean nationalism, rooted on fictitious tradition

and revised history, that created the Eritrean “nation.”66

INDEPENDENCE

Eritreans got immense psychic gratification when they quenched their thirst

for independence in 1991. Climbing the hill of an independent life has,

however, been too rocky. The Italian industrial capital and the Arab and

Indian commercial capital that kept the Eritrean economy fairly vibrant in

the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s had long gone mainly because of the war for

independence.

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Nationalism in Historic Ethiopia 285

The edifice for going it alone was put to a serious test when the Eritrean independence became a reality in 1991. It was one thing to advance

nationalism on the basis of reconstructed history, but it is quite another

to build a viable economy of a brand new nation. Fortunately for Eritrea,

Ethiopia came to its rescue by generously subsidizing its economy during

the first seven years of its independent life (1991–1998). Unlike Ethiopians

in Eritrea, Eritreans in Ethiopia held dual citizenship, enjoying all rights of

citizenship including having access to bank loans. Eritrea also continued to

use the Ethiopian currency, birr. Eritreans used to buy Ethiopian coffee with

birr and export it as if it were an Eritrean produce in order to earn hard currency, making Eritrea “a sort of a vacuum cleaner for most [of Ethiopia’s] hard

currencies.”67 Whilst Ethiopia continued to subsidize Eritrea’s stagnant economy, Eritrean intellectuals kept on promoting the dream of making Eritrea

the regional Singapore.68 Ethiopia’s generous subsidies and the dream of

Singaporization continued to buttress the edifice of Eritrean independence.

Yet, despite their economic dependence on Ethiopia, the Eritrean leaders issued their currency, nakfa, and demanded their currency’s parity with

that of the Ethiopian birr. Ethiopia refused to meet this demand as it would

have been suicidal for its economy. In 1998, Eritrea opted to use force, initiating the so-called border conflict. Although there were other unresolved issues

such as Ethiopia’s access to the sea, citizenship rights for Eritreans living in

Ethiopia and Ethiopians living in Eritrea, and, indeed, the un-demarcated

boundary, it was primarily Eritrea’s economic difficulties that dragged the

two countries into the 1998–2000 war. Technically, the war lasted for two

years. However, only a few days of fighting in 2000, which claimed nearly

100,000 lives, forced Eritrea to take a military defeat.

During the war, innocent Ethiopians, particularly Tigrayans, who had

lived in Eritrea for generations were subjected to extreme abuse. Ethiopia

reciprocated by deporting some of the hundreds of thousands of Eritreans

living in the country. As a result, the “border war” appears to have cemented

the boundary between the Eritreans and Tigrayans; a wall of separation that

was conspicuous only by its absence during the 1940s and 1950s.

Unlike the moderate nationalism of the 1940s and 1950s when Eritrean

political actors were pragmatic, the post-1961 leaders have been carried away

by the emotion that nationalism generates. Unlike their predecessors, they

readily revised history, refused to accept that their Eritrea was endowed with

only modest resources and constructed an identity of being different from

their Ethiopian kin. As Ethiopia progressively dismantled the federal arrangement in the 1950s, the Eritrean political actors had not immediately veered

off their moderate nationalism. As stated earlier, even nationalists such as

Ibrahim Sultan, Idris Mohamed Adem, and Walde-Ab Walde-Mariam who

escaped arrest and/or death did not ask anything more than the restoration

of the federation in their 1959 letter to the UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold. The leaders of the armed struggle era, on the contrary, argued

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286 A. Abbay

Eritrean reintegration with Ethiopia was illegal and sought nothing short of

independence. Whereas the 1940s’ and 1950s’ moderate nationalism did not

lose sight of Ethiopia’s interests, the nationalism of the post-1961 has been

exclusively concerned with Eritrea—an imagined Eritrea that could not have

been more different from the real Eritrea. It is this excessive nationalism that

led the Eritrean leaders to issue the nakfa currency and demand equity with

the Ethiopian birr. Unsurprisingly, Ethiopia had to resist Eritrea’s determination to have a total free access to its economy, including parity of nakfa and

birr.

Frustrated by its failure to impose its own economic terms upon

Ethiopia, Eritrea invaded and occupied Ethiopian border lands such as

Badme, Alitiena, and Zalambasa in 1998, dubbing it a “border conflict.”

In essence, the “border war” had little to do with some unattractive pieces

of land. Thus, journalists misunderstood the casus belli when they compared the “border war” with two bald men fighting over a comb. During

the war (1998–2000), driven by the atavistic notion of “our country, right or

wrong,” Eritreans of all walks of life, including academics, stood by the side

of their country’s nationalism in unison; a position that has not been helpful

in restoring peace and stability in the region. Indeed, the unionist (1940s)

and moderate (1950s) nationalisms evolved to Eritreanism (1961–1991) becoming as excessive as Ethiopia’s state nationalism that had been driven by

the twin projects of centralization and cultural homogenization. It is the irrationality, excessiveness, and zero-sum game manifested by both nationalisms

that justifies the metaphor of nationalism with pathology.

CONCLUSION

The historical character of the Ethiopian empire-state could not tolerate the

autonomous status of Eritrea; a status that could have allowed the former

Italian colony to develop its own personality. Ethiopia’s state-and nationbuilding process, which was at the center of the grand design of cultural

homogenization and centralization, thus created an environment that nurtured Eritrean nationalism. Amharanization, which became an article of

faith of the state-and nation-building process in Ethiopia, was discredited in

Eritrea.

Recalcitrant state nationalism, as constructed by the Amhara elite that

refused to accommodate a distinct Eritrean status, thus, pushed Eritreans

to centrifugal tendencies. Eritreanism, in its extreme format, sought nothing short of independence from Ethiopia. This path completely discounted

Eritrea’s economic dependence upon Ethiopia. Eritrea’s preference to go it

alone would have been more intelligible had it been as resourceful as the

Biafras and the Katangas. Given its modest resources, with a little tact and

patience on the part of the Ethiopian ruling classes, its emergent middle

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Nationalism in Historic Ethiopia 287

class would have realized its interests were best served if Eritrea remained

Ethiopian, much like the Queb´ ecois middle class standing averse to seces- ´

sion from Anglophone Canada. Thus, unlike European nationalism, Eritrean

nationalism did not grow out of internal socioeconomic dynamics. On the

contrary, it was a reactive nationalism that owes its birth and evolution to

the epicenter of all counter nationalisms in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia’s

state nationalism. Indeed, by refusing to compromise, state nationalism and

Eritreanism increasingly took chauvinistic paths. The conflictual duo bred a

regional climate of violence that engulfed other ethno-regional communities

such as the Tigrayans, Oromos, and Somalis.

NOTES

1. Cited in Stephen Nathanson, Patriotism, Morality and Peace (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 1993), 187.

2. Tom Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain (Trowbridge, Wilshire: Redwood Burn, 1981), 153.

3. Memhir Habte Zerae, “Ne mdedri ayehbula sedri, ne risti yewagaala aneysti,” Nay Ertra Semunawi Gazetta, 28 Nov. 1946, 2.

4. Walde-Ab Walde-Mariam, interview by Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, Rome, Italy, 22 Nov.

1982, Research and Documentation Center, Asmara, Eritrea. On Italophobia, see also Kennedy Trevaskis,

Eritrea: A Colony in Transition, 1941–52 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960), Chapter III.

5. For the role of history in communal identification, see Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins

of Nations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

6. See, for instance, the Italian protests about disorders in Eritrea, in “Memorandum of Conversation” of 13 Dec. 1949 and 19 Dec. 1949, Department of State, Declassified, Authority NND 760050.

7. Telegraph, Amconsul, Asmara to Secretary of State, Control 1692, 4 July 1951; Walde-Ab WaldeMariam, interview by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, Orota, Eritrea, 9 June 1987, Research and

Documentation Center, Asmara, Eritrea.

8. Sylvia Pankhurst, British Policy in Eritrea (London: Walthanmstow Press, 1953), 11.

9. Harold Courlander, Gura, Eritrea, to President Franklin Roosevelt, White House, Washington,

DC, 22 March 1943, declassified NND 760050.

10. For a list of Eritreans holding high-ranking positions in Ethiopia, see Pankhurst, British Policy,

26, 27.

11. American Legation, Addis Ababa, to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC, 28 Nov. 1944,

No. 291.

12. Amconsulate, Asmara, to the Department of State, Washington, DC, Desp. No. 76, 24 April

1958.

13. Walde-Ab Walde-Mariam, “Eritrea na men [?]” [Eritrea for Whom (?)], Part IV, Nay Ertra Semunawi Gazetta, 22 May 1947, 4.

14. Letter from Brigadier Benoy to Brigadier Cumming, 12 Aug. 1946, WO 230-126; Note by the

British Chief Political Officer in Eritrea, Major General P. Mitchell, Asmara, 5 April 1941, WO 230-16;

Dejazmatch Abraha Tessema, “Mot Kibur Dejazmatch Kassa Sebhat ... ,” Nay Ertra Semunawi Gazetta,

20 Dec. 1945, 3.

15. U.S. Embassy, Addis Ababa, to the Department of State, Washington, DC, Despatch No. 259,

13 April 1951.

16. Liberal Progressive Party, memorandum, Four Power Commission of Investigation for the Former

Italian Colonies: Report on Eritrea, 1948, Section 5, Chapter 2, Appendix 101, p. 2, FO 371-69365.

17. Walde-Ab Walde-Mariam, “Eritrea na men[?]” [Eritrea for Whom (?)], Part V, Nay Ertra Semunawi

Gazetta, 29 May 1947, 4.

18. Spokesman for the Liberal Progressive Party, memorandum, Four Power Commission of Investigation for the Former Italian Colonies: Report on Eritrea, 1948, Section 5, Chapter 2, Appendix 123,

pp. 1–2, FO 371-69365.

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288 A. Abbay

19. Ibid.

20. Walde-Ab Walde-Mariam, interview by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, Orota, Eritrea,

6 Sept. 1987, Research and Documentation Center, Asmara, Eritrea.

21. See, for instance, Dejazmatch Abraha Tessema’s speeches delivered in Adi Qeyih, Akkelle

Guzai, on 18 Feb. 1947 and in Medefera, Seraye, on 8 March 1947. The speeches were printed in Nay

Ertra Semunawi Gazetta, 27 Feb. 1947, 3; and Nay Ertra Semunawi Gazetta, 13 March 1947, 3.

22. Gebrezghi Andom, “Elama Naztsenaten Harneten Erta ... ,” Hanti Ertra, 4 Feb. 1950, 2.

23. Hanti Ertra, 31 May 1950, 1.

24. Walde-Ab Walde-Mariam, “Tihut qal selamta nehizbi Ertra,” Hanti Ertra, 15 April 1950, 1.

25. Alemayehu Alula, “Tensae Ato Walde-Ab Walde-Mariam Semate Ertra (Tigray Tigrignie),” Hanti

Ertra, 4 Feb. 1950, 2.

26. U.S. Embassy, Addis Ababa, to the Department of State, Washington, DC, Despatch No. 259,

13 April 1951.

27. Gebrehiwot Baykedagne, Mengistna ye Hizb Astedader, 2nd ed. (Addis Ababa: Commercial

Printing Press, 1960), 81.

28. Stephen Longrigg, A Short History of Eritrea (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945), 164.

29. F. G. Drew, Chief Administrator of Eritrea, to C.C.A.O., CAB, GHQ, M.E.L.F., “Intelligence.

Ethiopian Claims to Eritrea and Somaliland,” 30 March 1948, FO 371-69353.

30. Nairn, Break-Up of Britain, 106.

31. Amconsulate, Asmara, to the Department of State, Washington, DC, Desp. No. 28, 5 Sept. 1952.

32. Amconsulate, Asmara, to the Department of State, Washington, DC, Desp. No. 57, 30 Oct.

1952.

33. Amconsulate, Asmara, to the Department of State, Washington, DC, Desp. No. 57, 30 Oct.

1952.

34. Blatta Gabre-Igziabher Gabre-Michael, interview by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front,

New York, 23 Aug. 1987, Research and Documentation Center, Asmara, Eritrea. On the biography of the

Blatta and the four other Eritrean members of the Imperial Federal Council, see Amconsulate, Asmara,

to the Department of State, Washington, DC, Desp. No. 77, 22 Dec. 1952.

35. Amconsulate, Asmara, to the Department of State, Washington, DC, Desp. No. 34, 19 Sept.

1952.

36. Amconsulate, Asmara, to the Department of State, Washington, DC, Despatch No. 12, 29 July

1953.

37. Amconsulate, Asmara, to the Department of State, Washington, DC, Despatch No. 34, 19 Sept.

1952.

38. Amconsulate, Asmara, to the Department of State, Washington, DC, 5 March 1951.

39. Amconsulate, Asmara, to the Department of State, Washington, DC, 24 Sept. 1952

40. See Amconsulate, Asmara, to the Department of State, Washington, DC, Desp. No. 163, 29 April

1952; and Emperor Haile Selassie’s message as reported by Amdalkache Messai in Parliament, Zemen, 29

March 1955, 1.

41. Messai, Zemen, 1.

42. Mr. Berhane Mesqel Zelelew, aged 70 years, interview by the author, Axum, 4 May 1994.

43. U.S. Embassy, Addis Ababa, to the Department of State, Washington, DC, Despatch No. 259,

13 April 1951.

44. Abraha Future, “Etiopia way mot dina zebelna woyka’a etiopian moten,” Dehai Ertra, 28 Feb.

1953, 2.

45. Amconsulate, Asmara, to the Department of State, Despatch No. 48, 27 Dec. 1961.

46. U.S. Embassy, Addis Ababa, to the Department of State, Page 1 to Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch

No. 48, 20 Dec. 1961.

47. American Embassy Cairo to the Department of State, Washington, DC, Desp. No. 330, 30 Nov.

1959.

48. On the impact of the federation on the Eritrean economy, see Amconsulate, Asmara, to the

Department of State, Washington, DC, 13 Oct. 1958.

49. Amconsulate, Asmara, to the Department of State, Washington, DC, Despatch 29, 9 Oct. 1961.

50. Walde-Ab Walde-Mariam, interview by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, Orota, Eritrea,

10 Jan. 1987, Research and Documentation Center, Asmara, Eritrea.

51. Eric Hobsbawm, Bandits (New York: The New Press, 2000), 1–5.

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52. Shambel Bashai Tesfa-Mariam Asgedom, 71, interview with the author, Mendefera, 16 July

1994.

53. Amconsulate, Asmara, to the Department of State, Washington, DC, Airgram, No. A-38, 21 Dec.

1962.

54. Amembassy, Jidda, to the Department of State, Airgram, A-290, 9 Jan. 1963.

55. At formal independence in 1993, a rudely awakened Arab writer, Abul Qader Tash, asserted

in an article titled “Why Does Afeworki Reject the Arabism of Eritrea?” that “An Eritrean identity separate

from its Arab dimension is far from being a historic fact,” Arab News, 27 Oct. 1993.

56. See, for instance, the issues of 13 Sept. 1945 or 9 Sept. 1948.

57. See, for instance, the issues of 21 Feb. and 21 March 1946.

58. On the revisionist Eritrean history, see the Tigrinya manuscript of the EPLF, Ertran Qalsan

(Sahel, Eritrea, 1987); see also Alemseged Abbay, “The Trans-Mareb Past in the Present,” Journal of

Modern African Studies 35(2): 321–334 (1997).

59. The principal authority on the need to forget history in the creation of a nation is Ernest Renan,

Qu’est-ce Qu’une Nation? (Paris: Ancienne Maison Michel Levy Freres, 1882).

60. Blatta Gabre-Igziabher Gabre-Michael, interview by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, New

York, 23 Aug. 1987, Research and Documentation Center, Asmara, Eritrea. The interview was conducted,

during the armed struggle era by Arefaine Berhe, now Eritrea’s Minister of Agriculture.

61. Nay Ertra Semunawi Gazetta, 28 Nov. 1946, 4.

62. Major Hagos Tewelde, aged 74 years, interview by the author, Mendefera, 16 July 1994.

63. Mr. Isaac Gabre-Hiwot, aged 74 years, interview by the author, Mendefera, 12 July 1994.

64. Johannes Kolmodin, Traditions de Tsazzega et Hazzega (Uppsala: Imprimeri K. W. Appelberg,

1915), paragraph 286.

65. Walde-Ab Walde-Mariam, interview by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, Orota, Eritrea,

31 Aug. 1987, Research and Documentation Center, Asmara, Eritrea. Another nationalist leader, Othman

Saleh Sabby, also said that after the Battle of Adua “Menelik recognized Italy’s right to stay in Eritrea. He

preferred to exploit his victory financially and received huge sums of money from Italy.” Othman Saleh

Sabby, The History of Eritrea, trans. Muhamad Fawaz al-Azem (Beirut: Dar Al-Masirah, 1974), 197.

66. For this thesis, see Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983).

67. A Western diplomat, cited in Lara Santoro, “At the Root of an Odd African War: Money,” The

Christian Science Monitor, 22 June 1998, http://www.csmonitor.com.

68. The notion of Singaporizing Eritrea was stated in Gebre Hiwet Tesfagiorgis, Emergent Eritrea:

Challenges of Economic Development (Paper, Conference by the Provisional Government of Eritrea and

Eritreans for Peace and Democracy in North America, Asmara, Eritrea, 22–24 July 1991).

Alemseged Abbay is an Associate Professor in the Department of History, Frostburg State University, Frostburg, Maryland. He teaches the modern history of

Africa and the Middle East as well as genocide and mass violence. His research

interest is identity politics and comparative ethnic and racial studies. His work has

been published in the Journal of Modern African Studies, African Affairs, Africa,

and the Journal of East African Studies.