One Dergue demand that was immediately acceded to was

the appointment of retired Major General Aman Andom as

Chief of Staff. The nearest thing to a popular military figure the

country had, Aman Andom had languished in the Senate since

1965, apparently the victim of his popularity. An Eritrean by

birth, Aman belonged to a group of young men who found

themselves in the Sudan during the Italian occupation of

Ethiopia, and had received military training there. Though a

contemporary in service with two leaders of the 1960 coup

attempt, he was not privy to their plans, but gained fame during

that event for a different reason. Commanding the 3rd Division

at the time, he correctly anticipated a Somali thrust in the

Ogaden timed to take advantage of Ethiopian confusion, and

succeeded in repulsing the incursion. His popularity was enhanced by a reputation for honesty and concern for the soldiers'

welfare. It led to an untimely retirement in the Senate at the

age of 42, ordained by an ever-cautious Haile Selassie.

With a score of relatives, friends and many former colleagues

now imprisoned, Endalkatchew's position had become untenable.

The Dergue farced his resignation on 22 July, because 'he could

not subscribe to the views and objectives' of the military and

had 'tried to create dissension among the armed forces'. He was

arrested a couple of days later along with several high military

officers. Mikael Imru, the Minister of Commerce and Industry,

was named Prime Minister. This choice was further indication of

the confusion on the part of the military, who considered it

necessary still to look for leadership among the ruling class. 33

The Dergue explained that Mikael Imru was chosen because he

was an honest man, highly educated, had wide experience and

was well-known at home and abroad. Indeed, Imru enjoyed the

33. It was widely reported that other former high officials had been offered the

post and declined to accept it.

108 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

reputation of a liberal aristocrat who was thoroughly disgruntled

with the imperial regime. With the exception of a brief stint

as Minister of Foreign Affairs following the 1960 attempted

coup, he had not served at home since 1959. Moreover, his

father, Ras Imru, Haile Selassie's cousin, was probably the only

genuinely popular Prince in Ethiopia. 34 The Dergue's statement

asserted that though born of the aristocracy, Mikael Imru's

social outlook put him closer to the people than to the ruling

class.

Social outlook was not enough, however, and this became

apparent almost immediately. In his statement of acceptance,

the new Prime Minister saw himself crossing from one form of

government to another, which, at least, was a step forward from

his predecessor's position. Yet, he seemed to have no ideas as

to how the crossing could be managed. 'Nothing that creates

chaos in this society will be attempted', he promised. On land

reform he envisaged a policy that 'will suit both tenants and

landlords'. He would make no recommendations concerning

provincial administration, until he had talked to the newly

appointed Minister of Interior. As for the rest of the cabinet,

Imru said he would keep most of Endalkatchew's team in order

not to change horses at midstream. 35

The renewed activity by the military heartened the progressive forces, but neither Imru's appointment, nor the publication

of a draft constitution impressed them in the least. 36 The

radical intelligentsia was now raising fundamental issues which

made such mild changes appear innocuous, if not irrelevant.

34. Among other things, the old Ras had long ago distributed his vast estates in

the southern region to his tenants.

35. Reported in Ethiopian Herald, 1 August 1974.

36. The draft preserved the monarchy, and reserved the throne for the Solomonic

dynasty, i.e. Haile Selassie's progeny, although it divested the crown of direct

political responsibility. That was to be shared by the familiar tripartite system

- exec~tive, legislative, judiciary - through an equally familiar division and

separati~n of powers. The executive, headed by the prime minister, was to be

responsible to the lower house of the legislature which in tum was to be

P?pularly elected. A nineteenth century type of upper 'house w~s to be ind1rectly elected b_y ~he ~abine~, regional assemblies and municipal councils.

Freedom ?f assoe1at10n, mcludmg political parties, as well as other civil rights

were provtded for. Pro~er!Y rights were safeguarded, although the government

was given power to set limits to property size.

THE SOLDIERS ' REVOLUTION 109

These issues were being formulated 1n a remarkably clear and

concise form, and were expressed through a regular underground press which rapidly gained widespread circulation and a

formidable influence within the revolutionary movement. A

mimeographed weekly called Democracia appeared in mid-July,

and maintained an uninterrupted publication schedule ever

since. Devoted to a sophisticated marxist analysis of the Ethiopian situation, Democracia provided a continuous, highly effective

critique of the movement's course, presented in the classic

revolutionary style of simply phrased, often repeated, pithy

statements. Its two-fold aim was to raise the class consciousness

of the groups participating in the revolutionary struggle, and to

guide the struggle itself towards its ultimate goal, that is, a

fundamental social revolution. The Voice of the Broad Masses,

another underground weekly with a broadly similar orientation,

but less consistent in its analysis and position, appeared the

following month. Through these news sheets and pamphlets, the

radical intelligentsia succeeded, among other things, in fashioning an entirely new vocabulary in Amharinya to accommodate

the semantic aspect of the class struggle. 37

The radicals objected to the retention of the crown in the

draft constitution, as well as to the frequent proclamations of

loyalty to the Emperor by the Dergue. Pointing out the enormous powers the monarch had held for more than half a century,

they asked: 'who is more responsible than he?' 38 Unhesitatingly

they called for his removal, declaring that 'the fish rots from the

head'. 39 The draft constitution was rejected on numerous

grounds, including the fact that the people had not been consulted in its preparation. Imru's appointment was denounced not

only as undemocratic, but as an indication also of the Dergue's

political naivete. 'The Dergue tries to make people believe that

its enemies are individuals, as if there are no classes in Ethiopia '

40

it was said. Removals and arrests of individuals are all to the good,

37. The language of the ruling group did not even have a word for 'rev.olution'.

One was coined now from the Geez verb 'to refuse', i.e. refuse to obey.

38. Democracia, No.2, 25 July 1974. .,

39. University Students Union of Addis Ababa, 'Statement on Socio-economic

Issues' addressed to the Dergue, 30 July 1974.

40. Democracia, No.4, 8 August 1974.

110 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

but they must not be confused with change. The question that

ought to be asked, according to Democracia, was how change is

to be achieved, for whom, and by whom? The military's motto

'Ethiopia First', was criticized as dangerously confusing, because

it did not distinguish between antagonistic classes. Given the

class divisions of Ethiopian society, and the ongoing struggle

between classes, it was necessary to ask which Ethiopia is to be

first? 'We say, the broad masses of Ethiopia first', declared

Democracia.

41 The broad masses were defined as 'those who

work in the factories for low wages, the tiller who gives up half

of his produce, soldiers who suffer to protect the country, kiosk

owners who labour all day to win their bread, merchants who

suffer unable to compete with foreign capital, teachers, the

lowest ranks of government service, women who become

prostitutes for lack of other employment, domestic servants,

coolies, pensioners, and the unemployed. '42

The destruction of the feudal regime and independence from

foreign capitalism and imperialism were defined as the prerequisites of fundamental change. It followed that change could

not be brought about by the same ruling classes whose power

the movement sought to demolish. Change would only come

through the class struggle. Hence, the Dergue's reliance on individuals from the ruling class was deemed politically absurd, as

was its unwillingness to acknowledge the class struggle. The

radicals were quite aware that the popular movement could be

deflected from its course, with a military dictatorship as the

result. They sought to prevent this by making the formation of

a provisional peoples' government the major political objective

of the movement. Nowhere in the world, they argued, was fundamental change brought about without the participation of the

broad masses. A movement in which the people are simply the

audience cannot be a popular movement. Change is not to be

given to the people from above as charity, in the manner of

Haile Selassie. It can come -only from the people's struggle.

The Dergue's political pretensions were challenged sharply

even before they were clearly manifested. From the outset, it

41. Ibid., No.2.

42. Ibid., No.2.

THE SOLDIERS' REVOLUTION 111

was suggested that it should include representatives of the

various groups in the popular movement. 43 Very soon however,

the demand became one for a people's provisional government

in which the. soldiers would be represented. A statement attributed to the Dergue claiming that the Ethiopian people were not

ready for democracy, was challenged by the assertion that the

revolution was carried out by the broad masses and the soldiers

had simply joined it. 'How can one who speaks on behalf of the

people be fearful of the people?' it was asked.44 As the political

intentions of the military became increasingly clear, the criticism became sharper. Initially founded on the principle _of unit

representation, the Dergue had allowed this practice to lapse,

and refused to renew its membership through elections by the

units. Therefore, the Dergue was denounced as being rep·resentative neither of the people nor of the armed forces: 45 Th~

underground press focused on the military's lack of ideology

and programme, and raised the spectre of opportunism. The

slogan of 'Ethiopia First' without a definite programme is

meaningless, declared the Voice of the Broad Masses. 46 · · · · ·

The soldiers of the Dergue seemed aware of these , shortcomings in this respect and anxious to overcome them. Having '·

decided to seize power, they needed to win support amongthe

active groups in the popular movement, particularly the radical

intelligentsia and students whose influence in the urban sector

had become politically crucial. The seizure of ·power had to be

justified in terms of a proposed programme of action consonant

with the basic aspirations of the movement. During the next

few months, the Dergue tried to tap all available sources · for

suggestions and advice; it even established a postal address for

mailed comments from the public. As it turried out, a~ong _its

leading members were several officers who had studied at the

University and were known to the teaching staff. They no'w.

appeared there to request staff· members• to produce_ :on· short

notice position papers on a variety of topics. lnclividual~, rn,any . . 1'.

43. University Students Union of Addis Ababa Statement, 30 July· 1914,. op.cit. 44. Democracia, No.3, 1 August 1974. · · ' ·

45. No.6, 22 August 1974.

46. No.2, 27 August 1974.

112 CLASS AND REVOLUTiON IN ETHIOPIA

of them radical intellectuals known personally to members of

the Dergue, functioned as an ad hoc advisory group later

dubbed the 'Politbureau'. The demands and proposals ~f the

many groups involved in the struggle provided another guide

for action. The radical publications offered a synthesis for a

wide variety of converging viewpoints within a clearly formulated ideological framework.

In fairly short order, the soldiers tried to make up for their

ideological confusion and lack of programme by adopting the

radical orientation propagated by the marxist intelligentsia,

terminology and vocabulary included, and by appropriating

most of the radical programmatic suggestions as well. The

initial accessibility of the emerging soldier rulers and their

receptivity to the radical mood of the movement, produced

initially a widespread illusion that they would indeed serve as

the cutting edge of a popular revolution. Despite Democracia's

warnings, even members of the radical intelligentsia came to

believe that they could steer the Dergue to play that· role, and

they willingly collaborated with it.

In August, the Dergue moved cautiously to satisfy the most

insistent popular demand, that is, the .dismantling of the imperial

regime. Apparently, they had decided by now to depose Haile

Selassie, but did not do so immediately. Instead, they prepared

the way by clipping the imperial wings - through the nationalization of palaces, abolition of the Crown Council, the Ministry

of the Imperial Court, the Emperor's Court (Chilot), his Special

Chief of Staff - and discrediting his person through the disclosure and nationalization of his vast financial empire. The

extent and variety of the latter astonished the less jaded among

the Ethiopians. I ts disclosure told the sordid story of insatiable

royal cupidity. In brief, Haile Selassie was ~ot only the major

public transporter in the capital through the Anbassa Bus

Company, he was also the country's first .beer baron through

the ownership of two major breweries and a large share in a

third one, as well as control of a wine factory. In the Haile

Selassie I Foundation he owned the only holding company in

Ethiopia, thinly disguised as a charitable institution, with shares

in dozens of enterprises ranging from hotels· to firearms production. The urban real estate holdings of himself and his. family ' . ' ,

..

;.

'

THE SOLDIERS' REVOLUTION 113

were countless, while their_ holdin~s. i~ land throughout t~e

empire were legion. Yet, with undun1n1shed greed, he and his

brood never ceased accumulati~g po~sessions _through metho~s

that were seldom above board. Haile Selassie, who never distinguished between his ow~ and the public treasury, regularly

used public funds to acqurre possessions that were classed . as

private imperial property. The most astounding revelation concerned the appropriation of the entire output from the country's·

sole gold mine, which he is said 1

to have deposited regularly · in

the bulging vaults of a Swiss bank. 48 · ·

In the wake of these revelations, the Dergue reached into the

palace to arrest the Emperor's private treasurer and the commander of the Bodyguard Division. Remaining true to character .

until the very end, the autocrat seemed willing to sacrifice even

the most loyal of his retainers in the hope of saving himselL rhe

end was preceded by the most devastating attack yet launched .·

on his person. It highlighted Haile Selassie's culpability in the

catastrophic famine, a disaster that had scarred the national

consciousness. During the week that preceded the deposition, .···

posters appeared in the capital which juxtaposed photographs

of horribly emaciated famine victims with others showing the ·

Emperor at his favourite pastime of feeding his dogs with choice .·

cuts of meat. At a subsequent demonstration in the capital, his

deposal and execution were demanded. The night before the

final act, J onatha~ Dimbleby's film on the famine was shown

on television, followed by filmed scenes of imperial extrava-. ·

gance, including sumptuous state dinners, imperial canine feasts,

and pictures of the imposing mausoleum Haile Selassie had built

for himself. The announcement of his deposition was broadcast

the following day, 12 September, the second ~ay qf the new

4 7. Haile Selassie even received regularly a share of the contraband go'ods confis-·

cated by the customs service. · . ·

48. The enormity of this allegation caused widespread irtcredulity: Indeed, the

produce from the gold mine never appeared in any government revenue ao- ·

counting, and the revenue of the Ministry of Mines riever came close to matching its expenditure. To support the charge, the Dergue showed 'on television ·

a letter from a Swiss bank manager, 'in which the Emperor was allegedly asked

to delay new shipments because the storage capacity ·or. the.bank's vaults had_ .

been exhausted. · ·

., .. .

I

114 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

year in the Ethiopian calendar. It briefly and accurately accused

the Emperor of having 'abused the authority, dignity and honour

of his office for personal benefit and interest'. The same evening,

a delegation of Dergue members read the decision to Haile

Selassie himself at his palace. Even on this climactic occasion,

the autocrat did not rise above the stereotype, but responded

having recourse to the stock phrase: 'We have always done what

is good for Ethiopia. If this is for the good of the nation, so be

it.' He became agitated only when he was asked to leave his

palace, but finally consented to be taken to a place of comfortable detention where he ended his days.

The people's reaction to the autocrat's demise was remarably muted.49 A ban on demonstrations prevented any sort

of public manifestation. Almost immediately, the public consciousness relegated Haile Selassie to the past. Public concern

focused on the dramatic events that followed. Having gained its

initial objective, the popular movement now faced its first defeat

and the prospect of a military dictatorship. The soldiers now

showed no hesitation in claiming power and no qualms about

suppressing rival claims. The Dergue was renamed the Provisional

Military Administrative Council and assumed the role of head of

state. so General Aman became its Chairman, as well as the

Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Defence. 51

The constitution was suspended and parliament dissolved. 52

The new government· issued a list of its objectives, and proscribed opposition to what it called "the philosophy of 'Ethiopia

irst' ". No offer was extended to other groups in the popular

49. The editors of the government press now crowned a career of sycophancy by

applauding Haile Selassie's fall. 'He is now where he should have been long

ago', opinioned the editor of the Ethiopian Herald (13 September 1974). The

same person made a rash pledge to reflect public opinion in his editorial

column m the future. However, he and his colleagues were spared this unfamiliar task by the immediate reimposition of censorship which was, if anything, more stifling than before.

50. This was assumed to be a provisional arrangement until the return of the

Crown Prince to Ethiopia.

51. He was also initially Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Major General Gizaw

Belayneh, one of the handful of senior officers to survive the purge, was

named Chief of Staff at the end of September.

52. An evening curfew was imposed at this time. Set at varied time limits, it was to

become a permanent feature of life under the military regime.

THE SOLDIERS' REVOLUTION 115

movement to participate in the government.

These groups felt keenly what they regarded as the betrayal of

the popular revolution. Their earlier suspicions of military

intentions were now confirmed, and their fear of a stagnant

dictatorship that could pave the way for a resurgence of reaction

mounted. The underground press attacked the pretensions of

the Dergue to be both representative and leader of the mass

movement. The revolution was not a struggle between the

Dergue and Haile Selassie, wrote Democracia, but a struggle

between antagonistic social classes. 53 The Dergue had not

created the popular movement. It simply climbed on top of it

and made statements. The professed desire to retain the monarchy, the declaration of respect for all international treaties, the

promise that foreign capital would never be nationalized, all

these confirmed the impression of political disorientation

within the Dergue. The radical intelligentsia redoubled its

efforts to expose the vacuum at the top.

It fell to the organization of the working class to test the

determination of the military regime. The annual congress of

CEL U was held on 15-1 7 September. It resolved to demand the

removal of the military government, and urged its replacement

by a popular government composed of representatives of

workers, peasants, teachers, students, government employees,

traders, soldiers and women. It also demanded the recognition

of fundamental civil rights. The Dergue responded with its own

demand that CELU retract its resolutions, and when this was

rejected, it attacked publicly the leadership of the labour movement as counter-revolutionaries and imperialist agents. Carried

out through the ever obliging government media, the attack

cited earlier criticism of CELU's leadership by the radicals.

However, the latter now decried the interference in labour's

affairs, and strongly endorsed the demand for a popular government. On I 8 September, the university students braved a

military show of force designed to intimidate them, and demonstrated their solidarity with the workers. The government then

attacked the students as 'immature sons of the feudal classes',

and declared its determination to crush them. The top leaders

53. No. 15, 12 November 1974.

116 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

of CELU were arrested on 23 September for attempting 'to

disrupt peaceful change in Ethiopia'. Inspired by the success

of the February general strike, CELU's executive called for

another one on short notice, two days later. There was hardly

enough time to communicate the call to the branches, let alone

to convince them of its merits, or to co-ordinate their activities.

The government took advantage of the media to compound the

confusion among the workers, and to intimidate the less determined. As a result, the strike proved a dismal failure and a

serious blow to the morale of the popular movement. ·

The challenge from CELU was not the only one faced by the

Dergue in its first weeks of power. Radical elements within the

military itself attacked it, demanding the recall and re-election

of its members, and threatening action unless their demands

were met. Among these demands was the call for a peoples'

government. The Dergue resorted to arresting dissidents, even

from among its own membership, and took steps to neutralize

hostile units. In one such confrontation with the Army Engineers

in Addis Ababa, on 7 October, a number of soldiers were

killed. 54 To the widespread clamour for popular participation

in government, the military regime turned a deaf ear. 'Democracy is not the immediate need of the Ethiopian people', it was

explained. 55 The enemies of progress must be destroyed before

a popular government could come into existence. Among the

enemies of progress the regime was now beginning to include

the radical intelligentsia, whom it accused of wanting to divide

the nation and bring about bloodshed. 'Change without bloodshed', was at the time one of the regime's mottoes. A number

of well-known radicals, including the Dean of Arts at the University, were arrested and joined their class enemies ip detention.

In a conciliatory gesture, the government established a civilian

advisory council to study political, social and economic reforms . ' and to draft a new constitution. It was composed of 50 elected

representatives distributed among the provinces, government

agencies, CELU, Teachers Association and other groups. Widely

54. This unit_ had distributed a pamphlet challenging the Dergue, and denouncing

the appointment of General Gizaw Belayneh as the new Chief of Staff. Entitled 'Who to Hide it from?' (undated).

55. Ethiopian Herald, 22 September 1974 .

....

THE SOLDIERS' REVOLUTION 117

advertised as a reassuring indication that the military intended

to share power, it was received with a notable lack of enthusiasm

by the public. Its first meeting had to be postponed repeatedly

because many of the groups did not bother to elect representatives, some had to be coerced to do so, and the University

Teachers Association never did.

The nationalist rebellion in Eritrea provoked the second

major crisis for Ethiopia's military rulers. Apparently convinced

that the revolution they had wrought in Ethiopia would somehow appease secessionist sentiment in that province and pave

the way for reconciliation, the Dergue launched a campaign to

wean the population away from the two liberation movements,

ELF and EPLP. They in tum made it clear from the outset that

only complete and unconditional independence would satisfy

them. The first steps had been taken earlier in 1974. In midJuly, the commanding general and the top administrators in

Eritrea had been arrested, and the following month, a government functionary of Eritrean origin was named provincial

governor. At the end of August, General Aman made his first tour

of the province. An Eritrean himself, who also spoke Arabic,

Aman was the proper person to make this overture. In a tour

lasting 10 days, he visited various parts of the rebellious province

addressing mass rallies. Speaking in Tigrinya and Arabic, he

acknowledged the wrongs of the past, explained the nature and

aims of the revolution, promised a new relationship without

making any specific commitments, and appeared to evoke some

response in his audiences. When he returned to the capital, a

week before Haile Selassie's deposal, he made a number of recommendations for reforms in Eritrea, including the lifting of

the state of emergency, amnesty for political prisoners and

exiles, and administrative and judicial reform. During the

second week of October, Aman returned to Asmara, now as the

head of government. Addressing a mass rally, he regretted that

the people seemed not to have understood the changes that had

taken place in Ethiopia. Emphasizing that the oppressors of the

Eritrean people had been overthrown, he asked: 'who then is

the enemy of Eritrea now?'56 The following week, Mikael

56. Ibid. , 11 October 1974.

,_ ..... ...,.. . -----~-

118 CLASS AND REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA

Imru began a diplomatic offensive in the neighbouring Arab

states and Somalia to win support for the Dergue's overture to

the Eritreans.

However, the Dergue obviously was unable and/or unwilling

to consider the demand for independence posed by the liber•

ation movements, and the latter would not deign to negotiate

on any other basis. The diplomatic mission headed by Mikael

Imru, now a political advisor to the military government, re•

turned empty-handed, and the deadlock was once again sealed.

The weakness of General Aman's position was by now quite

evident. He, himself, was reduced to threats during his second

visit to the province. 'We have formidable force. We have

shunned from using it so far', he warned. 'The Eritrean people

should know in advance the consequences and possible damage

to the people if this force is used. '

57 He reportedly favoured

continued efforts to seek a compromise that would end the

conflict peacefully, and refused to sign an order transferring

the Bodyguard Division to Eritrea. However, the leading elements

in the Dergue, convinced that compromise was impossible,

determined to seek a military solution. Aman's usefulness was

thus greatly diminished, and other points of friction contributed

to the final break.

Though an embittered critic of the old regime, Aman's

political orientation was hardly radical, and he could not have

felt comfortable with the reigning mood of the movement. 58 A

proud, self-willed man, very conscious of his reputation in the

country and army, he was the wrong choice for the role of the

front man which the leaders of the Dergue seemed to have had

in mind for him. Such was his self-esteem, that he did not

bother to establish a personal base of power within the army

during those months, considering it impossible that he could be

challenged by a group of junior officers. Indeed, he felt uncomfortable surrounded by men of a younger generation, none

of whom held rank higher than Major, and proposed that

51. Ibid.

58. On 20 September he told journalists that the military government would never

n~tio~alize for~ign investment. He concluded his speeches a la Haile Selassie

with let God give us strength to fulfil our aims'.

.........

yJ,IE SOLDIERS' REVOLUTION 119

the Dergue be reduced in size and changed in composition

through the inclusion of senior officers and civilian experts. He

vehemently rejected the frequent proposals calling for the

summary execution of former officials, and insisted on a courtmartial by a bench of his own appointees. When the Dergue

countermanded appointments he made in his capacity as Minister

of Defence, Aman refused to attend meetings and withdrew to

his home. What followed has not been fully revealed. On 23

November, Aman died in a gunfight at his home with soldiers

who had been sent to arrest him. In a grisly sequel that night,

59 prisoners were massacred and their bodies disposed of

secretly, without the knowledge of their families. They included

two members of the Dergue, one of whom was reportedly with

Aman when he died. Three other officers and a soldier were

identified as radical critics of the Dergue. -The rest comprised

former high officials, including the two former Prime Ministers,

Aklilu Habte Wold and Endalkatchew Makonnen, high aristocrats and mil_itary officers. 59

The wanton manner of the executions and the inclusion of

military radicals in the massacre shocked many Ethiopians.- The

underground press which had been calling for the trial of

former officials, condemned the act as a fascist deed, and from

then onwards fastened that label on Ethiopia's military rulers.

The executions marked a new stage in the revolution, and a

crossing point for the Dergue. The revolution is no longer bloodless, and ruthlessness increasingly marks its course from now

on. The Dergue can no longer be expected to give way to pressure for a popular government, nor to seek a compromise solution to the Eritrean crisis. Concerning the former, the regime

marshalled a number of arguments to challenge the validity and

propriety of a democratic form of government for Ethiopia at

this time. It was argued that the majority of Ethiopians being

59. The massacre has been alternatively attributed to panic within the Dergue

caused by the belief that they were about to be ·overthrown, and to a desire

to dilute the impact of Aman's death by giving him plenty of company. The

choice of victims was reportedly made by voting among Dergue members who

were present, and general antipathy towards them seems tQ• have been the

common denominator among the executed, rather than any assessment of

relative guilt in the crimes of the ancien regime.

HI••