THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 87

units stationed in the capital, as well as the Air Force in the

nearby base at Debre Zeit. A certain degree of co-ordination

among junior and non-commissioned officers of these units had

obviously been established. Since this must have been accomplished throu~h radio, it must be assumed that the government

was aware of 1t, because it had always monitored military communications precisely for that purpose.

Faced with a full scale military mutiny, the regime faltered

but did not fall. Instead, pressure from below produced a

schism at the top between the two classes in the ruling coalition.

The dangerously exposed leadership of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, headed by the Prime Minister, Aklilu Habte Wold, and

his brother, Akalou Worq Habte Wold, sought to remove itself

from the line of fire through resignation. The high aristocracy,

whose leading members had long resented the lesser role accorded their class at the centre, now seized the opportunity to

claim control of the tottering regime. They seemed to believe

that their status could command the traditional deference due

to it, and would enable them to restore the authority of the

state. As it were, the soldiers' demands appeared to concern

mainly the resolution of material rather than political issues.

I~sofar as the latter were raised, they seemed to focus on the

shortcomings of the existing cabinet, without constituting a

co-ordinated attack on the regime itself. A change of cabinet,

it was reasoned, might placate the soldiers, and further financial concessions might win them over. That accomplished, it

should not be difficult to handle unrest in the civilian sector.

The initiative was taken by two leading aristocrats whose

highly important careers had ended in sinecure posts of little

significance. General Abiye Abebe, Haile Selassie's son-in-law,

had been president of the Senate for ten years, while another

royal relative, Prince Asrate Kassa, former governor of Eritrea,

was languishing in the chairmanship of the Crown Council,

an august organ whose precise function was unknown even

to its membership. The matter of the cabinet's resignation

proved something of a constitutional muddle, since no one

ever resigned the Emperor's service; dismissal was the only

known method of release. Indeed, the word resignation did

not exist in the language. While the cabinet parleyed for an

88 C LASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

honourable release the aristocrats insisted upon dismissal which

would ' carry with it the disgrace of failure, and hopefully would

clear the air somewhat. In the event, an extremely brief communique on 27 February announced the resignation of the

cabinet.

Endalkatchew Makonnen became the new Prime Minister. A

member of the royal nobility, whose father had served uneventfully as Ethiopia's first Prime Minister in the 1950s, the Oxford

educated Endalkatchew had been a member of the previous

cabinet since 1969. The choice, however, was not without

political merit. Along with some other scions of the royal

nobility, the new Prime Minister enjoyed a vague reputation as

a liberal aristocrat and something of a maverick in the Haile

Selassie regime. This reputation rested mostly on the fact that

he, like some others, appeared to prefer diplqmatic service

abroad, rather than duty at home under the eye of the Emperor.

Among the first group of educated Ethiopians to return from

abroad in the early 1950s, he had made a career in the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, and in 1960 was appointed Ambassador to

London. Following the attempted coup d'etat at the close of

the same year, he was recalled to take over the Ministry of

Commerce, as part of a face lifting operation carried out in the

aftermath of the coup. He departed soon however, to head the

Ethiopian delegation at the United Nations, and did not return

until 1969.

A similar reputation was enjoyed for the same reasons by two

other nobles, Zewdie Gebre Selassie and Mikael Imru, who now

joined the new cabinet. General Abiye Abebe took over the

Ministry of Defence. The rest of the cabinet was made up of

established members of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, mostly of

Endalkatchew's generation, who also had received their education abroad in the post-war period. In a sense, therefore, the

ruling coalition was re-formed with the aristocracy now in the

leading role. Having failed to establish a modern base of support,

the regime was now reverting to its initial base, the aristocracy.

It appeared as if half a century of autocratic rule had changed

little on this side of the political equation. However, appearances were misleading. One thing that had changed was the

position of the aristocracy itself. I ts authority, even among its

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THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 89

natural constituents, the northern peasantry, was a myth, as

events were soon to demonstrate.

A purge of top military officials was conducted in order to

appease the soldiers. Along with the former Minister of Defence,

the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Ground Forces were replaced. Continuing pressure from below in the weeks that followed resulted in the replacement of all four army divisional

commanders, the commander of the Air Force, the commander

of the police forces and the disgraced commander of the Navy,

the Emperor's grandson, who had fled in panic to Jibouti

during the army mutiny in Asmara. Thus, the military hierarchy

was decapitated without incident, and the heads that rolled

belonged to the regime's most trusted supporters in the armed

forces.

12 Their re placemen ts, particularly in the divisional

commands, were officers of lower rank - brigadier generals

and major generals - who were chosen because they were

acceptable or inoffensive to the troops they commanded. They

themselves knew that their position depended more on the

opinion of the latter, rather than that of the government. As a

result, they found it increasingly difficult to restrain their

junior and non-commissioned officers who gradually took command of the field units and began to speak in their name. It

wasn't long before the revolutionary committee that became

known as the Dergue emerged as the spokesman of the armed

forces.

On the very day of his instalment, the new Prime Minister

made his bid for military support by offering substantial increases in pay and allowances to soldiers and officers. The

monthly pay of a private was brought to well above 100 Ethiopian

dollars with allowances; pension, injury and death benefits

were accordingly increased. Apparently gratified, various units

sent messages pledging their loyalty to the Emperor, and a

military delegation visited the palace to express similar senti12. Replacement in some cases was effected through transfer to another post.

The police commissioner, Yilma Sibeshi, was given a provincial governorship.

One of the divisional commanders, General Nega Tegegne. Haile Selassie's

grandson-in-law, was made governor of Begemdir and Semien province, from

where he was later to make a counter-revolutionary attempt.

90 C LASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

men ts to him in person. They also brought with them a number

of members of the former cabinet who had been arrested by the

soldiers, and released them on his advice. The 2nd Division in

Asmara also released various officials that had been detained

there. A brief flare-up within the Bodyguard Division, which

had until now remained aloof from mutinous activity, was

quickly settled. Despite agitation in a few units, particularly

among the airmen at Debre Zeit, for a continued offensive

against the regime, the soldiers seemed generally content with

their gains. The new Prime Minister appeared to have won the

day, and he must have felt additional satisfaction when units

of the 4th Division participated in dispersing a mass demonstration in the capital on 1 March.

Nevertheless, the renovated regime was not to have the

respite it needed in order to marshall its rapidly diminishing

resources for a counter-revolutionary offensive. If the soldiers

were momentarily thrown off stride, the workers, southern

peasants and the petty bourgeoisie were not, and they took

the lead once more. They were not deceived by the change of

personnel at the top, and the radical intelligentsia launched a

leaflet campaign to expose Endalkatchew's role as the aspiring

saviour of the ancien regime. 13 The teachers' strike continued

despite repeated pleas by the new Prime Minister to end it.

The Ethiopian University Teachers Association, a group which

in the past had been made to appear quite timid by the aggressiveness of its. students, now joined the struggle. It published a

document designed to clarify the basic issues involved in the

popular uprising, to integrate the demands of the various social

groups participating in it, and to condense these into a series

of political objectives that could serve as the immediate programme of the movement. After listing the major causes for

the country's plight, including the oligarchy itself and the land

tenure system, it pointed out that the popular movement was

13. A leaflet appearing on the same day as the Ptitne Minister's appointment

declared boldly: 'We don't want Endalkatchew', and went on to brand him as

'a well known oppressor of the people'. Another, appearing the following day

reminded people of Endalkatchew's father, 'who thought he was better th~

the common man', and concluded that the Prime Minister's proper place was

in prison.

THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 91

not simply demanding satisfaction of economic grievances, but

a fundamental change in the socio-economic and political

structures which were the cause of the country's current problems. The new Prime Minister was rejected not only because of

his past record, but also due to the undemocratic manner of his

appointment and the fact that the autocratic system still functioned without alteration. An elected government, a new constitution, abolition of censorship and of the public security

department, land reform, civil liberties, and the punishment

of former officials were some of the basic demands included

in the document released by the University Teachers Association. The autocrat was obviously the central target, though

this was not expressly stated. Pending the satisfaction of these

demands, the university teachers went on strike. 14

On 4 March, the day before the university teachers issued

their pronunciamento, the Confederation of Ethiopian Labour

Unions (CELU) presented a list of demands to the Prime

Minister, and threatened to call a general strike unless these

were met within three days. The list of 16 demands included

the answers to the familiar tale of workers' woes: new labour

legislation, freedom of organization, minimum wages, job

security, pensions, wage increases to match the cost of living,

etc. They also included demands which reflected a new awareness of the working class position in society, and a sense of

solidarity with other social groups involved in the struggle.

CELU attacked the proposed education reform as designed to

separate the children of the rich from those of the poor, it

demanded free education for all, supported the teachers in

their strike, and condemned the unequal distribution of land

as responsible for the country's low standard of living. 'All

problems of Ethiopia are problems of the workers', the statement concluded. 15 The militant stance was something new for

14. "Statement from EUTA: 'Our Views on the Popular and Military Movement"'

(5 March 1974 ). Not surprising for a group within reach of the bureaucratic

bourgeoisie level, the university staff split within days following this action.

The conservative element retreated and called off the strike, while a radical

element formed a new organization called the Ethiopian University Teachers

Forum.

15. CELU Congress Resolutions, 7 March 1974. The Congress met from 23 February to 1 March.

92 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

CELlI's staid leadership. It reflected not only the rapid radicalization of the working class in the very recent past, but also

the stimulating influence of elements of the radical intelligentsia who strove to commit the labour movement to a political,

rather than simply an economic battle. The government initially

promised a reply in three to six months, then appeared to relent

and promised quick satisfaction. Nevertheless, the first general

strike in the history of Ethiopian labour was launched with

signal success on Thursday, 7 March. It lasted until the end of

the week, when the government appeared to give in completely.

Clearly hoping to gain time through its promises to CELU,

the Endalkatchew government was again to be frustrated as a

new onslaught was unleashed against it from another sector -

the employees of the public enterprises. This group had been

denied the right to union organization on the grounds that it

belonged to the public service. 16 However, the regime had

drawn a clear distinction between the civil service and public

enterprises in order to deny the latter many of the benefits

enjoyed by the former. Employees of public enteq~rises had no

job security, nor pension rights, unless a particular enterprise

sponsored its own pension scheme. The directors of such

enterprises exploited this advantage by keeping large numbers

of employees, particularly manual workers, on temporary

status, even though they were continuously employed thereby

denying them even the most meagre benefits, such as leave

pay, wage increments, etc. Public enterprises accounted for

about one-third of the work force in the public sector, and

employed both skilled and unskilled labour, and a large portion

of the technical and professional petty bourgeoisie. The right

of organization and parity with the civil service in the conditions of employment were the crucial issues that inspired joint

class action in this sector. However, once the battle was joined,

wider issues and larger goals came to the forefront, reflecting

the common concerns of the emerging coalition between these

classes. Almost immediately and completely spontaneously,

the petty bourgeois and the worker joined forces in a frontal

16. Actually the Labour Code permitted labour union organization in profitmaking public enterprise. The regime circumvented this provision simply by

claiming that its enterprises had yet to show profit.

THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 93

attack on the bureaucratic bourgeoisie who commanded the

public sector.

On 11 March, the day after CELU called off the general

strike, employees of the Civil Aviation Authority struck,

demanding the right to organize, as well as greater benefits

and pension rights. Domestic flights were suspended, while

Ethiopian Airlines was able to resume flights abroad after an

arrangement was made. From now on and until the end of

May, a wave of strikes, boycotts and other types of militant

action paralyzed the public sector, threw the country into

turmoil, and maintained the momentum of the popular movement. Militancy spread like an epidemic and infected all sectors

of urban society, including the civil service and large private

enterprises. There were strikes at the Post Office, Ministry of

Finance, the University, Addis Ababa Municipality, and practically all public enterprises, including the Emperor's own

Haile Selassie I Foundation. Most such actions incorporated

attacks on the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, demanding the dismissal, investigation and punishment of officials on charges of

corruption, abuse of power, etc. The staff, students and employees of the University compelled the resignation of its

president and two vice-presidents. Municipal employees of

Addis Ababa staged a huge demonstration and forced the

dismissal of the Mayor. A spectacular strike involving the

Anbassa Bus Company, the capital's main transport service,

lasted over a month. Its employees demanded an investigation

of the company's affairs and the dismissal of its directors. In a

demonstration of transport workers, a placard appeared urging

that 'the owners of Anbassa company must be made public'.

As the people were beginning to learn, the owner was none

other than Haile Selassie himself. This was the first muted

intimation of the Emperor's octopus-like financial empire

whose many tentacles were now gradually being brought to the

surface prior to chopping them off.

Other groups and associations joined the struggle by endorsing the movement's main goals and made demands of their own.

An unexpected protest, and a sure sign that the ancien regime 's

foundations were crumbling, came from the priesthood of the

Ethiopian Church, the spiritual guardian of the feudal edifice.

94 C LASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

Ostensibly the protest came from the clerical proletariat, the

humble village priests who were barely better off than the

peasants. Addressing themselves to the Patriarch, a group of

500 priests decried their miserable wages which ranged from

three to 15 Ethiopian dollars per month. They also accused

the ecclesiastical hierarchy of appropriating for themselves the

Church's huge income from land, and called for the confiscation of bishops' property. The priests were soon to be joined

by the teachers of Church-maintained schools and the employees of its printing press. In a pamphlet addressed to the

'Armed Forces and the Ethiopian People', the clergy expressed

regret because 'in the past we didn't proclaim that the people

were oppressed'. 17

Even more unprecedented and historically significant was

the mobilization of the Ethiopian Muslims. The socially introverted and politically passive urban Muslim community now

asserted itself in the biggest demonstration ever staged in the

country. On 20 April, 100,000 people, many of them Christian

sympathizers, marched through the streets of Addis Ababa

demanding an end to the traditional and official discrimination

practiced against Islam in Ethiopia. The day before, a Muslim

delegation had presented a list of demands to the Prime Minister. They sought redress for age old wrongs suffered by Islam

in the Christian empire. They asked that this faith be' recognized by the state and given financial support, Muslim courts

be recognized by law, and Muslim holidays be nationally celebrated. They demanded also that Muslims be allowed freedom

to form associations, to broadcast over the radio and television

' and to be given equal opportunities of employment in the civil,

military and diplomatic services. Furthermore, Muslims asked

to be given land like all other Ethiopians. Finally, a plea was

made that the term 'Ethiopian Muslims' be used in public,

instead of the regime's invidious favourite 'Muslims in Ethiopia'.

Equally unprecedented and far more exhilarating was the

sudden lifting of censorship from the state-controlled media of

communication, especially the press. The quality of the latter

had never risen above the level of an unimaginative propaganda

17. Entitled 'Voice of the Clergy'. (no date).

' '

1

I

THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 95

effort orchestrated by the Ministry of Information. News and

opinions were the last thing one would look for in Ethiopian

newspapers, where the staple fare was an uninterrupted panegyric of Haile Selassie's rule. 18 The association of the much

abused Ethiopian journalists demanded the elimination of

censorship on 5 March. The very next day, a long statement

entitled 'Speaking Out' appeared on the front page of the

Ethiopian Herald. Its author, Tegegne Yeteshaworq, longtime

editor of the same paper and later General Manager of the Press

Department in the Ministry of Information, was more than

anyone else identified with the regime's stultifying censorship

practices. With admirable aplomb, he now denounced these

practices and championed a free press.

Some days later, the first mention of the death toll taken by

the famine appeared in the press. From now on, the press began

to report fairly accurate, albeit abbreviated, accounts of the

events that were shaking the regime. For the first time in their

history, Ethiopians were able to read something other than

soporific propaganda in their newspapers. More than that, they

were now able to express their own opinion in letters to the

press. Letters from private citizens began to occupy considerable space in the newspapers, which were forced to expand their

size greatly despite the 200 per cent increase in the price of

newsprint. Revelations, accusations, criticism, praise, advice and

demands abounded in these letters. The long dormant Amharinya

press now came into its own with critical reportage and news

presented in a language that was inspired and rejuvenated by

the popular movement. In what amounted to a literary renaissance, the Amharinya language asserted its primacy and recovered the allegiance of the western educated section of the

population. As a result, newspaper circulation surged far beyond

printing capacity. Queues formed to buy them, and newsboys

learned to mark up the price according to the newsworthiness

f d ·1 . 19 o a1 y issues.

18. So narrow were the confines of press activity, that it was not-even permitted

to report the deliberations of parliament.

19. Photographs of the Emperor disappeared from the front pages for a time.

Only the editorial space remained devoted to routine embellishment of official

positions.

96 <.'LASS AND RFVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

Even parliament now joined the fray. Trying to put some

distance between themselves and the discredited regime, the

parlian1entarians launched an attack against the bureaucrats.

Their choice target was the provincial administration, an organ

of governn1en t they proceeded to dissect in a four-day debate

at the beginning of April. Deputies from the southern provinces

related endless charges of embezzlement, murder and rapine

committed by provincial governors, while deputies from Wollo,

Gojjam and Eritrea provinces in the north recounted a rich

store of similar abuses. A demand was voiced that all provincial

governors be replaced immediately. Answering it, the new

Minister of Interior took a philosophical line. 'We cannot

change Ethiopia overnight', he declared, 'nor can we dismiss all

officials on short notice. '

20

In fact, spontaneous uprisings in the southern provinces were

changing the situation overnight. It was inevitable that the

popular movement would strike a responsive chord in that

region. The pent-up hatred of the southern tenant had begun to

explode in acts of spontaneous violence against absentee landlord property. The uprising in the rural areas assumed a more

co-ordinated and effective form through the activity of petty

bourgeois elements in the provincial towns, who performed

the same role there as their counterparts in the national capital.

Teachers and students were particularly active in agitating

among the volatile elements in the provincial towns, which

included a sizeable portion of unemployed youths drifting in

from the countryside. They integrated the diverse grievances

of various groups and focused them on the most exposed

target, the provincial officialdom. When necessary, they summoned the peasantry from the countryside to bolster the

attack. Several of the most notorious satraps in the southern

provinces had to flee to escape lynching, and were followed by

the provinciai police commanders and a cohort of officials.

Other officials and prominent landlords prudently removed

themselves from the southern region with less commotion. Provincial administration in this region was nearing collapse , at one

point the government was forced to empower the senior officials

still at their post to act as governor.

20. Ethiopian Herald, 6 April 1974.

THE FEBR UARY R EVOLUTION 97

During this entire period, students and teachers in the capital

and other urban centres remained at the forefront of the movement. Despite an offer to raise teacher salaries, the schools did

not reopen. The university reopened for one week in March,

only to close again as students boycotted classes. Students and

teachers were extremely active agitating, pamphleteering,

demonstrating and provoking others to do the same. They infiltrated other organizations, and sought to influence their position

injecting political elements into every conflict and sharpening

contradictions whenever possible. Gradually they succeded in

focusing diverse grievances on the regime itself, defining it as

the country's essential problem, and the formation of a people's

government as the only real solution. 'The root of such problems as corrupt officials and similar problems, is the system

itself, averred one leaflet, 'and the solution to them is a fundamental change of the system and the formation of a people's

government. '

21

The regime did not collapse before this onslaught. Though

spirited, the popular movement was divided and unorganized.

Its attack was not co-ordinated - its programme, non-existent.

The ruling classes waged a defensive struggle along predictable

lines. Just as the radical intelligentsia was seeking to provoke

further military intervention against the regime, the government

was intent on neutralizing this force and, if possible, as of old,

to turn it against its opponents. For the moment, with the soldiers back in the barracks, the government ventured some conciliatory gestures towards its critics. Haile Selassie promised

constitutional reforms that would make the prime minister

responsible to parliament, modernize the judiciary, etc. A

committee was appointed to draft them.

22 In deference to the

widespread popular demand for the punishment of former

officials, a Commission of Inquiry was established to investigate

their misdeeds. The process was expected to take a long time,

the Prime Minister explained, 'because inquiry is new to us.'23

21. Entitled:The Solution is a Peoples Government', (no date).

22. The same promise concerning the prime minister's responsibility to parliament

had been made in 1966 in an imperial speech over the radio, and was subsequently retracted as a slip of the tongue.

23. Ethiopian Herald, 31 March 1974.

98 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

At the end of March, salary increases were granted to civil

servants earning less than 153 Ethiopian dollars per month, a

group that comprised about 42 per cent of the total civil service

work force. The following month, pension rates for those in the

lower half of the pay scale were increased. Small increases

were also given to the Territorial Army, a paramilitary organization under the control of the Ministry of Interior.

The government showed its true colours some 40 days after it

took power, when it finally revealed its long-a waited policy

statement.24 It saw its priorities in resolving the fiscal problem,_

coping with the consequences of the drought, promoting constitutional revision, and protecting national security. Nothing

specific was promised on the burning issues of the day, other

than. a general intention to reduce the existing wide disparities

of income among the various social classes. On the explosive

issue of land reform, the government promised to submit legislation on landlord-tenant relations, and to assist tenants to become landowners. New grants of land were to be made only

to cultivators, and holdings in excess of their owner's capacity

to develop might be acquired and distributed. In short, these

amounted to a vague promise to implement the reforms recommended by the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration

some years earlier. Concerning the provincial administration,

Endalkatchew would go no further than to reiterate a classic

regime formula, to wit: the Minister of Interior will exercise

proper control as provided by law over the actions of provincial

governors. In fact, new appointments in this field indicated that

the government was recruiting mainly from the traditional

sources. Endalkatchew's policy statement made it clear that no

serious reform was contemplated. The regime's new team was

obviously determined to limit the damage caused by the popular

movement, and to play for time until it could mount a counterrevolutionary offensive.

Before it could attempt to restore the status quo ante, the

regime had to assure itself of the support or, at least, the neutrality of the military. In the latter instance, the police, still

thought to be quite reliable, could be brought into play. It had

24. Ethiopian Herald, 9 April 1974.

THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 99

not been seriously committed thus far for fear of provoking a

military reaction. An armed force almost as large as the military itself, the police were thinly spread on the ground in

force was used to bolster police control in the countryside. In

the cities however, concentration and mobility of police forces

were probably a match for the unco-ordinated and unarmed

popular movement. During April, the government launched a

campaign to create the proper atmosphere that would enable it

to ask for military support. Press editorials fulminated against

anarchy, chaos, disunity and disruption, and pleaded for patience

and understanding for the government's efforts to deal with the

accumulated problems of centuries. 'Give them a chance, please',

begged the Ethiopian Herald editorial of 6 April 1974. The

forces of anarchy and impending chaos, it was made clear, were

the strikers, demonstrators, students and radicals who demanded

the impossible, i.e. that a new society be fashioned overnight.

In the second half of April, Endalkatchew arranged to address

military and police units in the capital on several occasions,

with the obvious intent of winning them over to a policy of

forceful suppression of the rebellious actions that were erupting

daily throughout the country. He stressed the danger of anarchy

and the threat to national security thereof, and reminded them

of their responsibility in that regard. In each instance he answered questions, some of which obviously had been planted in

order to indicate military concern over civilian unrest and

labour strife.

However, many questions indicated genuine concern over

the continuing impunity of former high officials. 'Why is it',

wondered one questioner, 'that officials who are alleged to have

committed crimes against the nation are not punished, while

people who are accused of stealing a chicken are given long

sentences?' Endalkatchew evaded such questions with the customary dodge that he was going to relay their deep concern

over this matter to the Emperor. Another soldier maintained

that the economic crisis was the result of employer pursuit of

profits, not labour's struggle for decent wages, and wanted to

know why the government did not nationalize industry. 25 Be25. Reported in Ethiopian Herald, 18 and 24 April 1974.

100 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

cause, the Prime Minister replied, "our economic policy does

not allow us to do so." Still others indicated concern over

growing civilian hostility towards the military. Indeed there had

been a marked change in the public attitude since the February

days, when men in uniform were often applauded in the streets

and were otherwise flattered by a gratified public for their role

in bringing down the Aklilou cabinet. People now spoke with

contempt for the soldiers who withdrew from the struggle as

soon as they had received salary increases. Mercenary was one

of the kindest epithets thrown at them. Endalkatchew assured

them that their salary increases were justified and not exessive.

The next step was to threaten the rebellious civilian sector

with military retribution and, if possible, make good on such

threats. On 22 April, the government issued a stern warning

against illegal demonstrations, strikes by civil servants, and

contraventions of Labour Board decisions. Forceful measures,

it warned, would be taken by the armed forces and police

'working together'. On the same day, the Labour Relations

Board rejected an application from the workers of the Telecommunications Board to form a labour union, thereby reneging

on a promise to allow organization of workers in public enterprises made to CELU during the general strike a month earlier.

On the same day, the Board ruled that the general strike itself had been illegal and that workers were not entitled to

pay for its duration, thereby reneging on another government promise which had been given as a condition for ending

the strike. On 29 April an.other stern warning was issued, and

security forces were offered to any public agency and private

enterprise that felt the need for protection.

Emboldened, the government made ready to use force. Its

chosen instrument was the Security Commission, which was

established on 30_ April. Chaired by the Minister of Defence, it

included 25 members representing the military, police and

security branches, as well as various other governmental agencies.

Its task, as officially described, was 'to ease tensions'. At the

first meeting of the Commission, the Minister of Defence made

it clear to its members that they had full powers to use anf

means they deemed necessary to accomplish the desired end. 2

26. Text of Order, published in Ethiopian Herald, 11 August. 1974.

THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 101

'Enough is Enough', exclaimed an editorial, proclaiming the

government's exasperation, as the Security Commission swung

into action.27 The Commission gained instant notoriety through

its use of terroristic methods against the strikers of the Telecommunications Board and other similar exploits. Its chairman

threatened CELU itself with closure unless it stopped agitating.

The forceful assertion of government initiative acted as a

tonic for the ruling classes. On 5 May, Haile Selassie used the

occasion of the Victory Day Anniversary to broadcast an appeal

for unity against agitators, and asked the public to co-operate

with the military and security forces. 28 Four days later, the

Prime Minister addressed parliament - the first such occasion

in the history of this institution - and boldly declared that a

change of cabinet did not mean a change of government. He

suggested that high expectations among the people should not

be encouraged by loose talk about a change of government. To

make the point clear, the government undertook further action

against its opponents. At the beginning of May, the leaders of

striking Post Office workers were arrested, while officials who

had been suspended initially were now reinstated. In mid-May,

tenants in Chilalo district of Arussi Province who refused to

pay rent were attacked by the police, and a number of people

were killed. The newly appointed governor of the province

attempted to restrain the police, was himself attacked and

forced to flee the province. Striking farm workers in Sidamo

province were forcefully removed from the area and were left

stranded in the streets of a distant town.

21. Ibid., 3 May 1974.

28. During this time, delegations of provincial notables arrived at the palace to

pledge loyalty to the Emperor, whose photograph reappeared once more on

the front page of the newspapers. Haile Selassie felt confident enough to

attend the OAU summit meeting at Mogadishu, on 12 June. The aristocracy

also thought the time opportune for a bit of byzantine byplay. Haile Selassie's

grandson was named successor to his father, the Crown Prince. The move was

obviously inspired by a clique plotting to bypass the latter in the order of

succession. The Crown Prince had grown old and decrepit in the shadow of his

father. Disgraced in a moment of weakness during the attempted coup d'etat

in 1960, he had been entrusted with no more onerous office since then than

the presidency of the Ethiopian Red Cross.

102

Chapter 8

The Soldiers' Revolution

Ihe regime's apparent resurgence in April-May proved to be

its dying gasp. Tl1ough disorganized and unco-ordinated the

February revolution had defined clearly the lines of the class

struggle. The ruling coalition of the bureaucratic-military

bourgeoisie and the landowning aristocracy was confronted

with a spontaneous coalition of the petty bourgeoisie, workers

and southern peasants in a challenge that was no longer cast

in terms of reform but of revolution. Bereft of support among

the broad strata of the population, the regime was left with

only one pillar of support, the repressive apparatus it had so

zealously nurtured during the postwar period. When this pillar

cracked~ the ancien regime fell precipitously like a dead weight.

The ruling classes were aware of the fact that the military

hierarchy was no longer in effective command of the apparatus.

They realized, as an editorial put it, that 'the umbilical cord

between the generals and the soldiers was cut. '

29 Yet, it was

hoped that changes at the top would restore control, and that

the soldiers could be manoeuvred in to forceful opposition

against the popular movement. Endalkatchew was scheming

quite adroitly to bring this about. The Security Commission,

which implicated the military along with the police and security

forces in the government's suppression efforts, was a shrewd

attempt to provoke a civilian versus military confrontation.

The regime did not seem to realize that the class conflict which

was tearing the social fabric was faithfully reflected within what

the ruling classes had come to regard as an instrument of their

own making, responsive only to mercenary motives. In fact, the

29. Ethiopian Herald, 5 March 1974.

THE SOLDIERS ' REVOLUTION 103

unfolding class struggle had already demolished the status quo

within the military establishment, and was transforming the

regime's forme r pliable tool into a weapon destined to accomplish its master's destruction.

The radicalization of the Ethiopian military sector is a reflection of its social composition. Common soldiers and non-commissioned officers were normally recruited from among the

peasantry, with a large portion coming from the population of

the southern provinces. The issue of land never ceased to be of

concern to them, for retired soldiers had no other means of subsistence. Despite grandiose promises of land for service it was

mostly officers who benefited. A soldier's life involved considerable deprivation, often as the result of corruption, incompetence

and sheer neglect on the part of superior officers. It also involved

frequent exposure to severe hardship and violence in the course

of suppression of peasant and nationalist uprisings. Army

divisions tended to remain almost permanently in their assigned

regions, thus prolonging, almost indefinitely in some cases,

exposure to such conditions. The 2nd Division in Eritrea had

struggled vainly for years to subdue the elusive but deadly

nationalist guerrilla movement. It was gradually ceding control

of the countryside, and retreating to the urban centres whose

population became increasingly hostile. The 3rd Division had

a similarly frustrating duty in the arid Ogaden, whose Somali

inhabitants had never reconciled themselves to Ethiopian rule,

while units of the 4th Division had spent years battling against

a handful of peasant rebels in Bale. Only the coddled Bodyguard

Division enjoyed comfortable duty in the capital, as well as

many additional privileges. It was the last to join the soldiers'

revolution.

Leadership in the initial stages of the uprising fell into the

hands of the non-commissioned officers. At the head of their

men, they frequently arrested all officers present and took

over command of their units. They were instrumental in affecting a degree of co-ordination among the various units throughout Ethiopia, and played a prominent role in the Committee

that emerged as the directing organ of the military movement.

The radica.lism of this group, whose social composition was

essentially similar to that of the common soldiery, was leavened

104 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

in recent years by an influx of young people with a measure of

modern education. This was particularly true of the Air Force,

and specialist units such as the Army Aviation Corps, Army

Engineers, Army Medical Corps, Mechanized Brigade, etc. These

units recruited and trained young men who had some secondary

school education but could find no alternative employment.

The Air Force and specialist units were consistently the most

radical elements in the soldiers' movement.

The petty bourgeois element in the military establishment

was to be found within the ranks of the junior officers. This

group was the product of two different avenues of recruitment.

The oldest military training institution, founded in 1934 at

Holeta, initially took its students from among primary sch~ol

graduates, and later among non-commissioned officers _with

several years of service, and put them through an abbreviated

course of military training. Some of the oldest Holeta graduates

had reached general rank in the 1960s. The Harar Military

Academy was founded in 1957 as a high-level training institution. Its first students were conscripted from among the entering classes in the University. Since then, it has recruited secondary school graduates, who follow a four-year course that

includes academic training. Harar turned out its first graduates

in 1960. By 1974, this first group had reached the rank of

major. The majority of the junior officer group shared the

social and political aspirations of the petty bourgeoisie. Consequently, they proved highly sympathetic to the rebellious

mood of the soldiery. More significantly, untouched by the

miasma of power and corruption that enveloped the senior

officer corps, the junior officers retained the trust of the

soldiers, and were able to participate in the movement from

the outset. Eventually, they assumed a guiding role, and ultimately emerged as the dominant element in the military government that succeeded the ancien regime.

Throughout the period of apparent quiescence on the part of

the military, agitation within its ranks did not abate. Leaflets

proclaiming that 'our aim was not to get salary increases',

?enounc~d those who ~ulogized the Emperor for granting them,

for making us look like money-loving people.' Nor did the

incidents of insurrectionary activity cease. The Air Force base

THE SOLDIERS ' REVOLUTION 105

at Debre Zeit was constantly seething. On 25 March, it broke

out in a revolt which was foiled through the intervention of

a paratroop brigade. Six days later, the Ministry of Defence

announced simply that an attempt to seize power had been

prevented by the armed forces. On 7 April, the 3rd Division

in Harar seized the town's radio station, while some of its

units took over the town of Jijiga, where they harassed local

traders in a protest against high prices. The 3rd Division also

demanded the dismissal of the deputy Chief of Staff, which was

announced by the government the very same day.

By late April, the process of co-ordination among the radical

elements in the armed forces had reached an advanced stage.

A committee of elected unit representatives comprising all ranks

was set up under the name of Co-ordinating Committee of the

Armed Forces, popularly known as the Dergue (Amharinya for

'Committee'). Its first action, taken during the last week of

April, was to arrest almost all the members of the former

cabinet. As they were to do in each instance until they deposed

him, the Dergue followed this action with pledges of loyalty

to the Emperor, and implied that the arrests had been ordered

by him. 30 That their course was not clear to the soldiers at this

time is evident from the fact that they took no further action

for two months, while the government was trying desperately

to repress the civilian uprising.31 When they moved again at the

end of June they were once more guided by the popular mood

which demanded more arrests. This delayed action appears to

have been provoked by -an incident involving eight Members of

Parliament, who appeared at the headquarters of the 4th Division,

on 26 June, to ask for the release of the detained former

ministers. Instead, the soldiers began a new wave of arrests. This

time, the Dergue cast its net widely, and it brought in the leading aristocrats, highest dignitaries, top military officers, judges,

ranking bureaucrats, and the Emperor's religious mentor. Other

30. A conference called to announce the arrests, on 26 April, marks the first

public appearance of what was styled as the 'Co-ordinating Committee of the

Armed Forces'. See Ethiopian Herald, 27 April 1974.

31. At the conference held on 26 April, the Committee appeared to give support

to the government's efforts in a statement which opposed strikes as 'rather

illegal', and urged the striking transport workers to return to work.

106 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

prominent figures of the regime were ordered to surrender

themselves on pain of having their property confiscated. Most

of them complied and joined their colleagues in detention at

the headquarters of the 4th Division in the capital. From this

point onwards, the arrests continued uninterruptedly until all

leading personalities and agents of the ancien regime had been

removed from the scene.

The sweeping arrests showed that the soldiers had learned

from the fatal mistake of the 1960 rebels, who foolishly had

allowed their enemies the freedom to organize a counter-coup.

The Dergue, which now had added the Police and Territorial

Army representatives to its membership, presented the Endalkatchew government with its own list of demands. These included the release of political prisoners, the return of exiles, the

right of the Dergue to consult with the cabinet, the extension of

the parliamentary session and speedy constitutional reform. It

also listed its major objectives, none of which seemed particularly

radical, and introduced its motto 'Ethiopia First'. 32 Neither the

demands nor the objectives of the Dergue clarified its intentions.

It appeared that these were not clear to the soldfors themselves.

They had not yet reached a decision to take over power, although there were many among them who were thinking along

those lines. Equally obvious was the fact that they had no clear

ideas concerning a programme which power might be used to

implement. The Dergue's list of objectives was a catchall which

included even the promotion of tourism, while the slogan of

'Ethiopia First' exuded the sort of nationalist mystique one

has come to expect of the military everywhere. The Dergue's

indecisiveness concerning the immediate objective of power,

and its lack of clarity concerning a programme, were to have

important consequences for the course of the revolution. One

of these was the phenomenon dubbed by journalists the 'creeping coup', which allowed the regime to linger on for several

months, while the soldiers steeled themselves to deliver the

32. These were punishment of corrupt officials, rehabilitation of famine victims,

rapid development, constitutional revision, promotion of the dignity of

labour, and improved labour relations. Only 'the abolition of certain traditional customs which may hamper the unity and progress of Ethiopia', contained a hint of things to come.

THE SOLDIERS' REVOLUTION 107

coup de grace. Far more important was the impact which the

socio-economic programme advocated by the radical intelligentsia was to have on the receptive soldier rulers. Eventually

they were to embrace the radicals' major proposals, while rejecting their claim to play a political role.