ERITREA 65

I 960s onward . The govern1nent was forced to maintain a large

military force in the province, but made little progress in stemming the growth of the movement. Equipped and trained by the

United States for positional warfare, the Ethiopian army found

it increasingly difficult to cope with the lightly armed, fleet

raiders who specialized in ambush and avoided confrontation.

A series of bombings and highjackings of Ethiopian Airlines

aircraft in 1969 won the ELF international attention, and

forced the government to acknowledge its existence. Increasingly

bold actions during the same year led to the declaration of a

state of emergency in the province and its placement under

military rule.

By this time, the political orientation of the nationalist movement was being transformed in a direction that proved highly

menacing to the Ethiopian regime. After several years of struggling against the parochial and conservative limitations of the

ELF leadership, the younger, radical elements, many of them

Christian, broke away and formed the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Forces in 1970. Adopting a revolutionary class ideology, the

EPLF opened new vistas for the liberation movement. By rising

above petty bourgeois nationalist limitations, it created the

opportunity for broad participation among the Christian community, whose role had thus far been limited by the religious

identification of the ELF. The increasingly indiscriminate repressive tactics used by the Ethiopian military in Eritrea, and

the complete dislocation of the local economy, greatly strengthened the potential of nationalist support from this source.

The EPLF also opened wider prospects of recognition and support from progressive states in Africa and elsewhere. First

however, an internecine struggle had to be fought, as the ELF

sought to eliminate its rival in the field. This struggle was fought

in 1972-74, and the outcome was a demonstration of the EPLF's

viability as an armed force. Subsequently, both groups returned

to the common task, with consequences that were to prove

crucial for the ancien regime in its last phase, and equally so

for the opening phase of the military regime.

The prolonged liberation struggle in Eritrea has had an

incalculable, continuous impact on the central conflict waged

by contending social groups in Ethiopia. It has given prominence

66 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

to the manifold nationality problem in that country, a problem

which was allowed to fester under the old regime, and was inherited in an aggravated form by its successor. The imperial

regime did not deign to acknowledge the existing diversity

among its subjects; in fact, it outlawed any mention of it.

Correspondingly, it made no great effort to eliminate it. It

contented itself by imposing the Amharinya language to the

forcible exclusion of all others, upholding Orthodox Christianity

and ignoring all other creeds and, most significantly, it made

acceptance of these two pillars of northern Ethiopian culture

the necessary condition for entry into the ruling classes. The

regime's narrow cultural chauvinism compounded the antagonism between the ruling classes and the mass of the population

throughout the southern region and all along the lowland

periphery of the state, and contributed materially to the eruption of national uprisings in Eritrea and among the Ogaden

Somali.

The long-standing challenge to Ethiopian rule at the northern

and southeastern comers of the country greatly increased the

regime's need for support from the United States, particularly

following Somalia's acceptance of military aid from the Soviet

Union. At the same time, Ethiopia's relations with many of

the Arab states in the region became strained, a factor which

intensified its insecurity and dependence upon the United

States. Exclusive reliance on military methods of suppression

of nationality conflicts did not only fail to resolve the regime's

predicament, but undoubtedly also weakened its main pillar

of support, the military itself. Prolonged, brutal but inconclusive warfare in Eritrea, and for sometime in the Ogaden and

Bale, exposed the common soldier to frequent hardship; more

often than not greatly and unnecessarily exacerbated by the

indifference, incompetence and corruption of officialdom, both

military and civil. Such conditions were the catalyst that

produced the first army mutinies in 1974 and helped launch

the February Revolution.

Until the late 1960s, even the radical intelligentsia in Ethiopia

were inclined to regard the nationality issue as a contrived one

and shied away from a serious consideration of its politicai

implications. Towards the end of the decade, many came to

ERITREA 67

regard the Eritrean nationalist movement a useful ally in the

struggle against the regime, and a number of young men, not all

of them of Eritrean origin, joined the secessionist movement

and contributed significantly to its reorientation through the

EPLF. Eventually, after a long and agonizing consideration, the

radicals came to accept the Eritrean movement on its own

merits and, consequently, they explicitly upheld the unconditional right of self-determination for all nationalities in

Ethiopia. This forthright stand was to become one of the

crucial points of contention between this grou·p and the military

regime. Despite an otherwise new approach to the issue of

national diversity, the new regime, as we shall see later, proved

unable to change the policy of its predecessor in Eritrea, and

indeed intensified the attempt at forceful suppression.

68

Chapter 6

A Post Mortem

The Ethiopian regime of the post-war period represents a

mutation from the earlier feudal structure. Despite its many

peculiarities, it is not without historical parallel. The advent of

the capitalist mode of production; the appearance of elements

of a new social order incompatible with feudalism, and the

futile attempt to graft them on to the latter; the conversion of

feudal privilege into modem rights of property; the centralization of state power and bureaucratization of its processes

within the orbit of monarchical absolutism; all resemble the

interregnum between declining feudalism and the rise of bourgois capitalism, a period known to French history as the ancien

regime. Like that prototype, the Ethiopian regime was flawed

by the dissociation of its ruling classes from the productive

process, i.e. the economic base of society. Such a detached

position rendered them exceedingly vulnerable to attack from

other social classes.

·1n the feudal mode, the aristocracy possessed a sound economic base in thegult, a device that gave it control over the surplus,

as well as political control over the peasantry. Both these

elements of control were seriously weakened during the postwar period, and the position of the traditional ruling class was

similarly affected. Formally, this class managed to cross the

initial stage of transition from feudalism without grave damage

to its economic position. It exchanged feudal rights to tribute

for modem legal rights of property over vast areas of land. Was

it, then, in the position to transform itself into the typical landlord class that emerged from the collapse of feudalism elsewhere? History has already given its verdict, and we may only

suggest some reasons for it.

A POST MORTEM 69

Never having had to concern itself with affairs of production

or commerce, the Ethiopian aristocracy lacked the aptitude for

an active entrepreneurial role in agriculture and the capacity to

forge a link with emerging capitalist enterprise in the urban

sector. The younger generation which inherited the estates of

its parents, but made no better use of them, showed itself incapable for anything but a wholly inert rentier role. Otherwise,

they continued to regard government as their metier. Even

though it continued to appropriate a major share of the peasant

surplus, the landlord class in the traditional sector was devoid

of economic dynamism. Land could not be turned easily into

profitable enterprise, and did not contribute to capital accumulation. Absentee ownership and tenancy were two basic obstacles. Market, transport and storage limitations were additional

hindrances to more intensive exploitation of land. Basically

however, the parasitic nature of landlordism itself was opposed

to the transformation of the process of production, because

such transformation inevitably would have affected the relationships of production as well, thereby undermining the position

of this class. Con seq uen tly, landlords collected rent mostly in

kind on a sharecropping basis, and used it mainly for their own

consumption and status maintainance. In later years, landlord

capital went into urban real estate, local trade and transport,

hotels, restaurants and the like. Some of it was invested in

foreign enterprise operating in Ethiopia but played an entirely

passive role in this field. A few landlords also had began to

convert to commercial agriculture. However, the dominant role

in this sector was taken by foreign capital and management. The

bulk of the landlord class had not yet began to accumulate

sufficient capital for any novel venture in or out of agriculture.

As a class, they remained fastened and, therefore, dependent

upon the tenant farmer - an extremely precarious position, as

it turned out.

Timing proved a crucial element affecting that position. The

introduction of the capitalist mode of production in agriculture

had a highly pernicious impact on the position of landlordism

by exposing its parasitic nature and condemning it as a fetter

on the productive forces in the rural sector. Spurred by foreign

capital and skills, production in the small commercial sector in

70 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

agriculture expanded itnpressively within a very few years, while

production in the traditional sector had yet to catch up with

the rate of population increase. As a result, landlordism came

under attack by all other social classes atnong whom expectations of progress and development had been aroused by the

commencement of modernization. These included not only the

nascent working class and the rapidly expanding petty bourgeoisie, but the bureaucratic-military bourgeoisie and its foreign

patrons as well. Anxious to promote capitalism, the latter consistently urged a suitable kind of land reform that would

free land from traditional restraints and turn it into a market

factor.

29 Most anxious to see this condition prevail was the class

of bureaucrats who had sponsored the various reform measures

related to land and land taxation in the 1940s and early 1950s.

Despite ~he reforms, the state's share of revenue from agriculture had declined steadily for over two decades, and amounted

to less than 7 per cent of the ordinary revenue in 1967. It was

in the same year that an income tax was imposed on agricultural

income, and the first time in Ethiopian history that landlord

income became subject to taxation. As noted earlier, in the

following year an abortive effort was made to tighten the reins

on landlordism through proposals for tenancy regulation and

taxation of uncultivated land. In the preamble to the former

proposal, the bureaucrats made bold to raise the spectre of

violence among the tenant cultivators, whose number was estimated at approximately 9 million.

30

·Thus, the economic position of the landowning aristocracy

was becoming untenable. The political position of this class was

also reduced. Though prominent at the centre, the educated

scions of the traditional ruling class no longer commanded

exclusive rights to office, nor unchallenged authority in it.

Rather, they were forced to enter into an alliance with the

bureaucratic and military officialdom. As the grand nobles who

'Until a workable agrarian reform is implemented, no rapid improvement can

occur in the economic well-being of the large majority of the people, nor can

the full agricultural potential be realised', was the warning of the IBRD

Economy of Ethiopia: Main Report, August 1967, p.6.

30. Justification for Agricultural Tenancy Regulation (Preface to Draft Legis•

lation), Ministry of Land Reform and ,\Administration, Addis Ababa, April

1968.

A POST MORTEM 71

had enjoyed great power, in or out of office, passed from the

scene by the beginning of the 1960s, the latter group assumed

an increasingly dominant role in the ruling coalition. Controlled

by the overriding need to share power harmoniously for their

common interest, the relationship between these two classes

was not free of conflict arising from the fact that not all interests

could be easily harmonized. As mentioned earlier, the relationship was initially one of active rivalry, as the bureaucracy became the vehicle for centralization and the instrument for

taming the aristocracy. Supported by peasant provincialism

in the north, the aristocracy succeeded in stalling the centralization drive and managed to preserve its traditional control of

the provincial administration. The issue of land tenure and

taxatiun remained a contentious one within the coalition

throughout the lifetin1e of the regime. Nevertheless, the two

classes drew closer together as they faced a common opposition

from other social groups in the 1960s. With the aristocracy no

longer a threat at the centre, its value as a lever of control over

the peasantry was increasingly appreciated. Consequently, no

further attempt was made to reform the provincial administration. Similarly, agrarian reform was never seriously contemplated, and no meaningful effort was made to restrain 1andlordism, since the landlord class was the regime's main, and in the

southern region its only, political support.

The regime's reliance on the political strength of the landowning aristocracy proved quite misplaced. Perhaps more

significant than the loss of its share of the surplus, was the

loosening of the historic bond between the aristocracy and the

northern peasantry represented by the gult. The elimination of

gult freed rist from its ancient burden and the ristegna from his

traditional dependence on the gultegna. Defence of local privilege, therefore, was no longer essential for the safeguarding of

rist, and the aristocracy could no longer depend on the reflexive

peasant reaction of the past on behalf of the status quo. The shift

of the younger generation o°f aristocrats to the centre further

weakened their ties with the peasantry in their home provinces.

The position of this class in the southern provinces was highly

vulnerable, depending entirely on the ability of the central

government to maintain effective control in a region where

72 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

convergent class and national antagonisms had already become

violently manifested. When the centre's control faltered in

1974, the landlords and officialdom in the south were the first

elements of the ruling class to be put to rout by spontaneous

local uprisings.

The dissociation of the bureaucratic-military bourgeoisie

from the productive process was complete. Having been raised

to power by the institutional structure of the state, this class

never acquired a base outside that structure. Essentially dependent on the salary and other perquisites of office, members of

this class invested in urban real estate, bought shares in foreign

enterprises operating in Ethiopia, and acquired some land

through grants. None of these amounted to a secure foothold

in the country's economy, let alone a meaningful role in the

productive process. Even in its proper vocation, administration

and planning, this class had come to be regarded as an obstacle

to the country's further development by the younger, better

educated and increasingly radical petty bourgeoisie. Nor was

the bureaucratic-military bourgeoisie able to secure a political

following within the country on the basis of ideology, programme, or the outstanding personality of any of its leading figures.

The retainer role in to which the inner core of this class had

been cast precluded the development of group cohesion on

political grounds, and ruled out the attainment of national

eminence on the part of any individual. Haile Selassie carefully

weeded out persons who attracted unusual public attention.

Thus, the leading element in the ruling coalition struck an

improbably modest pose against the protective background of

the throne's allegedly unassailable legitimacy, and trusted its

control of the state structure to contain the growing opposition

among other classes. It was prepared neither for the dissipation

of imperial legitimacy, nor for the fragmentation of the state's

administrative and coercive apparatus due to the revolt of the

petty bourgeoisie and the soldiery. When these occurred the

bureaucratic-military bourgeoisie ' crashed precipitously from

the heights of power. A creation of the ancien regime, this class

was destined to perish with it.

Though it came into existence with the ancien regime the

petty bourgeoisie was not destined to perish with it. The 'con-

A POST MORTEM 73

ditions of its existence promoted a revolutionary political

attitude, and when the movement came, this class played the principal role in the popular movement that dismantled the old

regime. Its subordinate position in the state structure proved

of crucial importance in this affair, for it enabled this class to

paralyze both the administrative and repressive apparatus

upon which the power of the regime was founded, and then to

turn these institutional weapons against the ruling classes themselves. In playing the role of the devil's apprentice successfully,

the petty bourgeoisie acted within a spontaneous alliance of

oppressed classes. Although the alliance occurred spontaneously,

it was hardly a fortuito us occurrence. Not only was there a

coincidence of class interests between the workers, southern

peasants, soldiers and the petty bourgeoisie, which promoted

a common revolutionary political attitude, but the nature of

these interests and the outline of a common programme that

would serve them had been sketched and propagated by the

radical intelligentsia for some years before the revolutionary

movement was launched.

PART II

, The Revolution

77

Chapter 7

The February Revolution

The manifold contradictions spawned by converging class and

national divisions in Ethiopian society were rapidly approaching the point of violent resolution in the early 1970s. Ethiopia's

rulers seemed impervious to the multiplying warnings of impending disaster. Throughout the year of 1973, the government

followed its characteristic glacial rhythm. Prime Minister

Aklilu Habte Wold had served in that post with consistent

lack of distinction for 16 years, and was no better known in

his country than he was abroad. 1 His generation of pre-war

educated retainers who had held a monopoly over the top

posts of government for three decades, had thinned out somewhat by now. The gaps were filled by younger men who followed the traditional patronage route to the top. Neither they

nor the older generation of bureaucrats had gained public

esteem or popularity. Lack of imagination, initiative and

courage was their hallmark. The few persons among them who

had been endowed with any of these traits had had remarkably

short careers in government service. The military hierarchy was

headed by officers who had proved their loyalty during the

attempted coup d'etat in 1960. That attempt was made by

officers of the Imperial Bodyguard and was crushed by the

army and air forces. Subsequently, the loyalist officers were

rewarded with promotion to the top posts, and were in complete command of the military and police apparatus at this

time. Distinguished neither by professional ability nor personal

integrity, the military officialdom enjoyed no popular respect,

1. He was later to claim with apparent truthfulness before the Commission of

Inquiry, that Haile Selassie had forbidden him to venture outside the capital.

78 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

nor even the trust of the junior officers and plain soldiers.

Under this leadership, the Ethiopian armed forces had an undistinguished record in the field against peasants and nomads,

and no positive results to show for more than a decade of

fighting against the diminutive and ill-armed Eritrean rebel

force.

Haile Selassie celebrated his 81st birthday in 1973 showing

no obvious signs of physical or mental deterioration. Completing his 57th year of rule, the durable autocrat had claimed

absolute power over a state longer than any other man in contemporary history. Heavily shrouded in his own legend, he

already seemed a figure out of the past. It seemed possible that

his mind was increasingly dwelling there, for he seemed incapable of making a realistic assessment of the present. During

the entire year the Emperor followed his customary routine.

He officiated at numerous functions of the Organization of

African Unity, visited five countries abroad, distributed degrees

to university and secondary school graduates, granted appointments and promotions, and dispensed titles, decorations and

other rewards to hundreds of worthy subjects. He addressed the

newly elected parliament, and cunningly sought to blame that

bastion of landlordism for allegedly delaying the government's

projects for land reform. Throughout, he made no mention at

all of the raging famine that was stalking his domain claiming

thousands of lives among the peasantry only a short distance

north of Addis Ababa.

There was ample reason for reticence on the subject of such

horror. In an incredible act of folly, the government was attempting to conceal the very existence of the famine, apparently

intending to allow it to run its lethal course unhindered by any

effort to assist the victims. The regime's medieval attitude was

voiced later by the governor of a stricken province, who was

reported to have stated bluntly that nothing unusual had

occurred in that province; people had often perished of starvation there. Haile Selassie himself visited the area towards the

end of the year, long after the calamity and the regime's infamy

had been exposed. He sought to comfort the starving peasantry

by assuring them that 'natural disasters beyond human control

have caused untold damages since time immemorial', and

l

\

1

I

I THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 79

implied that there was little to be done, since famine was caused

by drought, which itself was a natural disaster beyond human

control. 2 However, if the drought was indeed a natural disaster,

the·famine was undoubtedly a man-made catastrophe. The essential conditions for the devastating impact of drought were the

prevailing economic conditions in the region, and a political

system that placed the peasantry at the mercy of a ruling class

whose chief representative regarded famine as an act of God not

to be interfered with.

The economic conditions in the affected provinces were not

dissimilar essentially from those obtaining in the rest of the

country. Nevertheless, the province of Tigre is one of the most

impoverished in Ethiopia. Badly exhausted by centuries of

uninterrupted cultivation, its land is parcelled out in tiny plots.

Two-thirds of the holdings are less than one hectare, 45 per cent

are less than half a hectare. It is not unusual here to see steep

slopes being ploughed by peasants tied with a rope from the

top of the hill. Famine is no stranger to these parts. Thousands

of people perished in a similar visitation as recently as 1958. In

Wollo, a relatively fertile province, 37.2 per cent of the holdings

are less than half a hectare. One quarter of all holdings belonged

to absentee landlords. Worst off were the Afar pastoralists on

the Danakil plain, who had lost much of their grazing land to

the cotton plantations.

The normally erratic rainfall pattern had turned ominous as

early as 1970. The climatic trend that devastated the Sahel zone

across the continent was felt here at that time. The peasants

held on with the aid of the small rains that come from the

Indian Ocean. When these failed also in the spring of 1972, the

people were doomed unless aid reached them in time. It did

not, precisely because the government prevented it. This was a

deliberate act perpetrated in order to spare the regime any

embarrassment. In the autumn of 1972, a report prepared by

the Ministry of Agriculture and the United Nations Food and

Agriculture Organization warned of impending famine in

Tigre and Wollo provinces, and calculated the amount of grain

required to prevent it. Large amounts of grain were being held

2. Ethiopian Herald, 27 November 1973.

80 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

in storage by the government at the time, and some of it was

exported during 1973. Additional supplies could have been

secured quite easily from international agencies and other

countries. Yet, the government suppressed the report, and

involved the international agencies themselves in a conspiracy

of silence in which it sought to smother the calamity. 3

None of the grain held in storage reached the stricken regions.

In January 1973, starving peasants began arriving.at the capital.

The government's response was to set up road blocks at the

approaches to the city and tum the hapless people away without

offering them any assistance. The provincial administration did

not remain inactive. In the midst of the crisis, the governor of

Wollo province unleashed a campaign of terror to force payment of taxes. When secondary school students demonstrated

in the provincial capital, the police shot eight of them dead.

In mid-April, a group of university lecturers visited Wollo

and were stunned by what they saw. Eighty per cent of the crop

and 90 per cent of the animals had been lost. People who had

managed to crawl to the small towns on the main road were

dying by the hundreds daily in the dusty streets. Walking

skeletons thronged the same streets in futile search for charity.

Upon their return to the capital, the lecturers posted a report

to the university community accompanied with gruesome

photographs. On 1 7 April, the university students took the

matter in their own hands, and in characteristically militant

fashion brought it to the attention of the nation. Demonstrations and violent clashes with the police followed, shattering

the conspiracy of silence that had condemned up to that time

an estimated 100,000 people to a cruel death. The government

was now compelled to make a show of action. On 28 April, a

joint meeting of civilian and military officials, presided over by

the Emperor, decided to lift the censorship in the government

controlled media. The first official mention of the famine

appeared in the press on Ethiopian Easter. 4 A new governor was

3. The culpability of the international agencies is cited by Jack Shepherd in The

Politics of Starvation, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace, 1975).

4. The Ethiopian Herald outdid itself on that day by carrying an editorial warning its readers against the danger of overeating during the holiday, 29 April

1974.

THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 81

appointed in Wollo province, a committee was formed to organize relief, and a shipment of grain to the famine area was

announced.

Grain distribution centres were established in a few towns

astride the main road leading north. No effort was made to

reach the people trapped in the isolated districts hundreds of

kilometres away from the road. They were written off as 'inaccessible'. The peasants and nomads from these regions had to

make their way to the towns on foot, and a large number

perished on the way. The survivors faced a brutal screening

process, designed - as the newly appointed governor of Wollo

explained to the press - to ' distinguish those capable of working'. 5 He didn't say what they were supposed to be working

at. The government also undertook to minimize the seriousness

of the famine, and the official press concluded in September

that 'without doubt whatsoever, the quality of life in our rural

areas is steadily improving'.

6

At that point, the famine was reaching its peak. Towards the

end of the same month, an enterprising British journalist

managed to obtain official permission to film the food distribution centres) where, as he discovered, an emaciated, diseaseridden humanity was succumbing to its final end by the brutality. Jon a than Dimbleby's searing testimonial of human

suffering, entitled the 'Unknown Famine', was shown in Britain

on 18 October 1973. It shocked the world, but Ethiopians

were not to see it, nor to realize the full dimensions of the

disaster, until amost a year later. Towards the end of the year,

other regions were reported in the grip of famine, including

northern Shoa, Hararge and Gemu Goff a. The regime finally

admitted its inability to cope with the problem and applied for

international assistance. It proved too late for at least 200,000

human beings, the estimated toll taken by famine.

The ancien regime's last year began, appropriately enough,

with an incident a la Potemkin. On 12 January 1974, a unit of

5. Presumably, they were to present themselves to the officials for work, before

receiving any relief.

6. Ethiopian Herald, 4 September 1973.

82 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

the 4th Army Division stationed at the southern town of

Neghele mutinied. The apparent reasons were a temporary

lack of potable water and a chronic deficiency of food supplies.

One unusual aspect of this episode was the initiative of noncommissioned officers who, at the head of their men, proceeded to arrest all officers, and held them hostages pending the

arrival of top military officials who were requested to visit and

witness the soldiers' living conditions. When the obese Chief of

the Ground Forces, General Deresse Dubale, arrived, he was

subjected to the ordeal of sharing the soldiers' food and drink

for a whole week. Ill and deflated, Deresse was released only

when the Air Force commander flew in to negotiate with his

captors. A committee was sent to investigate the soldiers'

complaints, but the issue was soon submerged by a succession

of crises. If the government perceived an ominous radical

element in this mutiny, it was not given time to reflect upon it.

Shortly before the Neghele mutiny, an increase of 50 per

cent in the price of petrol had been announced. Transporters

and other businessmen were warned not to raise their rates

despite the additional cost of petrol. Most concerned about the

price . increase were the multitude of taxi drivers in Addis

Ababa, who had been ferrying passengers for a flat rate of 25

cents for more than a decade. Their income had diminished

already under the impact of soaring prices for motor spare

parts. Similarly concerned were the large number of their

passengers - members of the working class and the petty bourgeoisie who relied on taxi services for their transportation. Public resentment was not mitigated by the disclosure, made soon

afterwards by the Minister of Commerce, that the rate of

increase was due not solely to the higher cost of crude oil

imports, but had been calculated to recover as well the losses

sustained by the underutilized Assab oil refinery.

While the general public and the taxi drivers were mulling

over the higher cost of fuel, the Ethiopian Teachers Association

mobilized its membership for a showdown with the government. The 17,500 teachers constituted more than half the

country's professional stratum, and formed the core of the

petty bourgeoisie. Their association was the only effective

professional organization in existence, and it was to play a

THE FEBR UARY R EVOLUTION 83

leading role in the popular movement. The teachers had long

nursed many grievances concerning their professional situation.

Many were reluctant recruits to the profession, having been

forced to join the university's faculty of education by the quota

system, or to enter teacher training institutes after having

failed to complete the secondary level. Those posted to provincial schools suffered from the marasmus of rural life, and found

it impossible to upgrade themselves in the absence of training

facilities. The Ministry of Education had never had a definite

schedule of promotions or increments, and teachers felt that

their earnings and careers suffered in comparison with those in

other branches of the public sector. In the past, general dissatisfaction had led to a steady drain from the teaching profession

to other fields. In recent years, the saturation of the public

sector had all but eliminated such opportunities. The teachers

association had a specific grievance in the matter of salary

adjustment. Since 1968, when an unprecedented strike had

forced the government to meet teacher demands, the association had been unable to negotiate further adjustments to

meet the rising cost of living.

Within their ranks, the teachers included some of the more

radical and politically conscious elements of the intelligentsia.

In the turbulent months ahead, they saw to it that their organization became a spokesman not only for their profession but

for the petty bourgeoisie as a whole, while also embracing

the cause of the allies of this class in the coming struggle, i.e.

the workers and peasants. At this time, the association gave

its own action a wider social aim by attacking the government's

recently released proposals for educational reform. The Report

of the Education Sector Review proposed to constrict the

educational process to match the limping pace of the economy.

It recommended that further educational expansion be limited

to a primary level of practical rather than academic orientation, which was to be the terminal level for the vast maJority

of Ethiopians. The secondary level was to retain its present

miniscule scope, while the university level was to expand

slightly. 7 Post-primary education was to be financed by the

7. In 1972, secondary school enrolment represented only 4.1 per cent of the

relevant age group.

H4 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

students themselves through the aid of loans. Teacher qualifications and earnings were to be downgraded through the expanded use of graduates from the lowest level training institutes.

A work year of 48 weeks, double shift teaching of five hours

daily at a minimum, and class loads of at least 6 7 students,

were some of the other recommended economy measures

affecting the teaching profession.

The prospect of condemning the vast majority of the population to functional illiteracy and proletariat status caused

profound consternation among the educated petty bourgeoisie

and working classes. The status of the former class rested

essentially on post-primary education, which also represented

the only hope for the children of the latter to escape the unenviable position of their parents. People panicked at the thought

of their children being thrown into a glutted labour market

barely after reaching their teens, and everyone wondered where

the masses of young people who were, according to the Report,

expected to take up farming were going to find land. Their

bitterness was sharpened by the knowledge that the offspring

of the ruling classes were not affected by the proposed reform.

Understandably, therefore, when the teachers coupled their

own demands to an uncompromising attack on the educational

reform proposals, they gained wide support among the urban

masses. In fact, before the teachers launched their strike, their

students took the initiative on 14 February with demonstrations

that threw the capital into turmoil, and provoked police shooting into the crowds.

The following week was to prove a fateful one for the ancien

regime. On Monday 18 February, both teachers and taxi drivers

went on strike, and were enthusiastically joined by students,

sympathetic parents and the mass of unemployed youth in the

capital. Together they forced a halt in all forms of transportation in Addis Ababa, while similar manifestations led by

students occurred in other towns of Shoa province. The class

nature of the mass action was symbolized in the numerous

attacks on property belonging to leading personalities of the

ruling class. 8 The popular wave gained momentum as the week

8. The government listed three persons killed, 22 wounded, 38 attacks on build-

THE FEBRUARY REVOL UTION 8S

wore on and the government failed to take decisive counter

measures. Faced with what appeared to be a popular uprising

in the capital, the regime hesitated to use its main instrument

of control, the army. No doubt, it was afraid to risk exacerbating the already manifested mutinous mood among the

military. During the previous week, a strike by airmen at the

Debre Zeit base near the capital had barely been averted by the

suggestion that they await the return of the Emperor from

Eritrea. Given the mood of the military, the government also

hesitated to use the police, lest it provoke a negative reaction

among the soldiers.9 Thus, having left the field to its opponents,

the regime was forced to make the first compromise in a series

that would lead it to complete capitulation. On 23 February

petrol prices were reduced, though not to their previous level,

and the implementation of the educational reform scheme was

postponed indefinitely. A decision on teachers' salaries was

promised within a month, but the teachers association refused

to end their strike, which was to last until the middle of March.

Thus began the February Revolution.

At the end of the week, the government took · the unusual

step of issuing a 'fact sheet' on the events, 'because of the

damage rumours are doing'.

10 It seems as if in its last days the

regime had come to recognize the disadvantages of the crippling

censorship it had imposed on the Ethiopian people for half a

century. It was far too late, for by this time, a novel form of

communication had appeared in the streets of Addis Ababa -

the leaflet. Ethiopians had rarely seen illegal publications

in the past, but from now onwards they were to become familiar

with and fond of this form of clandestine communication. The

work of the radical intelligentsia and students, leaflets were

typed or handwritten, and duplicated in various ways. They

were normally addressed to all sections of the population inings, and innumerable attacks on transport, including two against trains.

Ethiopian Herald, 24 February 1974.

9. Tension between the two forces mounted when police units were despatched

to the Debre Zeit air base where a mutiny was threatened. On 24 February

shooting broke out in the capital when an army unit suspected that it was

being surrounded by police.

l 0. Ethiopian Herald, 24 February 1974.

86 CLASS AN D REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

volved in the revolutionary movement - including workers,

peasants, soldiers, civil servants, teachers and students - and

sought not only to impart information, but also to promote

unity of action among these groups towards the ultimate goal

of overthrowing the regime. In the following weeks, all groups

which presented demands to the government also publicized

them and sought support for their cause through this method.

A special target of the pamphleteers was the soldiery. At this

stage, the radical groups were simultaneously afraid of military

intervention on behalf of the regime, and hopeful of a rebellion among the soldiers. Leaflets addressed to the latter appealed to their class origin and urged solidarity with the worker

and peasant. 'Ministers and Generals enrich themselves at

the expense of the soldier', declared one leaflet, 'Ethiopia

rise. Crush the government that benefits only the few.' 11 In

an attempt to prevent this from happening, the government

granted small salary increases to the military and police forces,

the day after it had made its concessions to the strikers. The

attempt failed miserably, for on the very next day, 25 February, the 2nd Army division in troubled Eritrea mutinied and

seized control of Asmara, the provincial capital.

The same phenomenon of non-commissioned officers leading

soldiers in arresting their officers was witnessed. The mutineers

rejected the pay increase as inadequate, and presented a long list

of demands concerning their pay, clothing, pensions, allowances,

etc. They also demanded that high officials be deprived of their

Mercedes Benz automobiles supplied by the state. The government protested that the country could not afford higher pay

rises, and sent the Chief of Staff to negotiate with the mutineers.

Before they had a chance to assess the situation in Asmara, the /

shaken officials in Addis Ababa were thrown into panic by

simultaneous mutinies in the 4th Division and various specialist

11. 'Voice of the Oppressed to the Armed Forces', 17 February 1974. Another

leaflet accused high government officials and foreign capitalists of 'eating

our flesh and sucking our blood. Next they will chew our bones. We must not

keep silent. We must do something. We must rise up.' Entitled 'Let Us Strengthen Our Unity', 18 February 1974. All leaflets are written in Amharinya

and dated in the Ethiopian calendar. The dates here are given in the Gregorian

calendar.